关于内部审计若干概念问题的探讨

随着内部审计的发展,其职能也随之扩展和延伸,本文综合分析了理论界对内部审计职能的认识和观点。在此基础上提出“管理绩效审计”这一概念。论证了“管理绩效审计”存在可能及其必要性。指出“管理绩效审计”涵盖了内部审计职能的各个方面,是内部审计的发展方向。     

横向互补型企业网络形成动因的博弈分析

企业网络是一种新型组织结构形式和制度安排。本文首先分析了企业网络的形成动因,然后运用博弈论建立模型论证了横向互补型企业网络得以形成的动因在于网络成员自身的利益最大化。     

人力资本与企业绩效关系的实证分析

国内外对企业绩效的实证研究主要是研究财务指标与企业绩效的关系,缺少对非财务指标的实证研究特别是人力资本与企业绩效关系的实证研究。本文选取反映人力资本的指标和反映企业绩效的指标,随机选取上市公司的数据进行多元回归分析,结果发现,员工高学历比例和员工专门技术人员比例,与企业绩效存在显著关系。笔者建议,要明确企业绩效与人力资本的关系,重视人力资本的作用,同时要结合行业特点和竞争程度综合考虑企业绩效。     

基于BSC的服务创新成长绩效评估

服务经济时代的全面来临,促使我们以一种全新的视角来关注和审视现代企业的服务创新.服务创新是企业实现跨越式发展的重要途径,服务创新的根本目的在于实现企业的可持续成长.通过引入BSC(平衡记分卡)测评工具,可建立起一个涵盖财务、客户、内部流程与组织学习等方面的服务创新成长绩效的综合评估框架和模型,该评估模型能够分析滞后型结果指标与领先型驱动指标之间的因果关系,从而为改进服务创新绩效指明控制关键.     

银行业的集中、竞争与绩效

各国金融资产配置方式不同 ,银行业的产业组织结构也存在鲜明的差异。与传统的产业组织理论的逻辑推论及其倡导的理想境界可能完全相反 ,由大规模银行组成的相对集中的产业组织结构并不一定导致竞争程度的下降。中国银行业偏高的集中率并不是影响行业竞争程度的原因 ,事实表明 ,中国各银行之间在存贷业务及其他业务上并不缺乏竞争。主要问题在于现有的国有银行经营机制不灵活、效率过低。即使中国银行业大幅度提高了商业化程度 ,银行业的产业组织结构也不宜于过度分散 ,保持相对集中的行业结构 ,可能更有利于提高金融资产的配置效率。     

企业理论之新解释:一个基于知识管理的模型

企业理论研究往往关注三个基本问题:"企业为什么存在、企业和市场的边界是什么";"为什么企业会有所不同,是什么原因导致了这种不同";以及这些理论如何被应用于企业以获得持久的竞争优势.本文力图在这三个方面作出理论探索:一是从知识管理的角度回答企业理论的几个基本问题;二是建立一个基于知识传输的模型,并基于这个模型提出了四个可以检验的命题;三是讨论该模型对战略管理实践的启示.     

企业多元化:理论与实践的反思

多元化是目前许多企业热衷的战略选择 ,成为企业心目中的“伊甸园”。本文作者从多元化发展的理论与实践及其历程入手进行分析 ,认为不论从多元化与企业分散风险、扩张规模、增加绩效之间的联系 ,还是从发达国家多元化的实践来看 ,多元化并没有达到人们预想的效果 ,而正确的选择是坚持走专业化的道路。     

企业社会绩效评价的利益相关者模式

国内企业综合评价还停留在财务综合评价阶段，所以在评价的内容上编重于企业的经营绩效而忽视了企业社会绩效的评价。而20世纪70年代以来西方学者在利益相关者理论的基础上提出了多种评价企业社会绩效的利益相关者模式，试图更确切地评价企业的社会绩效。本文将总结借鉴国外较有代表性的两种企业社会绩效评价模式，并试图在此基础上探讨适合我国国情的企业社会绩效评价模式。     

Problems evaluating sales representative performance?: Try activity-based costing

Activity-based costing (ABC) offers a way to improve performance evaluation by providing estimates of the cost of satisfying sales terms to which a sales representative may agree, such as number of batches in which an order is produced and number of training hours provided to customer employees. It also provides estimates of the cost of resources that a sales representative may use while engaging in marketing activities, such as making sales calls and attending trade shows. Traditional costing, which assumes that costs only vary at the unit level, does not provide estimates of the costs of many of these terms and activities.     

Testing the conflict-performance assumption in business-to-business relationships

There is little empirical research published testing the interdependency between conflict in business-to-business relationships and commercial performance. The “conflict-performance assumption”—all other factors being equal, relationships where conflict is low will outperform relationships where conflict levels are higher—remains central in the marketing channels' literature despite insufficient and contradictory empirical evidence. There are several explanations for the lack of a clear relationship between conflict and performance. Rosenbloom [J. Mark. 37 (1973) 26] theorises that the relationship between conflict and channel performance follows an inverted U-shaped curve, where conflict is most productive at moderate levels and least productive at very low or high levels. Others have argued for a simpler, linear relationship between conflict and performance, usually negative in nature. Various theories about the conflict-performance relationship are empirically tested in a large marketing channel, using a number of dyadic and monadic measures of conflict (latent, perceived, and affective) and two objective measures of performance (effectiveness and efficiency). A linear model (performance declining as conflict increases) is adequate to explain the relationship between dyadic measures of both perceived and affective conflict and channel effectiveness. A threshold model is found to be superior to a linear model in explaining the relationship between dyadic measures of perceived and affective conflict and efficiency. Conflict increases slowly as efficiency falls until a threshold is reached when conflict escalates. Practical implications include that companies need to consider whether performance criteria affecting efficiency are as important to their business partners as those affecting effectiveness. If they are not, then business partners should be rewarded for meeting any such criteria that are more important to the one side of a relationship dyad than to the other.