Impact of dark patterns on consumers’ perceived fairness and attitude: Moderating effects of types of dark patterns,social proof,and moral identity

Despite the likely prevalence of deceptive dark patterns tactics in the tourism industry, specifically in online travel agencies (OTA), there is a dearth of dark patterns research in tourism literature. This study offers comprehensive knowledge regarding dark patterns tactics and how they influence consumers’ perceived fairness and their attitude toward OTAs. Two separate scenario-based experimental studies were conducted to test the moderating effects of social proof and types of dark patterns tactics as well as moral identity. Drawing on social influence and social proof theories, the authors demonstrate the moderating effect of social proof on the relationship between dark patterns practices and perceived fairness and attitude toward OTAs. Under the low stock message condition, the influence of deception on fairness and attitude perception was greater under negative social proof in comparison to a positive one. The results demonstrate that deception interacts with moral identity to influence fairness and attitude, confirming the moderating role of moral identity.     

When and how can organizational punishment stop unethical pro-organizational behaviors in hospitality?

How can hospitality employees be prevented from engaging in unethical behavior toward customers with the intention of helping their organization (i.e., from displaying unethical pro-organizational behavior directed at customers, UPB-C)? Drawing on ethical decision-making (EDM) theory, we propose that organizational punishment for unethical behavior and service climate will jointly inhibit UPB-C via moral disengagement. We test our hypotheses across two studies. In Study 1, using a sample of 122 frontline service employees, we find that, when both organizational punishment for unethical behavior and service climate are higher, UPB-C is lower. In Study 2, we replicate the above findings using a two-wave panel data from a sample of 191 employees who had service roles in the hospitality industry, and further indicate the role of moral disengagement in explaining the interactive effects of organizational punishment and service climate on UPB-C.     

The wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets

Insurance premium subsidies are present in many insurance markets. The Swiss government, for example, paid out CHF 4.26 billion or 0.72% of the Swiss GDP for health insurance premium subsidies in 2011. Analyses of premium subsidies have often highlighted that the increased insurance demand due to premium subsidies increases the effects of moral hazard in the market. Other consequences of premium subsidies, however, have mostly been neglected by the literature. We show in our theoretical model that the wealth effects of premium subsidies decrease the sensitivity of the insured towards the monetary consequences of losses. This leads to less prevention efforts by the insured and thus increases moral hazard in the market. The effect is preserved if the subsidy is financed through proportional taxation. Using two alternative models, we show that providing state-dependent subsidies can either increase or reverse this effect, depending on which state subsidies are paid. We argue that whether demand effects or wealth effects of premium subsidies will dominate the insured׳s behavior depends on the market structure.     

Capital and liquidity in a dynamic model of banking

This paper analyzes capital requirements in combination with a particular kind of cash reserves, that are invested in the risk-free asset, from now on, compensated reserves. We consider a dynamic framework of banking where competition may induce banks to gamble. In this set up, we can capture the two effects that capital regulation has on risk, the capital-at-risk effect and the franchise value effect (Hellman et al., 2000). We show that while capital alone is an inferior policy, compensated reserves, will complement capital requirements, by creating franchise value, and are therefore efficient in solving moral hazard problems.     

Exporting to bypass weak institutions

Institutions have been shown to be important for trade and growth. In particular, weak institutions may reduce the returns to product quality, harming domestic welfare and making it attractive to export to countries with strong institutions where quality is better rewarded. We model this alternative story as to why the “good apples are shipped out” and explore whether exporting ameliorates the problems created by weak institutions. We find that, instead, because home prices do not reflect the marginal value of quality, access to developed markets can be welfare reducing. Specifically, there are always export prices such that total welfare (and not just consumer welfare) is harmed by exporting. Furthermore, if the domestic price equilibrates to the export price, then the marginal unit exported reduces total welfare. Exporting can even reduce producer surplus, leading to a contraction of the export industry; although, welfare can decrease even if production of the exported good increases. Thus, our results reinforce the importance of strengthening institutions to help the development of economies.     

Picking on the new kid: Firm newness and deception in buyer–supplier negotiations

This study builds on liabilities of newness theory and moral disengagement theory to investigate deceptive behavior in buyer–supplier negotiations that involve new ventures. Using two purchasing negotiation experiments, it contrasts how negotiators treat employees of new ventures, mature firms, and firms of unknown age. The first experiment examined the behavior of participants in their role as salespeople toward buyers, whereas the second one examined the behavior of participants in their role as buyers toward salespeople. Across experiments, participants shared the belief that their negotiation counterparts were less experienced when these counterparts worked for new ventures than when they worked for mature firms. Moreover, both groups were more likely to deceive negotiation counterparts working at new ventures, although this effect was stronger in magnitude in the first experiment. These findings contribute to the field of behavioral supply management by identifying a new situational variable (firm newness) that promotes deception in purchasing negotiations. Moreover, they provide implications for buyers and suppliers on how to leverage preconceptions associated with their firm's age to gain advantages (or avoid disadvantages) in buyer–supplier negotiations. Finally, we add to liabilities of newness theory by identifying an additional liability that affects new ventures – namely, the increased risk of being deceived.     

公司品牌价值观研究的社会道德化取向及其影响

公司品牌价值观是实现公司品牌的生存与发展的重要环节。公司品牌价值观的社会道德化取向是企业在信息透明化时代追求利润最大化的内在动力和相关利益者群体博弈的结果。社会道德化成为公司品牌价值观是否科学的一个重要衡量标准。公司品牌建设社会道德化取向,可以促进公司品牌与社会的可持续发展。     

Publications and papers

America’s elementary and secondary educational system is faced with an inefficiency stemming from a basic problem associated with unobservability: moral hazard. In this case, the teacher (agent) has an incentive to exert less effort (given cost associated with more work) if the school district (principal) cannot distinguish between low student performance due to a lack of teacher effort and low student performance due low student quality (random variable). This research develops an optimal incentive scheme that guarantees the teacher a fixed payment, plus a variable payment that would be a function of teacher ‘action’ variables thereby reducing moral hazard.     

Endogenous group formation in experimental contests

We experimentally study endogenous alliance formation and contest effort choices in a generic three-player contest. Differences in intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to expend effort cause self-selection. Weakly motivated players have an incentive to enter into an alliance and to free-ride on strongly motivated players; hence, strong players prefer to stand alone. Self-selection has direct consequences for effort in endogenously formed alliances. But we also find evidence of an effort stimulating effect if players endogenously form an alliance, which is in line with theories of in-group favoritism. The experimental evidence on self-selection is in conformity with a theory analysis of the game.     

Social Contagion and Customer Adoption of New Sales Channels

We develop and test hypotheses regarding the role of social contagion in customer adoption of new sales channels. We examine two aspects of social contagion (local contagion and homophily) and two channels (Internet and bricks-and-mortar store). Drawing on diffusion theory, we propose a conceptual framework that identifies the factors associated with new channel adoption. Using longitudinal data from a major catalog company and a discrete-time hazard model, we find that (1) social contagion plays a major role in the adoption of new sales channels, (2) both local contagion and homophily influence channel adoption, (3) longer-tenured customers are less influenced by social contagion, and (4) adoption of the Internet channel is more influenced by social contagion than adoption of the bricks-and-mortar store. Managerially, our results suggest that marketing programs that encourage social contagion, for example, word-of-mouth campaigns, be targeted based on both physical and socio-economic proximity, and that such campaigns will play a bigger role in the adoption of new-to-the-world channels.