建筑市场信息不对称及治理对策研究

本文基于不对称信息理论,建立了委托代理关系下的建筑业信息模型,并具体分析了建筑业目前由于信息不对称造成的各种问题,最后对相关问题提出了几点治理对策和建议。     

Overeducation, regional labor markets, and spatial flexibility

For most workers, access to suitable employment is severely restricted by the fact that they look for jobs in the regional labor market rather than the global one. In this paper we analyze how macrolevel opportunities (regional market characteristics) and microlevel restrictions (the extent to which job searchers are restricted to the regional market) can help to explain the phenomenon of overeducation. We use a two-step procedure to control selective access to employment. The results show that the size of the labor market is an important factor in avoiding overeducation.     

上市公司财务报表附注披露存在的问题、原因及改进

本文首先从我国会计环境的实际出发,指出应对上市公司财务报表附注披露进行适度管制,在此基础上结合实例重点分析了我国上市公司财务报表附注披露存在的问题及成因。由于政出多门等原因,我国上市公司财务报表附注披露信息过载与披露不充分问题并存。     

The e-integration dilemma: The linkages between Internet technology application, trading partner relationships and structural change

The evidence from an empirical study involving 281 Australian organizations suggests that the availability, open nature, and (comparative) ease of implementation of Internet technologies for integration with trading partners, whilst on the one hand providing the means by which organizations can integrate processes and systems in a cost effective way, can amplify the need for both structural change and closer collaboration with trading partners. The relationships proposed and tested in the model are justified and explained based on a number of theoretical perspectives. These include Transaction Cost Economics, Socio-technical Systems, Resource Dependency, Knowledge Based View, Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Learning. The implications of the findings for Transaction Cost Theory are noteworthy firstly because they support the appropriateness of the inter-organizational governance structure in the context of this study, and secondly because although application of these technologies may reduce information search and related costs, whether this necessarily leads to reduced coordination costs is problematic. The potential benefits from improved coordination may be constrained by the perceived costs, and risks, of transition to new structural forms. The implication for practice is that increased use of Internet technologies creates substantial pressure to invest in organizational change. The attractiveness of investing in technologies that place managers in a position where they need to promote organizational change in order to extract adequate returns creates a significant dilemma. On the one hand Internet technologies enable extensive sharing and integration of data among trading partners, but at the same time they create conditions requiring managers to embrace fundamental organizational change in order to leverage the potential of such integration.     

Contests with spying: A comment

The subject of the following comment is a paper by Baik and Shogren which has been published in this journal (Vol. 11, No. 3 (1995) pp. 441–451). In their game-theoretic model, Baik and Shogren connect the informational states of the agents in a way which leads to inconsistencies.     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets

Policies such as the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rule, and technologies such as SEC EDGAR, aim to disseminate corporate disclosures to a wider audience of investors in risky assets. In this study, we adopt an experimental approach to measure whether this wider disclosure is beneficial to these investors. Price-clearing equilibrium models based on utility maximization and non-revealing and fully-revealing prices predict that in a pure exchange economy, an arbitrary trader would prefer that no investors are informed rather than all are informed; non-revealing theory further predicts that an arbitrary trader would prefer a situation in which all traders are informed rather than half the traders are informed. These predictions can be summarized as “None > All > Half”. A laboratory study was conducted to test these predictions. Where previous studies have largely focused on information dissemination and its effects on equilibrium price and insider profits, we focus instead on traders’ expected utility, as measured by their preferences for markets in which none, half, or all traders are informed. Our experimental result contradicts the prediction and indicates “Half > None > All”, i.e. subjects favor a situation where a random half is informed. The implication is that in addition to testing predictions of price equilibrium, experiments should also be used to verify analytical welfare predictions of expected utility under different policy choices. JEL Classification D82, D53, G14, L86 This work was largely completed while this author was at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.     

基于我国证券市场羊群行为的宏观与微观策略

证券市场的羊群行为是指投资者在证券投资中模仿其他投资者决策,在股票价格波动中追涨杀跌的行为.导致我国证券市场羊群行为的原因包括宏观和微观两个层面.为此,本文从宏观和微观两个层面提出抑制羊群行为的相应策略,即培育市场理性与培育理性投资主体两项对策.具体包括:完善信息披露制度;改善证券市场供求关系;完善合理的交易制度;规范证券公司"信息串联"行为;培育理性投资者等.以此来实现改善上市公司的信息披露质量,促进证券市场效率,以减轻羊群行为之害.