区域市场"煤电联营"的博弈分析

从产业结构的角度建立基于Stackelberg博弈的煤、电企业联营的收益模型,可分析不同条件下联营的效果,并对收益状况进行理论测算.研究表明,在不考虑形成联营的协调成本与稳定煤电联营的维持成本的情况下,煤、电企业实行联营,通过合理的收益分配,在用户侧电价未放开的情况下,可以保证发电企业的煤炭供应、电网的电量供给和相关利益方的收益增加.     

Controlling a dam to environmentally acceptable standards through the use of a Decision Support Tool

We aim to establish a simple mathematical tool that could be used to set an appropriate level for the environmental levy which would allow a dam operator to remain profitable, yet also to ensure that the operator's policy is environmentally acceptable. We shall use Bellman's principle of optimality to solve an optimal control problem which will simulate the Station Operator's behaviour. The problem of the Regulatory Authority is multi-criteria and will be solved through aDecision Support Tool. The degree of fulfilment of the criteria will be a function of the target lake level, target extraction rate, and the level of the environmental levy. We will investigate the extent to which the targets are satisfied when the levy is altered.Research supported by VUW Graduate School of Business and Management.     

广义Stackelberg市场上企业横向兼并获利性研究

基于广义Stackelberg寡头垄断市场,研究企业横向兼并的获利性和社会福利问题。结果表明,一个领头企业与一个跟随企业之间总是存在兼并动机,而领头企业之间很少存在兼并动机;当边际生产成本的差异程度较大时,两个跟随企业之间总是存在兼并动机;兼并导致的企业利润增加是以社会福利下降为代价的。     

基于Stackelberg博弈理论下风险偏好对可持续供应链风险协调策略

针对中美贸易摩擦下供需双方需求波动现状,考虑顾客风险型偏好因素对可持续供应链利润分配的影响,采用Stackelberg博弈理论,建立可持续供应链协同的集中决策模型和分散决策模型,通过数值模拟,对比分析风险偏好对绿色供应链和非绿色供应链的影响,使利润决策达到帕累托最优。结果表明：顾客风险型偏好有助于在环境动荡下选择信息共享机制远远超过了信息不共享策略所带来的利润;在动荡的社会背景下,风险偏好型决策者更愿意选择绿色供应链产品来满足自己的需求。该研究为可持续供应链风险韧性机理和演化过程提供理论支撑与方法借签。     

土地非农化过程中的博弈关系

研究目的：模拟土地非农化过程中中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府之间的博弈关系。研究方法：斯坦克尔伯格模型和库诺特竞争模型。研究结果：土地税费政策监管不力和地方政府间的过度竞争是造成土地过度非农化的一个重要原因。研究结论：要协调好经济发展与土地资源保护间的关系必须从两方面着手：一是完善土地非农化过程中的税费政策,加强税费监管;二是引导地方政府改变经济发展模式,避免以牺牲土地资源为代价的恶性竞争。     

Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

Summary. With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, that is, cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. This approach produces a simple and intuitive set of equilibrium behaviors and generates clear predictions about when these different outcomes are likely to arise. Our model also departs substantially from the existing literature in concluding that sunkness of capacity costs is neither necessary nor sufficient for capacity to have precommitment value. Received: August 25, 1999; revised version: October 15, 1999     

基于最大边缘分配算法的雷达博弈波形设计

实战背景下雷达目标先验信息有较大的不确定性,基于先验信息设计的波形不能满足参数估计的需要。为解决该问题,提出了一种博弈条件下的雷达波形设计方法。考虑到雷达与干扰机在电子对抗中的非同时性,采用Stackelberg博弈框架进行建模。该方法以优化雷达能量谱分布为策略,采用最大互信息准则建立效用函数。博弈过程中,雷达与干扰机各自根据对手策略优化发射波形,经过多次迭代,双方达到纳什均衡。仿真实验对比了均衡策略与maxmin策略与随机策略,证实了所提算法的有效性。     

Moore's law and price trends of digital products: the case of smartphones

ABSTRACT

Since the introduction of the iPhone by Apple in 2007 and Google's Android platform in 2009, the two systems have accounted for a total of 90% of the U.S. smartphone market. Apple, however, reaps most of the profit in the industry. In the second quarter of 2016, for example, Apple's iPhone gets 104% of the sector's profit. This suggests that the smartphone market resembles a Stackelberg leadership model. Despite Apple's strong market power, we investigate if the market leader is under pressure to be price competitive. We calculate a quality-adjusted price index for smartphones from 2007 to 2016. Our results show that the average price declines at an average rate of over 27% per year. The price trend is similar to other digit products such as computers, cameras, and portable music players. We observe that the large price decline reflects the effect of Moore's law, which predicts that the capacity of integrated circuits undergoes an exponential growth. The effect of Moore's law is incorporated into the Stackelberg model. We also observe that price trends of other digital products also follow a similar pattern. This suggest that the long-run price trends of digital consumer goods are somewhat independent of the market structures.     

Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence

We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm à la Cournot in a second market. We compare treatments where the multi-product firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether to bundle or not. We also contrast the simultaneous and the sequential order of moves in the duopoly market. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling: with bundling and simultaneous moves, the multi-product firm offers the predicted number of units. When the multi-product firm is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling, especially when it chooses to bundle, even though in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum, bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another.     

Dynamic management of water transfer between two interconnected river basins

This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structures (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, and Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases toward a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.