FDI与湖南产业结构关系的实证研究

对湖南的产业结构和三次产业利用FDI的现状进行了分析,利用1983～2006年的统计数据,运用协整分析技术、误差修正模型和Cranger因果关系检验,对FDI与产业结构变动之间的关系进行了实证研究.结果表明,FDI与产业结构变动之间存在正向的协整关系,FDI是产业结构变动的重要原因;在短期FDI偏离了产业结构的长期均衡水平,但短期波动对长期均衡的回调速度较快.进而,就模型得出的结论提出了若干建议.     

基于终极产权论的股权结构与公司绩效研究

文章依据终极产权理论,对我国制造业上市公司股权进行重新划分,分为国有终极控制权和非国有终极控制权.采用面板数据方法,在控制样本选择偏差和股权内生变量的前提下研究股权结构对公司绩效的影响.实证结果表明,终极控制权比例与国有控股公司绩效CFOA、M/B呈显著的倒U性关系,而与传统绩效指标ROE、ROA无显著关系,在非国有终极控股公司中则不存在上述关系.流通A股比例与公司绩效关系不确定.样本选择偏差、机构投资者和外资股对公司绩效也有不同的影响.     

跨国经营企业公司治理结构评价及实证研究

一个企业若要在激烈的国际竞争中立于不败之地,完善的公司治理结构是不可或缺的。文章运用层次分析法和模糊综合评价法构建了跨国经营企业公司治理模式评价体系,并进行实证研究。解决因跨国经营所面临的复杂环境而带来的公司治理问题,已经成为管理学界和企业界普遍关注的焦点。     

Entry into Banking Markets and the Early-Mover Advantage

Using a sample for 1972–2002 with over 10,000 bank entries into local markets, we find a market share advantage for early entrants. In particular, the earlier a bank enters, the larger is its market share relative to other banks, controlling for firm, market, and time effects, with a market share advantage for early movers between 1 and 15 percentage points, depending on the order of entry. The strongest early-mover advantage is for banks that were in our sample in 1972 and survive into the 1990s. Moreover, early entrants appear to have such hold in the market by strategically investing in larger branch networks. Even controlling for the potential survivorship bias, we find that a bank's share decreases by 0.1 percentage points for a change in its order of entry from n th to ( n + 1)th. High growth markets show a smaller difference between late and early movers, consistent with a larger fraction of consumers yet to be locked in with a bank in these markets.     

中国工业结构有序变动的劳动生产率因素研究——基于劳动生产力增长率和GM(1,3)模型的分析

灰色模型CM(1,3)很好体现了资本使用量和劳动投入量对下期工业产出值增加率的影响。通过对2003-2005年劳动生产力和灰色模型分析可以看出,中国能源类工业部门产出的增加更多依赖于劳动力的投入;化纤和石油等工业生产率提高呈现出较高趋势,其劳动力对产出值增加的影响度在下降。     

Entrepreneurial Structure Qualitative Analysis: The Case of Seville (Spain)

In the field of territorial economic growth, it is possible to identify important characteristics in the entrepreneurial structure, such as the structure of the size of firms, main activity sectors, or the degree of innovation. However, other lesser known characteristics are important also, such as functional dependency, which considers the relationship between small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and suppliers and clients belonging to any territorial field or productive dependency, which considers the level of concentration in terms of buying and selling in connection with the main suppliers and clients, respectively. In order to empirically contrast the importance of these entrepreneurial characteristics and try to relate them with territorial economic growth, a sample of 400 enterprises in the province of Seville (Spain) is used.      

经理人行为与资本结构评述

行为公司金融已成为金融学中的研究热点。现代行为公司金融理论认为，由经理人与股东的利益不一致所导致的经理人非理性行为对资本结构产生显著影响。当前，为约束经理人的行为，股东普遍对经理人实行激励机制。把握其内在联系，对推动与拓宽这一领域的发展有积极意义。     

论我国金融监管机构自体问责制度的完善

金融监管机构的自体问责是问责制度的重要组成部分,与外部的异体问责成互补关系。金融监管机构的自体问责若采用最高监管权力层内部各部门间互为问责的形式,可以克服“问责人与责任人合为一体”的缺陷,而这必须以良好的内部治理结构为基础。本文分析了十多个国家的金融监管机构的治理结构与自体问责制度,并据此对我国金融监管机构自体问责的完善提出建议。     

Limit theorems for multivariate discrete distributions

According to the usual law of small numbers a multivariate Poisson distribution is derived by defining an appropriate model for multivariate Binomial distributions and examining their behaviour for large numbers of trials and small probabilities of marginal and simultaneous successes. The weak limit law is a generalization of Poisson's distribution to larger finite dimensions with arbitrary dependence structure. Compounding this multivariate Poisson distribution by a Gamma distribution results in a multivariate Pascal distribution which is again asymptotically multivariate Poisson. These Pascal distributions contain a class of multivariate geometric distributions. Finally the bivariate Binomial distribution is shown to be the limit law of appropriate bivariate hypergeometric distributions. Proving the limit theorems mentioned here as well as understanding the corresponding limit distributions becomes feasible by using probability generating functions.     

Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites

In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.