使用差价补偿策略的寡头竞争模型

差价补偿策略,是近年来在国内兴起的一种企业间竞争策略。从博弈论角度来看,对消费者承诺差价补偿,即是向竞争对手发出了一种不打价格战的可置信的威胁信号,可以有效地避免企业间的价格竞争;从市场营销角度来看,差价补偿策略会影响消费者行为,改变消费者预期,最终促使市场竞争向着企业有利的方向发展。本文对差价补偿策略建立了一个数学模型,分析企业采用差价补偿策略的原因以及竞争双方博弈的均衡结果。     

基于时间竞争的物流周期压缩方法研究

阐述了基于时间竞争条件下物流周期压缩的主要方法：并行工程、全面质量管理、延迟化策略、绿色冉制造和运用交叉功能团队进行生产。     

国外标准化战略及其对我国的影响

简要介绍了欧盟及美、日等国的标准化战略及标准化发展趋势，并就其对我国标准化工作的影响进行了分析。     

粮食直接补贴面临的问题及对策研究

粮食直接补贴是我国2004年粮食流通体制改革的主要内容之一。直补经过四个阶段的探索和改革,在增加农民收入、保障国家粮食安全等方面取得良好效应。但改革是对政府、企业、农民三者之间利益关系的重大调整,在补贴方法、标准、资金等制度设计和操作过程中还存在很多需要研究的问题。因此,进一步深化改革,尤其是建立产销区间的直补资金转移机制非常重要。     

Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government.     

后营销管理观念的兴起

在市场营销活动的竞争重心发生转移的今天 ,后营销管理理论的产生对于指导我国的企业的营销实践 ,锻造企业市场营销能力 ,提升企业核心竞争力和竞争优势有着重要的借鉴意义。     

中国服务贸易竞争力的国际比较研究

服务贸易是当前国际贸易中发展最为迅速的领域,已成为我国经济新的增长点.通过服务贸易的国际横向比较,服务贸易TC指数大部分长期为负值,且各行业之间TC指数差异大,我国服务贸易竞争力水平远远落后于发达国家.从制约因素分析来看,提升我国服务贸易的国际竞争力,必须重视服务贸易营销,寻求国内市场支持,建立服务贸易扶持政策.     

Competition with Congestible Networks

We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore, capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities.     

On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly

Summary. For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Industrial Economics at the University of Copenhagen during Spring 2000. Their financial support and stimulating research environment are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the European Commission. Correspondence to: R. Amir     

Environmental Policy in Open Economies and Monopolistic Competition

This paper analyses the implications of international trade for non-cooperative environmental policy in the case of local production externalities. A particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting international spillover caused by trade. A tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad, since such a policy reduces their variety of imports (due to fewer domestic product inventions) or their consumption of each imported brand (due to higher import prices). Ignoring the negative spillover, non-cooperative governments implement inefficiently strict standards in equilibrium. In contrast to this clear-cut inefficiency result, the impact of international trade on the state of the environment is ambiguous.