马克思如何实现对黑格尔辩证法的改造

马克思是如何实现对黑格尔辩证法的唯物主义改造的呢?马克思反复强调,黑格尔哲学是一种“头足倒置”的哲学,通过推敲黑格尔和马克思的辩证法思想,本文认为马克思实现对黑格尔辩证法的改造,至少经过了三个倒置:倒置了黑格尔辩证法辩证发展的主体;倒置了黑格尔辩证法辩证发展的中介;倒置了黑格尔辩证法辩证发展的理论结构。     

房地产业中政府与开发商的博弈分析

房地产业中政府与房地产开发商之间的关系既是行业主体关注的重点,也是国家如何加快房地产业发展步伐的核心问题。近年来,国内外专家研究房地产行业开发商与政府的行为的很多,但大多仅停留在对现象的描述,不够全面。本文以博弈论及信息经济学理论为依据,分析了房地产业开发商与政府的利益博弈,建立了存在政府监管情况下开发商行为选择的“监管博弈”模型,并且求解出纳什均衡解。在此基础上,给出了应对房地产市场各种情况的治理对策,以实现加快城市建设步伐、保证社会经济的协调、健康和长远发展。     

On Sraffa's Standard commodity: is its price invariant with respect to changes in income distribution?

In his 1960 book, Sraffa suggested using a composite commodity,which he called the ‘Standard commodity’, to solveRicardo's search for an invariable measure of value, i.e., astandard capable of isolating the price movements of any othercommodity induced by changes in income distribution. The absencein Sraffa's book of an explicit proof of the invariance propertyof this standard gave rise to many misunderstandings about itsmeaning and its role as an invariable measure of value. In orderto clear up these questions, Bellino (On Sraffa's Standard commodity,Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, 121–32, 2004)has proposed a ‘proper’ definition of an ‘invariablemeasure of value’, showing that Sraffa's Standard commoditydoes fulfil the requirements of this definition. He claims thatthe fulfilment of this property (but not the constancy of its‘nominal’ price) qualifies the Standard commodityas an invariable measure of value. In this paper, a proof ofthe invariance of the price of the Standard commodity with respectto changes in income distribution is given, and the equivalenceof this property with Bellino's definition of invariance isshown.     

中国和新加坡产业内贸易与规模经济关系的协整分析

中国和新加坡产业内贸易与规模经济存在着一种长期的均衡关系,新加坡生产企业的规模经济对产业内贸易的推动作用大于中国,中国和新加坡生产企业的规模经济与产业内贸易存在单向因果关系,即规模经济促进产业内贸易.     

公司财务控制机理:一个基于制度博弈的分析

财务控制的目标是对出资者和经营者之间形成的代理契约的冲突进行管理和协调.以出资者与经营者的制度博弈模型为分析基础,可以清楚表明财务控制机理特征:首先,财务控制本身具有的制度成本(控制成本)是制约控制成效的关键因素;其次,财务控制作为一种制度安排,应具备使经营者违背代理契约的外部成本内部化的功能;最后,财务控制本质是一种契约安排,是出资者和经营者之间多次动态博弈的结果,因此需要不断进行修正完善.     

用普遍的人性来解释艺术—浅谈荣格的美学思想

荣格将人的心理结构分为意识、个人无意识和集体无意识三个层次，通过对集体无意识与创作过程、艺术作品、艺术家的关系的分析，以及对里比多理论在艺术创作中的阐述等，确立其美学理论的基本构架。他创立的精神分析学说对现代西方美学和文艺理论发展产生了巨大而又深远的影响。     

基于“行为经济学理论”的旅游者行为分析

传统的旅游者行为分析方法,主要是进行定性的分析,将各个因素进行框架分析,而对旅游者行为的影响因素分析深度不够。借助行为经济学的理论和分析方法,从旅游者的心理活动角度入手,注重旅游者的心理变量分析,应用前景理论和心理账户分析旅游者行为,充分考虑了情境因素和体验因素,使得关于旅游者的行为分析更加细化和接近现实生活。     

Decoupled earnings: An institutional perspective of the consequences of maximizing shareholder value

Recent accounting scandals have brought focus on the role of management in financial statement manipulation. This focus on micro-behavior does not capture the complexities of earnings management. Taking an institutional rather than agency theory approach, earnings management is posited as a decoupled behavior. A behavior that results from not only agency-based motivations of self-interests, but also regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive legitimacy pressures. Conformity to the central logic of “maximizing shareholder value” found in the “US financial market” institutional field provides the context in which to explore earnings management as a decoupled behavior. Insights for earnings management include the blending of agency and institutional theory perspectives to gain a more complete understanding of the behavior and the positing of a continuum of earnings management conducive to this merger. Institutional theory benefits from exploring the nesting in multiple institutional fields.     

基于博弈视角的供应链伙伴关系研究

科学技术的飞速发展、经济的全球化以及竞争的日益激烈，使得企业要想在市场上取得成功，就必须和供应商、客户建立紧密的伙伴关系，通过整体协作增强各节点企业的竞争力。对于供应链伙伴关系，可以从交易费用、资源观、博弈论等到不同视角进行研究，本文将从博弈的视角，通过企业间博弈的不同阶段，包括囚徒困境、鹿的陷阱以及单方承诺三个阶段，对供应链内企业间的伙伴关系进行探讨，揭示其内在规律。     

Control of intellectual assets in client relationships: implications for innovation

This empirical study of business‐to‐business service firms examines the determinants and effects of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers that retain control over their intellectual output are more innovative. In long‐term relationships, service firms' clients may thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers' incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights theoretic predictions, service suppliers' bargaining power and their indispensability in service projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation capabilities are not very significant in determining control rights allocation between service suppliers and their clients. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.