用新规制俘获理论看社保案中的政府规制问题

随着市场经济体制改革的深入,我国逐渐放开了公用事业领域的投资。近年来,民间资本进入公用事业领域的步伐逐渐加大。但在国家对公用事业投资放松管制的同时,也出现了不少亟待解决的问题。在上海社保案中牵涉到的张荣坤案,从一个侧面反映出公用事业引入民间投资出现的政府规制问题。施蒂格勒创立的规制俘获理论认为,规制机构会被规制行业所俘获,使其从中获利。用新规制经济学的规制俘获理论来分析社保案中的俘获问题,有利于改进和完善政府对公用事业民营化过程的规制。     

英国国有企业民营化改革及对中国的启示

英国从20世纪80年代开始对国有企业进行了大规模、且比较成功的改革。英国的国有企业改革前所面临的困境与中国国营企业有着相似之处,改革打破了原有国有企业的垄断,注重股权分散化,以放松规制来促进民营化的顺利展开。借鉴英国的经验,对中国国有企业的改革与发展大有裨益。     

论公共服务民营化与我国政府职能构建

公共服务民营化已是一股世界潮流。公共服务民营化的出现既是政府自身失灵的表现，也是救治政府治理失灵的一副良药。在我国，同样面临着公共服务民营化的现实问题。因此，探讨民营化自身的发展和政府在民营化中的作用，对于构建我国政府的公共职能，具有重要的意义。     

台湾公营事业民营化的发展及其对大陆的启示

台湾自1953年公布"公营事业移转民营条例"正式推动民营化政策至今,其历史已超过50年,文章从民营化法令修订更迭历程分析其趋势,发现台湾公营事业民营化的政策朝加强员工权益保障、容许部分民营化、重视公股管理等趋向发展,据此对大陆公营事业民营化政策推动提出5项启示供参考。     

Non-wage benefits,corporate ownership and firm performance in post-communist economies: evidence from Ukraine

The economic reforms in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have fundamentally reshaped ownership and governance of economic production, notably through the privatization of former state-owned enterprises. These reforms were expected to transform management practices by displacing ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare arrangements administered by state-owned enterprises. Using data drawn from two large samples of Ukrainian establishments, we investigate, in two different time points, the relationship between non-wage benefits and firm performance during the period of transition to a market economy (1994–2004). We found that non-wage benefits continued to be a critical feature of HRM practices in Ukraine during this period, and were positively associated with firm performance.     

我国公交行业公私合作的实践、困境与对策

公交公私合作既是缓解财政压力、改善经营管理、推进政府公共管理改革的需要,也是公共物品理论、产权理论以及委托代理理论在公共服务市场化改革中的应用和实践。改革开放以来,我国公交公私合作经过初期尝试、探索迈进、改革热潮三个阶段后,出现了“民退国进”的逆民营化现象。国内外成功案例的经验表明,公交公私合作的成败和绩效受到体制环境和制度结构的影响和制约,需要有健全的市场机制和完善的立法、政府部门的大力支持和严格监督、专门的管理机构和专业化人才以及完善的财政补贴制度和风险分担机制。应完善相关政策法规,提高政府公共管理能力,提升依法监管水平,优化监管方法和手段,完善风险分担机制,以有效推进公交公私合作改革实践。     

经济转轨、跨国公司进入与国有企业改革

在经济开放的背景下分析跨国公司与转轨国家之间经济的紧密联系,建立跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,并以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,剖析开放程度和经济调控手段以及垮国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程和转轨国家国有企业竞争力的影响,表明对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,而对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则.     

Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in Russia

We investigate whether privatization, competitive forces, and the hardening of budget constraints played efficiency-enhancing roles in Russia in the immediate post-privatization period. We find evidence of a positive impact of privatization on labor productivity: a 10% point increase in private share ownership raises real sales per employee by 3–5%. The evidence on product market competition is weaker, depending on model specification. Soft budget constraints are usually found to reduce restructuring but the effect is small and insignificant. We find that in terms of their impacts on productivity, privatization and subsidy reduction are substitutes; privatization and competition (measured as the geographic scope of markets) are complements; and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly

A model of differentiated mixed oligopoly is developed to systematically discuss the welfare consequences of partial privatization of a public firm. We analytically derive the optimal degree of partial privatization not only in the short run with restricted entry but also in the long run with free entry. It is shown that the short-run optimal policy is non-monotonic in the degree of love of variety, while the optimal degree of privatization is monotonically increasing in the consumer's preference for variety in the long run.      

Divestment and Bank Competition

We determine optimal divestment (partial privatization) and entry in banking in the context of a mixed oligopoly. When banks compete in deposits, greater entry is associated with higher divestment. However, social welfare improves with entry only when the private entrants are more efficient than the public bank. Further, when banks compete in interest rates with differentiated products, the public banks behavior resembles that of a price leader and it earns less profit than the private bank, if government holding in the public bank is sufficiently high. Competition becomes excessive in this case, and social welfare maximization requires greater divestment.