再谈环境保护税设置——基于两类竞争制造企业环保技术创新策略的演化博弈

利用演化博弈模型分析处在竞争的两类制造企业(在位企业和进入企业)的环保技术创新策略问题,考量以环境保护税为主体的环保规制如何科学设置才能更好地促进制造业企业的环保创新.研究发现:创新效应和市场需求均影响企业创新策略演化的均衡结果,并在两阶段博弈分析的基础上,得出市场需求和创新效应共同作用下两类制造企业的生产策略选择方案.因此,环境保护税的改革与实施应注意掌握好时点,税率的设置应充分考虑不同行业环保创新效应和产品市场需求,进行区别化的、动态的税率设置,并加大其他税种对环境保护税的支持.     

供应链金融利益主体的多阶段博弈研究

现代经济中,金融在资源配置方面发挥的作用明显不足,出现严重的资源浪费和供需错配现象,加剧了中小企业面临的融资难问题.本文从供应链金融的内涵切入,建立以利益相关者为主体的融资量化模型,利用多阶段博弈理论对企业不同模式下的成本收益进行检验,结果表明:供应链金融在实现上、下游各利益相关者个体的最优化的同时,也可有效促使供应链整体的利益最大化、实现高效运作和价值增值,全面实现链上企业间的资源共享、互利共赢.     

Optimizing the credit term decisions in supply chain finance

We study a credit term determination problem in the context of a supplier-buyer supply chain. The supplier's credit term decision is simultaneously made with its production and inventory decisions, and most importantly, it is impacted by the buyer's order quantity. We present a new game-theoretic framework to model this problem, which captures the interaction between the supplier's credit term decision and the buyer's order decision in a multi-period setting. An exact method based on nonlinear programming is implemented to obtain the optimal solutions. We apply our methodologies on a real world case. The computational results show that our approach significantly outperforms the heuristics with fixed credit terms, and either a short or a long credit term can be sub-optimal for the supplier in profitability. Our work offers the first data-driven model and solution approach that assists purchasing and supply managers to make optimal dynamic credit term decision in conjunction with production, ordering and inventory decisions in a game-theoretic setting.     

基于协议代理模式下IT外包项目博弈研究

互联网经济的出现致使全球信息化水平向更高级的智能化延伸。IT外包项目对现代企业的作用毋需置疑。本文通过建立了IT外包公司与地方系统集成商间单委托—代理博弈模型,分析了双方间的IT外包项目分包费率和努力程度取值范围,并讨论了IT外包公司和地方系统集成商的行为选择。对IT外包项目的博弈分析结果对于信息化建设企业未来在外包决策时进行风险控制具有一定的借鉴意义。     

基于云重心Shapley值的供应链融资联盟收益分配研究

针对Shapley值法在供应链融资联盟收益分配过程中分配因素考虑不全以及各分配因素随机性和模糊性强的缺点，本文利用云重心法修正Shapley值的收益分配。根据供应链融资联盟收益分配的主要影响因素，在传统的Shapley值法的基础上引入了风险系数、投入成本、努力程度以及信息对称水平4个分配修正因子，弥补了影响因素的缺失，并利用云重心法计算各联盟企业的收益修正值，云重心法能够解决定性指标和定量指标之间的模糊性转换，极大克服了Shapley值法自身的局限性。算例对比结果发现，改进的Shapley值法能更加合理的分配收益，有利于维持供应链融资联盟的稳定。     

Identifying the internal structure evolution of urban built-up land sprawl (UBLS) from a composite structure perspective: A case study of the Beijing metropolitan area,China

Differences in the internal composite structure during urban built-up land sprawl (UBLS) will generate different effects, and thus, a city’s spatial structure has important bearings on urban sustainability. This study investigates the spatial and temporal characteristics of the internal structure and allocation relationship of UBLS using multivariate spatial correlation and the Weaver-Tomas composite coefficient based on site data of granted built-up land parcels. Moreover, the composite structure evolution process of UBLS and its driving mechanism are examined in this study. The results reveal that the amount structure of the three types of UBLS (i.e. industrial land sprawl, residential land sprawl and commercial land sprawl) tended to be balanced during the study period. Following the transformation and upgrade of the urban industry structure, the overall composite structure of UBLS ranged from single residential land-use structure (Res.) to industrial-residential land-use structure (Ind.-Res.) In the early period of land marketization, the marketization land granting mechanism caused low spatial correlation between the various types of UBLS and a single composite structure, i.e. Res., single commercial land-use structure (Com.), and residential-commercial land-use structure (Res.-Com.). Subsequently, a dual-driving force including the market economy and government interventions caused a relatively high degree of spatial correlation and a multiple composite structure, i.e. Ind.-Res. and industrial-residential-commercial land-use structure (Ind.-Res.-Com.). However, the evolution characteristics of the composite structure in various regions illustrate some problems, such as the spatial isomorphism phenomenon of the composite structure and the dislocation of urban built-up land allocation. The urban internal built-up land spatial layout pattern is the embodiment of two dominant driving forces, the market and the government, interacting with each other according to natural and socioeconomic conditions. Therefore, we suggest that it is necessary to reform the future urban built-up land granting mechanism based on market guidance, and the composite structure of UBLS should be adjusted according to the regional function. The government should reinforce the macro-control of land-use planning for the dispersed granted land parcels so as to optimize the urban land-use structure.     

数量驱动或创新驱动：异质型人力资本对经济增长的机制演进

基于1987-2017年中国省际面板数据，运用SYS-GMM模型研究异质型人力资本对经济增长的影响。在区分高级与基本人力资本基础上，基于招生率和收入维度，从全局和阶段差异视角剖析异质型人力资本对经济提速的机制演进。研究发现：全局而言，两种测度下基础和高级人力资本各自以数量及创新方式驱动经济增长，并呈现以数量驱动为主，数量、创新双驱动的增长模式；从演进视角看，两种测度均表明，高级人力资本创新驱动是新常态阶段经济增长的核心动力，但相比旧常态阶段，基础人力资本数量驱动日趋弱化并呈异质性；进一步研究表明，产业结构、城镇化及开放程度均对创新驱动有不同程度激励效应，而城镇化是挤出数量驱动的主要推手。     

金融机构集聚过程的动态博弈分析

在理性行为人收益最大化原则条件下得出了行为人空间博弈的结果——在均衡状态,限制性条件(如运输技术等)能够产生一个收敛的空间区位调整过程,最终实现空间集聚。在这个博弈集聚的过程中,外部因素存在发生作用的空间,从而说明了政策制定者可以通过制定相关的政策来影响金融机构的集聚过程,进而促进金融市场的深化发展和金融中心的形成。这一空间集聚过程也可用于分析城镇化的形成和发展过程。     

Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalitional improvements are acyclic and hence strong Nash equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain facilities; all players using a facility extract the same amount of local utility therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the ultimate utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are “games with structured utilities,” basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and “bottleneck congestion games,” which attracted researchers’ attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the existence of strong Nash equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, in all games of this type is established.     

重大水利工程项目决策社会稳定风险评估中的公众参与博弈

为改善重大水利工程项目决策社会稳定风险评估中公众参与现状,从社会稳定风险评估3个主要利益主体——中央政府、地方政府与公众不同的利益诉求出发,运用演化博弈模型,探讨在不同利益诉求的相互作用下影响地方政府与公众在社会稳定风险评估中策略选择的因素。研究发现,当公众受到的损失大于参与付出的成本时,双方稳定均衡状态均表现积极,反之,双方可能均表现为消极或积极这两种截然不同的状态。基于此,分析了中央政府对地方政府和公众在社会稳定风险评估博弈中策略选择的影响。最后,提出应加大对地方政府的支持、规范公众参与相关制度、加大教育培训及宣传力度、创新公众参与方式几项政策建议。