上市公司股权结构与财务报告舞弊关系分析

经理人员对上市公司的内部控制已不能完全解释上市公司的财务报告舞弊问题，大股东控制了上市公司，通过对上市公司的利益侵占获取私人收益，财务报告舞弊是隐瞒大股东行为的手段。本文以截至到2005年受到证监会处罚的上市公司为样本，分析了股权结构与财务报告舞弊的相关性，从股权制衡与培育大股东诚信义务方面提出了治理大股东行为的建议。     

我国上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效的理论与实证研究

本文以净资产收益率、主营业务资产收益率及市净率为被解释变量,股权集中度为被解释变量,并使用公司总资产的自然对数代表公司规模、财务杠杆、净利润增长率作为控制变量,从公司治理角度分析股权结构对公司绩效的影响。从农林牧渔业、采掘业、制造业等11个行业中挑选了923家上市公司为样本,分别对样本总体和各行业的数据进行了回归分析。此研究的政策意义在于现阶段上市公司治理结构的改革不应盲目模仿英美模式无视中国的国情,过于强调股权分散。认为只有保持股权的适度集中才有助于我国上市公司的长远发展和整体绩效的提高。     

代理成本视角下的股权结构与现金股利波动

选取中国2001-2004年连续发放现金股利的196家上市公司为研究样本,利用四个股利调整模型（PAM模型、FAM模型、Waud模型和ETM模型）和固定效应面板数据对样本公司的股利波动进行了分析,结果发现,每股收益及其变动是引起每股现金股利变动的关键因素。同时还发现,股利波动与公司股权结构相关,第一大股东持股比例越高,股利波动越大;第二大股东持股比例越高,股利越稳定。     

我国景区经营权转让的研究综述

我国景区经营权的转让是近年来旅游学界研究的热点问题之一。在回顾国内研究进展的基础上，对我国景区经营权转让研究的主要内容作了霞点而详尽的介绍．并就我国目前研究中存在的问题提出了一些看法。     

The formation and early development of German audit firms

This paper examines the emergence of audit firms in Germany through an analysis of contemporary sources. Special attention is paid to the range of services offered, their legal forms and ownership structure. In Germany, the demand for external audits developed because the corporate supervisory boards had been unable to fulfil their monitoring task satisfactorily. As a consequence of the major economic crisis of 1929-1931 and the collapse of large corporations caused by the fraudulent actions of managing directors, statutory audits for stock corporations were introduced in 1931. The first German audit and trust company, the Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, was established much earlier in 1890. Like other trust companies which emerged from 1905 onwards, it was owned by large banks. After the First World War, large commercial groups on the one hand, and the state on the other hand, started to form their own audit firms. Most of the audit and trust companies used the legal form of a corporation. Originally, the main activities of the trust companies were trustee activities and audits. Subsequently, they also offered tax and business advisory services. These features (a broad range of services offered, the corporation as the dominant legal form, and clients who are also owners) help us to understand key characteristics of modern German audit firms such as their limited liability to third parties.     

Seasoned Equity Issues in a Closely Held Market: Evidence from France

This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France.Even though a rights offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly usingthe relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the announcementof seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and insignificantly negative forpublic offerings. Our results suggest that the adverse selection effect is greater for rights issues thanfor public offerings, due to stronger underwriter certification for the public offerings. We find that theshare price effect is positively related to blockholders take-up renouncements for firms with priorconcentrated ownership. For these firms, the favourable ownership dispersion effect offsets the adverse selection effect.     

论市场所有权

本文作者首次在国内外提出了市场所有权理论，作者认为，过去我们对企业微观产权（包括有形产权和无形产权）研究较多，而忽视了对这些微观产权赖以存在的基础和实现条件－－市场产权的研究。实际上，市场本身也有一个产权界定及其制度安排问题，本文在界定产权概念的内涵，本质与功能的基础上，认为市场产权由狭义市场所有权，市场使用权（经营权），市场占有权和市场收益权等四个要素构成，认为市场产权具有五个方面的基本特征；市场所有权的稀缺性，市场所有权的准资本属性；市场所有权的排他性；市场经营权的可转让性；市场所有权收益的可计量性等，市场产权具有三种基本形式；市场国家所有制；市场区域共享制；市场全球共享制等，虽然市场市场产权天生具有国家排他性，归一国政府所有，但市场经营可以转让，各种贸易战的实质是争夺市场经营权，控制权和收益权，区域经济一体化和经济全球化是市场经营经营权的有限互换和交叉分享。     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据

本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。     

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.