制造商统一定价下的双渠道供应链服务决策

双渠道供应链由零售商控制的线下零售渠道和制造商控制的线上销售渠道构成,产品的销售价格由处于强势地位的制造商确定,制造商和零售商分别以自身利益最大化为目标进行独立决策并实施服务差异化策略。在集中式双渠道供应链中,如果制造商采用线上线下不同价的定价策略,消费者对渠道的偏好程度不会影响制造商的定价策略和服务策略。在分散式双渠道供应链中,渠道控制较强的制造商为避免线上线下同品不同价给企业带来的消极影响,制造商制定销售价格后,零售商的线下销售价格只能服从制造商的价格安排,但双方可从服务方面进行差异化经营,产品的销售价格、线上服务水平和线下服务水平将随着消费者对线上渠道接受程度的提高而提高。当市场上多数消费者接受网络购物时,制造商可以通过提高销售价格或提高线上服务水平的方式获得更高利润;当市场上消费者倾向于传统购物渠道时,制造商将会降低销售价格和线上服务水平,零售商也将调低线下服务水平。制造商确定的销售价格和批发价格对零售商服务水平的影响是相反的;线下服务水平将随着销售价格的提高而提高,随着批发价格的提高而降低。     

我国制造商应对外资强势零售商的合作广告策略

文章研究了在外资强势零售商对我国零售业强烈冲击下,制造商应对强势零售商的合作广告策略。文章运用Hotelling模型建立了一个我国制造商和零售商合作广告模型,并运用Stackelberg博弈得到了模型的Nash均衡。研究发现,合作广告策略下强势零售商的利润下降的同时,制造商的利润提高了,但我国零售商的利润下降了。同时还发现,合作广告存在的条件是相对于强势零售商我国零售商的差异化适中,过小的差异化会造成竞争加剧,而过大的差异化会造成强势零售商更大的竞争优势。     

供应商与制造商在订单分配方面的博弈行为

对于两类不同质供应商与单制造商组成的供应链在订单分配方面的博弈行为,通过综合考虑部件价格、质量、交货期等构造订单质量指标,建立制造商和两类供应商的斯塔克尔伯格效用模型。模型显示,当两类供应商送交的订单质量相等时,制造商的效用可以达到最大;同时两类供应商对订单数量的需求均受到竞争对手对订单偏好的影响,由此可能导致供应商出现虚报自身信息的情况。制造商引入惩罚机制,并通过对惩罚进行适当限制,可实现让供应商实报私人信息的目标。     

基于Stackelberg模型的区域集装箱港口网络建设规划优化研究

本文利用Stackelberg模型考虑港口规划者与货主之间的相互关联、相互制约的关系,目的是想从根本上提高港口网络系统的运作水平,以实现对它优化的目的。     

搭便车行为对双渠道供应链的影响分析

本文建立了一个双渠道供应链的模型,得出了存在搭便车行为时供应链的定价、服务决策和利润水平,并分析了搭便车行为的强度变化对于供应链决策和状态的影响。我们的结果说明了搭便车行为对于双渠道供应链有双向作用,既能提高集中决策供应链的利润,也会使分散决策的供应链利润受损,同时,证明了搭便车行为是导致供应链冲突的原因之一。     

Sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times: Impact on operating profits

When managing a project, a firm must evaluate multiple strategic factors and operational issues before deciding which tasks to keep in-house and which to outsource. We focus on one operational aspect of this evaluation process by examining the impact of different sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times on operating profits. As an initial attempt, we present two stylized models that capture two simplest types of projects: (a) a project with two “parallel” tasks that can be performed simultaneously and (b) a project with two “serial” tasks that must be performed sequentially. For each model, we determine the optimal operating profit for the case when the firm outsources zero task, one task, or two tasks. These operating profits can be informative for making sourcing decisions of different project tasks.     

A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE

We investigate the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that: (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.     

Heinrich von Stackelberg on joint production

In the 1970s, considerable interest arose into the study of multi-output firms and industries. However, this literature did not seem to be aware of the contribution that von Stackelberg made to the issue almost half a century earlier. This paper outlines von Stackelberg's contribution to the theory of costs under joint production. It critically assesses the place of his contribution in the modern history of the theory of joint production and it suggests an answer to the question of why von Stackelberg's theory of joint production fell into oblivion and even contributed to the abandonment of the issue for decades.     

Advances on Stackelberg open-loop and feedback strategies

In this paper, we study a familiar type of dynamic games called "common-property resource games" to establish the following results. First, the Stackelberg equilibrium may not exist in some cases, with open-loop strategies as well as with feedback strategies. Second, an explicit example is given to show that under feedback strategies, the best linear strategy on the part of the leader is inferior to a nonlinear strategy so that it is dangerous to confine our search to the Stackelberg equilibrium in the space of linear functions. Most importantly, we establish an "Implementation Lemma", which allows us to develop one methodology to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium with feedback strategies when the equilibrium is assumed to exist.     

横向兼并的均衡分析：对价格、利润和福利的影响

本文在Salant古诺模型的基础上尝试建立了一个新的模型来分析横向兼并对企业利润、市场价格和社会福利的影响。但是，与Salant模型不同的是，本文不再假定企业在兼并前后始终保持古诺竞争策略，而是假定当兼并发生之后新企业采取的是斯塔伯格竞争策略，而未参与兼并的企业仍然采用古诺竞争策略。结果表明：参与兼并的企业存在很强的兼并动机，而且对于企业而言有利可图的横向兼并在一定条件下可以降低市场价格，也有利于消费者福利和社会总福利的增长。