Changing the Rules of the Game

Abstract

This article examines the impact of privatization on the relative bargaining strength of management and trade unions. Findings are based on a study of Ireland's largest telecoms provider, Eircom, which has been privatized since 1999. The privatization of Eircom adopted a stakeholder approach, under which employee share-ownership and management–union partnership played an important role in firm restructuring. Findings show that despite this approach privatization has resulted in a significant decrease in the perceived bargaining strength of unions and an increase in the perceived bargaining strength of management.     

Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines how government ideology influenced privatization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe after the transition from socialism. We analyse a dataset of privatization indicators covering small‐ and large‐scale industries in 19 transition countries over the period 1990–2007 and introduce a government ideology index. The results suggest that market‐oriented governments promoted the privatization of small‐scale industries more than that of large‐scale ones. In the rapid transition process in the early 1990s, leftist governments stuck to public ownership more strongly than in the following period from the mid‐1990s to 2007. The remarkable differences between leftist and right‐wing governments concerning both the role of government in the economy and the basic elements of political order are in line with developments in OECD countries, and may also hold further implications for transition and democratizing countries outside Central and Eastern Europe.     

农地制度私有化的国际借鉴及启示

农地制度私有化是原东欧社会主义国家经济体制转型的重要内容。由于农地制度的初始状态不同,东欧国家农地私有化采取了土地归还、证券赔偿、按人均分三种不同方式。东欧国家农地私有化的进展比预期缓慢,伴随农业生产的大幅度下降和波动。东欧国家农地私有化对我国农地制度改革具有重要启示:必须高度重视东欧国家农地私有化进展缓慢,私有化后农地市场发育缓慢、农业绩效不佳的情况,注重培育适宜改革的宏观经济环境。     

上海港口民营化改革的动因、问题及对策

在推进上海国际航运中心建设进程中,完善上海港口设施、提升港口专业化管理是前导,上海港口民营化改革理念顺势出现在人们视野中。文章主要对上海港口民营化改革的动因、现状及面临的问题进行了详细地分析,并针对问题提出相应的对策建议。     

Buy-outs in Hungary,Poland and Russia: governance and finance issues1

The governments of Hungary, Poland and Russia have used buy-outs as an important privatization strategy which can be viewed as forming a continuum from straightforward sales where management and employees generally achieve significant ownership, as in Hungary, via intermediate approaches as in Poland where both payment and free distribution of shares are involved, to the Russian case where state-owned enterprises were effectively “given away” through a voucher privatization scheme. This paper, first, presents preliminary evidence on the extent and nature of post-privatization restructuring in buy-outs in these three countries, which highlights the transitory nature of this form of organization. Second, in the light of these findings, the paper analyses the possibilities and difficulties associated with enhancing corporate governance and finance.     

THE THEORY OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN MARKET ECONOMIES

Abstract. Four topics are covered: the circumstances under which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more effective than private firms; the different approaches to modelling public and private firms; the performance of SOEs; and strategies including privatization to limit their more damaging effects. It is argued that ideological or development motives are important in their genesis, but that if efficiency and innovation are key considerations the normative case for their existence is more doubtful. Various types of SOE model are identified, deriving from the variety of circumstances in which they operate, and the theoretical perspective of the modeller. These include the property rights school, the public choice tradition, neoclassical, behavioural and budget maximizing approaches. All models assume the existence of monitoring problems, created by informational asymmetry. The consequences can include high non-pecuniary benefits for managers, a concentration on monitored activities, and lower innovation levels and efficiency than private firms. Curiously this is not necessarily reflected in higher prices or costs. Possible remedial strategies include a change of ownership, a change of objectives, the introduction of incentive-compatible payment schemes, improved performance indicators and privatization.     

Organizational ownership,competitive intensity,and firm performance: an empirical study of the Indian manufacturing sector

Emerging countries are using privatization as a key strategy in their drive to become free market economies. Although these ownership changes are rapidly gaining prominence, the academic literature has been equivocal about the performance benefits of private vs. state ownership. The lack of clarity in findings can be largely traced to the underspecification of the models that prior studies have examined. Specifically, prior studies have mostly ignored the central role of competitive rivalry. This paper proposes a model that centers around the interactive, inseparable effects of ownership and competitive rivalry on firm performance. Results of the empirical examination set in India show that competitive intensity moderates the relationship between ownership and performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH AN R&D RIVALRY

This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.