谈判势力与中间品关税政策研究

中间品国际贸易对全球贸易举足轻重。当前文献聚焦于最终品关税政策的研究，对中间品关税政策的模型研究关注不足。构建拥有一体化企业和中间品生产企业的D国和拥有依赖中间品进口才能完成生产的最终品生产企业的F国在第三国市场开展产量竞争的博弈模型，分析企业同时或先后进入市场时中间品生产企业的谈判势力对两国中间品关税政策的影响。研究发现：①无论企业是否同时进入第三国市场，一体化企业所在国家均会选择对中间品选择出口征税干预政策，其社会福利与企业进入顺序相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场或一体化企业与最终品生产企业同时进入市场时，D国社会福利相较于自由贸易时得到优化，当一体化企业先进入市场时，D国社会福利遭到恶化，两国实行的贸易政策陷入“囚徒困境”。②当F国实行贸易干预时，中间品关税政策与企业进入顺序密切相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场时，F国将对中间产品进口征税；当一体化企业先进入市场或双方同时进入市场时，若谈判势力相对较强，F国将实行征税，反之则会实行进口补贴。     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.     

Competitive sustainable processes and pricing decisions in omnichannel closed-up supply chains under different channel power structures

In recent years, omnichannel retailing and remanufacturing issues have rapidly emerged in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The omnichannel is a combination of online and in-store retailing, and it affects supply chain relationships and channel power structures by changing value creation processes. It allows consumers a hybrid shopping experience where they can order products online and pick them up in the store or test in-store and buy online (TSBO). Despite this practice, no studies exist on CLSC considering omnichannel retailing under different channel power structures. We investigate the TSBO retailing strategy and its impact on CLSC profit considering price competition between manufacturer and remanufacturer under Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), Vertical Nash (VN), and cooperation (CO) models game settings. In this paper, mathematical models are developed to drive the optimal solution. A two-part tariff coordination mechanism (i.e., IS model) is also used to integrate all supply chain members. The proposed models examine the environmental and social welfare benefits of adopting green innovation products and remanufacturing processes in omnichannel retailing. A numerical study is carried out to illustrate the proposed models' application. The results show that the IS model can synchronize the economic, environmental, and social aspects leading to significant increases in performance. Total supply chain profit under the CO model is the highest. The manufacturer and remanufacturer generate higher profits in the MS model, whereas the retailer makes higher profits in the RS and VN models. When a manufacturer only wants to increase profit with green processes and is not concerned about omnichannel processes, more resources must be allocated for green innovation.