组织视角下的企业员工情绪管理

员工情绪管理是现代企业管理中新的课题。文章从组织的角度出发,将员工情绪分为个体情绪、组织情绪、企业情绪三个层次,对相关概念进行了界定。研究了激励理论与员工情绪管理的关系。将相关理论应用到实践当中,论述进行员工情绪管理应当遵循匹配和疏导的原则,并从引导员工树立正确的情绪管理、采取多种激励手段与员工积极进行沟通、丰富企业文化内涵等方面提出了具体对策。     

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

We extend the classical results on the Walras–core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy; that is, an economy where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our new modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy necessitates new equilibrium notions, which are always efficient and incentive compatible.     

Optimal insurance under rank‐dependent utility and incentive compatibility

Bernard, He, Yan, and Zhou (Mathematical Finance, 25(1), 154–186) studied an optimal insurance design problem where an individual's preference is of the rank‐dependent utility (RDU) type, and show that in general an optimal contract covers both large and small losses. However, their results suffer from the unrealistic assumption that the random loss has no atom, as well as a problem of moral hazard that provides incentives for the insured to falsely report the actual loss. This paper addresses these setbacks by removing the nonatomic assumption, and by exogenously imposing the “incentive compatibility” constraint that both indemnity function and insured's retention function are increasing with respect to the loss. We characterize the optimal solutions via calculus of variations, and then apply the result to obtain explicitly expressed contracts for problems with Yaari's dual criterion and general RDU. Finally, we use numerical examples to compare the results between ours and Bernard et al.     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

基于声誉效应的工程监理激励机制模型研究

为了提高工程监理工作积极性,基于Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,引入声誉效应,建立声誉效应和显性激励机制相结合的动态委托代理激励模型。分析声誉效应发挥激励机制作用条件,并与未考虑声誉效应的委托代理模型进行比较。结果表明:声誉效应在满足一定的条件下,引入声誉激励机制能够增加业主的期望收益,并且能提高监理的努力水平。最后,通过数值仿真模拟验证引入声誉效应的合理性。     

商业银行管理层激励机制研究——基于董事会多重目标的视角

由于管理层激励与银行价值相关性较弱,其有效性问题一直困扰着公司治理学者。研究商业银行管理层激励机制设计得出,银行有效管理层激励机制应该是：将董事会所有的目标都作为管理层激励合约的考核指标,并且各个目标产出对管理层收入的影响系数保持相同。除了反映公司价值目标的股票、期权等激励以外,银行管理层的收入还必须包括相当比例的反映资产风险等目标的激励部分。由于商业银行的特殊性,其最优管理层激励约束机制的目标影响系数设定应该较普通企业更低。因此,委托代理问题更严重,董事会直接监督的责任更大。     

美日经营者激励约束机制比较研究

以美国和日本为代表的两种公司治理模式在经营者激励约束机制方面既存在明显的不同之处,如激励约束主体不同、激励约束机制发挥作用的侧重点不同、激励约束方式不同,又存在许多相通之处,如激励和约束主体既有动力、又有能力,经营者的选择都经历了充分的内部竞争或市场竞争,信息传导机制通畅,经营者有充分经营自主权和稳定的预期,经营者的选任权限于企业系统内部等,这种不同而又相通的特性,对完善我国国有企业经营者激励约束机制具有诸多启示。     

构建长期激励性经营者年薪制的结构分析

经营者年薪制是西方企业普遍采用的薪酬激励制度,也是我国企业经营者薪酬制度改革的方向。设计长期激励性经营者年薪制是构建企业长期激励机制的基础,而年薪制结构是年薪制激励效果的基础。     

人事管理经济学:一个述评

近10来年兴起的人事管理经济学是经济学原理运用于工商管理的一个典范。探讨人事管理经济学的产生、发展、主要理论成果是今后继续深入研究的课题,并简要评析了人事管理经济学的学术价值与应用价值。     

基金会制度与独立董事制度的完善

呼吁引进一个新的制度,即基金会制度,并且从我国实际出发,研究分析了基金会制度在解决独立董事制度中的难题作用。从基金会制度在独立董事的选任和激励约束制度中的作用来看,基金会应是一个独立的非营利性法人机构,将其融入独立董事制度中,能使许多问题迎刃而解。