中国北京奥运经济投入产出与计量模型研究

将投入产出模型与计量模型结合起来研究北京奥运经济,重点编制北京市2002年30个部门的经济投入产出表、资源投入产出表和环境投入产出表,建立与投入产出表对应的C-D生产函数模型、居民消费需求函数模型、政府消费函数模型、固定资产投资需求函数模型,利用计量模型起动投入产出模型,研究2008年奥运年经济的供需平衡乃至2010年的供需平衡,为北京奥运经济的决策提出了相应的建议。     

关于现代产业经济学前沿问题研究

随着国民经济的发展,现代化经济产业布局基本完成,同时在经济发展过程中涌现出一些现代产业经济学相关问题,探究这些经济学前沿问题对助推现代化经济突破发展瓶颈、实现可持续健康发展有重要意义。基于这一背景,论文首先剖析现代产业经济学前沿问题研究的意义,之后列举当前国内主要存在的一些前沿问题,并提出对应解决策略,以期能够为助推国民经济稳步发展提供一定的理论和实践参考。     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

The Economics Of Partner Out Trading in Sexual Markets

This paper derives a model of participation in what is commonly known as ‘adultery’. Arguably the best sex survey in the world is used to produce estimates of participation functions. The results show a great deal of support for bioeconomic models and reveal some interesting similarities and differences between the male and female equations. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

贴现因子、偏好和行为经济学

本文讨论了影响人们跨时选择的重要因素--贴现因子的最新进展以及他们在经济学和金融中的重要应用,给出了目前关于改变贴现因子的模型.     

中国金融控股公司发展模式的新制度经济学分析

随着区域经济一体化和金融全球化的加强,金融控股公司混业经营所带来的规模经济性日趋强化,从而成为金融业发展的一种重要组织形式,从本质上反映了各国金融业和政府制度面向新的前景而作出的相应战略性调整,初步展开了21世纪世界银行业的市场结构与竞争态势。这种态势为中国金融业的发展和中国金融控股公司模式的选择提出了外在的要求。同时,中国的金融业将在WTO的框架下融入全球金融市场,中国的金融业也要走向世界,在国际金融市场上成长壮大,这就要求中国金融业必须与国际惯例接轨。     

超越契约理论--演化论视角的企业理论研究

企业的契约理论围绕交易成本概念解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织,但严重忽视了企业的技术和生产功能,演化经济学的企业理论通过研究企业内知识的产生、传播和利用过程,以及组织与个人的交互学习,不仅重新解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织问题,还研究了契约理论未触及的企业异质性、竞争优势和企业家等问题.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.