Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Interindustry flows, non-traded intermediate goods and the theory of effective protection : A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the response of net and gross outputs of tradeable goods to changes in tariff structure in the context of a comprehensive general equilibrium model with interindustry flows and non-traded, as well as imported, intermediate goods. There are two major results. First, the nominal rate of tariffs on a tradeable good is shown to correctly indicate the movements of its net output under most general conditions. Second, the (modified and) generalized Corden index of effective protection for a tradeable good is revealed to be in a close relationship with the behavior of its gross output under certain restrictions on the input substitutability of industries.     

Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are affected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term—logit distribution—one is able to calculate exactly the stationary distribution of the perturbed Markov process for any level of noise. We show that the stationary distribution places the largest probability on the maximizers of weighted sums of the agents’ (intrinsic) utilities, and this probability tends to 1 as noise vanishes.     

URBANIZATION, URBAN CONCENTRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

An international comparative study of the relations among the process of urbanization, urban concentration and economic development, and income distribution was performed by using data of developing and developed countries. Cross-section analyses at certain time periods for capturing "long-run" effects as well as time-series analyses for some countries for "short-run" effects were done taking advantage of the "rectangular" array of data. There were several interesting results: the pattern of unemployment rate in most developing countries shows an inverted-U shaped curve with respect to the degree of urbanization; the pattern of urban concentration is in the form of an inverted-U with respect to the economic development level; and the degree of inequality of income distribution seems to react in an inverted-U form to the variances in the extent of urbanization.     

Partial Free Trade Agreements and Economic Welfare: Reconsidering GATT Article 24

This paper generalizes the Kemp–Wan theorem on the customs union to cover partial and incomplete free trade agreements emerging all over the world and elucidates the conditions which ensure that they are potentially conducive to the economic welfare of member countries without harming the rest of the world. In the light of this generalization, it also reconsiders two well‐known conditions stipulated in Article 24 of the GATT required for the formation of FTAs.     

The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale

I examine why the performance of an organization is often subject to gradual erosion. I assume that players are motivated partly by psychological factors, norms and morale, and that they are willing to exert extra efforts if others do so. I show that repeated random shocks induce the erosion of the extra efforts supported by norms and morale, but they do not completely decay; in the long run a certain range of efforts are sustainable. Hence different organizations typically enjoy diverse norms and morale, which persist for a long time, in the vicinity of the equilibrium determined by material incentives.     

Technology Choice,Overtaking, and Comparative Advantage*

This paper argues that the basic concept of comparative advantage, used in international trade theory to establish choices of commodities exported, can also be used to explain choice of technology by a firm. A firm with a current leading position in a given technology may spurn a new technology, which is developed by a currently lagging firm, leading to future overtaking.     

Replicability of Experimental Data and Credibility of Economic Theory

Finding a data set that supports a theory is not enough for the theory to gain credibility. Credibility of a theory is established only after the initial supporting finding can be replicated by a number of follow‐up studies. Economics so far has paid little attention to replicability, presumably because the profession has been overly pessimistic about obtaining a high degree of replicability of non‐trivial theoretical predictions. By using a large data set I have collected that involves more than 4,000 subjects, I show that there is hope for economic theory to gain credibility by means of replications of laboratory data.