Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.     

Surplus extraction by network providers: Implications for net neutrality and innovation

This paper looks at surplus extraction by network providers who control the medium of information transfer between application developers and consumers, and addresses the following questions: is net neutrality beneficial to society? and does providing network providers flexibility in pricing stunt innovation in the long run? To answer the first question, it looks at a market consisting of a monopoly network provider and two application providers with non-substitutable products, using a simple single period model. It shows that net neutrality is necessary to ensure maximal benefit to the society. To answer the second question, the paper shows that a monopoly network provider, if allowed complete flexibility in pricing, does not necessarily stunt innovation. Looking at a market that consists of one network provider and one application provider, and using a simple multi-period model, it shows that given maximum flexibility the network provider not only encourages innovation when the potential benefits are sufficiently high but also maximizes surplus. This paper takes the view that the topic of net neutrality is not only controversial but also complicated, and suggests that policy makers use a balanced approach based on sound analysis.     

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firm's managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.     

不同质产品市场Stackelberg博弈模型

一个不同质产品市场中，两企业只能选择产量或价格中的一个为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争，没有生产能力限制。均衡结果为产品可替代（互补）时，领头企业和尾随企业都将选择产量（价格）为决策变量，存在“先动优势”。     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: THE COURNOT‐BERTRAND MODEL

Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.     

供应链应收账款质押融资的双重Stackelberg博弈分析

供应链金融是银行将核心企业和上下游企业联系在一起提供灵活运用的金融产品和服务的一种融资模式。文章从供应链金融的视角研究供应链成员企业的融资决策,将双重Stackelberg博弈应用于供应链金融的三种融资模式之一的应收账款质押融资,通过博弈模型的建立分析供应链金融中各个参与主体的期望收益,考察融资运作的影响因素,给出了参与主体选择策略的条件,为成员企业融资决策提供依据,维持供应链整体稳定运行。     

Explaining cross-supplies

Cross-supplies describe the phenomenon that two or more firms in the same industry supply each other with their final products. A prominent example is the cooperation in the European flat-glass industry, which was recently criticized by the European Commission. In a simple model we attempt to explain what incentives firms may have to use cross-supplies (instead of producing the goods themselves) and what welfare effects cross-supplies have if they are used. Contrary to the ruling of the European Commission we find that cross-supplies improve welfare whenever they are employed. Furthermore, for a large range of parameters, they even benefit consumers.     

存货质押业务中银行与物流企业Stackelberg博弈行为分析

完全信息下的存货质押融资业务中,物流企业作为先行决策者决定风险承担比例,银行据此决定利率,对实践中双方博弈行为进行分析与求解的数值仿真研究表明:完全信息下由银行和物流企业"双边决定市场"的优势大于由银行单边决定的市场;借款企业高履约水平时,物流企业愿意通过提高自身的风险承担比例来换取银行减让利率;利率敏感度对均衡结果的影响较自有资金敏感度更为显著。     

考虑决策时间顺序的自有品牌渠道策略研究

研究在零售商引入自有品牌的条件下,供应链渠道各成员的定价和广告决策问题。运用Stackelberg博弈模型分析不同的广告和定价决策顺序下,供应链最优决策组合以及决策顺序的改变对利润的影响。研究结果表明:在引入自有品牌的条件下,制造商对定价和广告决策顺序的改变会影响零售商引入自有品牌后的利润,尤其是当交叉弹性较高时,制造商在引入自有品牌前后改变决策顺序可以实现制造商和零售商利润的增加。