Harmful signaling in matching markets

Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms. We show that such mechanisms are harmful for some environments. While signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same “typical” known preferences with probability close to one or “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have known preferences over workers. We show that under some technical condition if at least three firms are responsive to some workerʼs signal, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of matches.     

Counting combinatorial choice rules

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso–Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents—which has positive implications for the Gale–Shapley algorithm of matching theory.     

Incompatible theoretical bases underlying accounting standards

The paper presents evidence that demonstrates that U.K. and International Accounting Standards require entries in income statements that are sometimes based on a matching approach and sometimes on a valuation approach. It indicates that the two approaches are fundamentally different and that they produce different net income figures that have different meanings. In these circumstances, the imposition of the standards currently required results in figures of net income that have no defined meaning and are therefore potentially confusing. Consequently, one can argue that the regulators have been misguided in failing adequately to differentiate between the two approaches. Each income statement published should be based on a clearly identified model and be interpretable by reference to known assumptions.     

中国信贷市场匹配机制的再设计

我国的银行信贷市场呈现二元结构--目标客户与非目标客户信贷市场.两者有着不同的运行机制.目标客户信贷市场的议价过程存在一个类似企业"求婚"的递延接受程序,市场的运行结果稳定.非目标客户信贷市场不存在导致稳定结果的分散化匹配程序,市场广度和深度不够.为提高非目标客户信贷市场的稳定性和运行效率,我们建议通过公布银行信贷方案、设立非目标客户信贷中心、设立中央化的匹配清算所等,把分散化的议价过程变成中央化的匹配程序,从而完善和降低中小企业的交易成本,为中小企业的发展拓展广阔空间.     

能力柔性与知识管理战略匹配对竞争优势的影响

能力柔性与知识管理战略相互影响形成匹配，对企业战略选择而言，匹配模式及其对竞争优势的影响至关重要。基于匹配及战略管理理论，构建知识管理战略与能力柔性匹配模式，运用独立样本T检验探究匹配对竞争优势的影响。研究发现，能力柔性与知识管理战略存在两种一致性匹配模式，即高能力柔性与积极知识管理战略匹配、低能力柔性与保守知识管理战略匹配。匹配对竞争优势产生积极影响，即高能力柔性与积极知识管理战略匹配能够增强企业灵活性、提升顾客优势、增强创新优势，而低能力柔性与保守知识管理战略匹配更有利于提升顾客优势及创新优势。     

The relationship between supervisor and workers — The case of professional baseball in Japan

This paper analyzes the relationship between the workers' productivity and the supervisor from the point of view of the Matching Hypothesis using data from professional baseball in Japan. The main findings of this paper are the following three points. The first point is that the Matching Hypothesis is rejected in the case of pitchers and hitters. The second one is that the depreciation rate of the effect is about 10–15% per year and differs from zero significantly. Hence, the effect continues for a long time after the matching is broken. Lastly, we cannot find a learning curve for the managers' ability.     

On the evolution of comparative advantage in matching models

This paper examines whether comparative advantage is the long-run outcome of an evolutionary process in the open economy. It formalizes the notion that natural selection eliminates inefficient firms and thus leads to stable and perhaps efficient patterns of world trade. Instead of assuming the existence of a Walrasian auctioneer, we study two simple matching processes that coordinate trade between firms. Our central result is that specialization according to comparative advantage, with the larger country possibly incompletely specialized, is the unique evolutionarily stable state of the world economy.     

项目申请者“头衔”更有利于科研绩效提升吗——一个面向国家社科基金教育学项目产出的倒序评估

如何预判项目申请者的科研绩效是科研资助中的焦点问题。不同于传统做法，以已结题的国家社科基金教育学项目产出为既定绩效，利用倾向得分匹配方法，倒序评估项目申请者既有“头衔”对产出绩效的因果效应，结果发现：项目申请者“头衔”显著提升了科研绩效，较行政职务头衔，学术荣誉头衔带来的科研绩效提升更显著。但并非所有类型头衔都显著作用于科研绩效，确切地讲，教育部新世纪人才、国务院特殊津贴专家、校长、院长、研究所所长及副所长等头衔更有利于科研绩效提升。对此，基金主管部门可通过适当增加对有“头衔”者的资助，构建以成果为导向的资助方式，倡导以结项为依据的评价体系，开放以质量为核心的结题通道等途径改善科研项目绩效。     

Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms best reply by acting truthfully, every equilibrium outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game.     

Does population density matter in the process of matching heterogeneous job seekers and vacancies?

This paper studies the matching of job seekers and vacant jobs using data on local labour markets. We estimate differences in the ability of the local markets to form new matches and trace whether these differences can be explained by the differing population densities across markets or by the heterogeneity of job seekers measured by the distribution of their education level. We find that high-density areas are more efficient in forming matches than other areas despite frictions caused by the wider heterogeneity of job seekers in those areas than elsewhere.