On the Benefits of Withholding Knowledge in Organizations

Transferring knowledge to an agent makes him more successful or productive, which is beneficial for the principal. However, knowledge transfer also increases the agent’s outside option. I identify two reasons for withholding knowledge — to reduce labor costs within a principal–agent relationship, and to weaken the agent in case of a separation. Moreover, the role of synergy is discussed both for building up a principal–agent relationship and for transferring knowledge. While synergy is decisive for knowledge transfer, cooperation between the principal and agent may even take place in the absence of synergy. Furthermore, I analyze whether the principal is more likely to transfer knowledge to a more able or to a less able agent. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of a noncompetition clause are briefly discussed.     

Existence of competitive equilibrium under financial constraints and increasing returns

This paper studies a ‘factor cost in advance’ model with increasing returns in production. In the model both partial equilibrium and general equilibrium may exist since working capital of firms limit their input demand. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of partial equilibrium of a firm operating on a non-convex choice set. Furthermore we establish the existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium in the special case of logarithmic utility.     

防止利益冲突：治理房地产腐败的有效途径

当前,中国正处在发展的“黄金期”、“关键期”和“敏感期”,经济发展的“高速”、腐败现象的“高频”,以及由此引发的各类矛盾“高显”是其突出表征。我国房地产业在迅猛发展、对国计民生影响愈来愈深远、并成为国民经济发展支柱产业的同时,却也因房地产领域腐败案件频发给其发展带来极大困扰。应当充分认识利益冲突是房地产领域腐败的第一诱因和根源;多管齐下,建立健全防止利益冲突机制是从源头上治理房地产腐败的必然选择。     

The response of term rates to monetary policy uncertainty

This paper shows that greater uncertainty about monetary policy can lead to a decline in nominal interest rates. In the context of a limited participation model, monetary policy uncertainty is modeled as a mean preserving spread in the distribution for the money growth process. This increase in uncertainty lowers the yield on short-term maturity bonds because the household sector responds by increasing liquidity in the banking sector. Long-term maturity bonds also have lower yields but this decrease is a result of the effect that greater uncertainty has on the nominal intertemporal rate of substitution—which is a convex function of money growth. We examine the nature of these relations empirically by introducing the GARCH-SVAR model—a multivariate generalization of the GARCH-M model. The predictions of the model are broadly supported by the data: higher uncertainty in the federal funds rate can lower the yields of the three- and six-month treasury bill rates.     

清朝三代皇帝肃贪特点及所蕴含的管理思想

清朝康熙、雍正、嘉庆三位皇帝对肃贪问题有其基本认识和做法，从中可发现其所蕴含的系统管理思想和权变管理思想。从三代皇帝的肃贪中可得到以下启示：必须把肃贪当作一项系统工程来抓；在肃贪思想及方法上要树立权变思想；真正念好肃贪的“肃、扶、养、率”四字真经。这是肃贪必须解决的三个关键问题。     

从“有限理性＋社会人”的模式中恩考反腐倡廉工作——读《转型期防止腐败的综合战略与制度设计》后的思考

中国从计划经济向市场经济转变的过程中出现了政府职能的转变不能及时满足经济发展和社会发展的需要，从而导致了很多问题的出现。而腐败问题尤为突出，解决好了此问题为政府的职能转变将会有很大的推动作用。有很多学者对中国的腐败问题提出了自己的看法，本文对《转型期防止腐败的综合战略与制度设计》提出的对腐败问题的治理办法进行分析，运用西蒙的决策理论和人际学说的社会人的理论，提出用“有限理性＋社会人”的模式补充只重视制度建设来解决腐败问题的不足。     

The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing: a new NPV rule

Summary Limited liability debt financing of irreversible investments can affect investment timing through an entrepreneur’s option value, even after compensating a lender for expected default losses. This non-neutrality of debt arises from an entrepreneur’s unique investment opportunity, and it is shown in a standard model of irreversible investment that includes the equilibrium effect of a competitive lending sector. The analysis is partial, in that it takes as exogenously given an entrepreneur’s use of debt. Intuitively, limited liability lowers downside risk for the entrepreneur by truncating the lower tail of risks, and lowers the investment threshold. Compensating the lender for expected default losses reduces project profitability to the entrepreneur, and increases the investment threshold. The net effect is negative, because lower downside risk has an additional impact on the option value of delaying investment. The standard NPV rule in real options theory implicitly assumes debt to be neutral. With non-neutrality of debt, an investment threshold is higher than investment cost, but lower than the standard NPV rule. Comparisons with other standard investment thresholds show similar relationships.     

资产价格泡沫研究述评:实验金融学视角

本文从实验金融学的视角介绍了资产泡沫最新的定义和分类,阐述了投机性泡沫、理性泡沫与非理性泡沫之间的区别和联系,着重从信息对称、信息不对称、有限套利泡沫、异质信念和实验金融五个方面系统评述了资产价格泡沫理论的发展历程和新进展,指出该领域进一步的研究方向和中国开展资产价格泡沫研究的重要意义。研究表明,随着现代金融学的高速发展,学界对资产泡沫的研究日益深入。特别是非理性和实验金融学视角的引入,突破了传统金融框架的束缚,为这一课题研究带来了新的认知和理解。即便如此,目前仍无法根除资产泡沫产生的可能性。很多相关问题,如资产泡沫产生的时间和根本原因,仍然等待着学者们去探索和研究。     

股指期货对A股波动性的影响

鉴于GARCH模型适合研究金融时间序列的方差随时间变化的情况,笔者采用该模型研究股指期货的推出能否减少股票市场的波动性。本文选取股指期货推出前后一年的沪深300指数的日收盘价作为原始数据,通过建立GARCH模型就股指期货对股票市场波动性的影响进行了实证研究,结果显示,股指期货的引入在一定程度上降低了我国股票现货市场的波动性,但不显著。     

Crony capitalism,the party-state,and the political boundaries of corruption

We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.