Trust and the tendency towards multi-unit franchising: A relational governance view

Previous research mainly focused on the agency-theoretical explanation of multi-unit franchising (MUF). The aim of this study is to develop a relational governance perspective of MUF by investigating the role of knowledge-based trust and general trust in franchisor's choice between multi-unit and single-unit franchising. Our data from the German franchise sector indicate that knowledge-based trust positively influences and general trust negatively influences the franchisor's tendency towards multi-unit franchising.     

股东网络能提高企业创新绩效吗？——两类代理成本的中介效应研究

以中国2010年至2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,运用社会网络分析(SNA)方法,研究股东网络、两类代理成本与企业创新绩效之间的关系。结果表明,股东网络有利于企业创新绩效的提高,两类代理成本在股东网络与企业创新绩效之间有部分中介效应。同时发现,第一类代理成本的中介效应低于第二类代理成本的中介效应,原因在于第一类委托代理关系中股东网络降低了股东与高管之间的信息不对称,进一步降低了第一类代理成本,从而提升了企业的创新绩效;而在第二类委托代理关系中股东网络较大幅度地增加了中小股东的谈判能力,进而降低了大股东对中小股东的剥削程度,也就降低了第二类代理成本,进而也提升了企业的创新绩效,但是第一类代理成本的降低可能小于第二类代理成本的降低。这一研究深化了股东网络与企业创新绩效的认知,细分了两类代理成本的作用机制。     

赛达航空:"服务到家"的精细化运作模式实践者

赛达航空是一家以航空代理为主业的小型企业.航空代理业是一个业务相对简单、竞争异常激烈的行业,生存在这个行业中的企业要想培育自己独特的竞争优势就变得非常困难.创造并成功实施一种好的商业模式是培育企业竞争优势的一种可行的途径.作为一家小型企业,在信息时代里,同时面对传统的航空代理企业和便捷的网络航空代理商的双重竞争压力,赛...     

Foreign ownership mode,executive compensation structure,and corporate governance: Has the literature missed an important link? Evidence from Taiwanese firms

We propose an alternate context-based extension to the agency theory-grounded explanation of foreign ownership mode choices proposed in the literature. Using a sample of Taiwanese firms investing in the greater China region over the 2001–2009 period, we show that both economic and non-economic factors influence the choice of foreign ownership mode. In addition, we document that higher institutional ownership percentages motivate Taiwanese firms to select shared ownership in the greater China region. Further, no long term compensation mix/ownership structure link is found. These findings run counter to a theory provided for foreign ownership mode choices of US based firms. Our findings provide support for the validity of stewardship and social capital theory, but not financial incentives-based agency theory, for Taiwanese firms investing in the greater China region.     

Information,Knowledge and Agency: The Information Theoretic Approach and the Austrians

Both the Information Theoretic Economics and Austrian Economics investigate the impact on market activity of problems of information and knowledge. The conceptions of information and knowledge they employ, however, as well as their respective views on and treatment of economic agency, are quite different. The purpose of this paper is to examine these differences, not primarily from an abstract philosophical point of view, but by looking at substantive examples of the economics offered by the two approaches. An attempt is made to explain the Austrian preference for non-formalist approaches to economic analysis.     

Big Five Audits and Accounting Fraud*

We examine the association between Big Five audits and the incidence of accounting frauds allegedly committed by U.S. public companies between 1981 and 2001. Many commentators argue that the prominent financial reporting failures that led to major corporate governance reforms cast serious doubt on whether the large public accounting firms continue to supply relatively high‐quality audits, especially in recent years. However, in unmatched and matched samples, we provide strong, robust evidence that fraudulent financial reporting becomes less likely with the presence of a Big Five auditor. Importantly, time‐series tests suggest that the Big Five are consistently associated with a lower incidence of fraudulent accounting, including in the last five years of our sample period when the number of frauds soared. Moreover, we find evidence implying that these relations are causal rather than an artifact of endogeneity in auditor choice.     

质检机构B/S架构检验信息管理系统的开发应用

对原有的C/S结构下产品质量监督检验综合服务平台进行改进与提升，通过B/S架构平台完整实现内部流程和业务的信息化管理。同时，对外拓宽检验信息状态，及时通知、查询企业质量状况等内容，以适应我国电子政务和现代管理发展趋势，更好的建设服务型质检技术支撑机构。     

Does conglomeration really reduce credit risk?

I quantify the effects of conglomeration on credit risk by first computing theoretical default probabilities for conglomerates and their hypothetical stand‐alone counterparts and then mapping them into physical probabilities using a comprehensive database of corporate failures. Comparing the credit risk of conglomerates with that of hypothetical stand‐alone firms, I report significant reductions in the annual probability of default for small firms. My results support the proposition that managers can have a strong incentive to engage in conglomeration, even if it reduces shareholder value and show for which firms this is the case.     

The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels

Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements. These programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion. We compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way.We discuss possible adverse effects of whistle-blowing programs on firms' behavior, and particularly on turnover, incentives to innovate and cooperation. We also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.     

Agency costs of vertical integration—the case of family firms,investor‐owned firms and cooperatives in the French wine industry

Vertical integration theory has long suggested internal costs related to changes in incentives due to vertical integration, which means that vertical integration may lead to agency costs. In this work, we specify the notion of agency costs of vertical integration and extend Ang et al. (2000)'s measurement of agency costs to provide an empirical assessment of these costs in the French wine industry. Our econometric analysis finds that the agency costs of vertical integration may reach 2–3% of sales. It also showed that operating expenses of vertical integration are lower for cooperatives than for other firms, while vertical integration is less rewarding for them. This raises questions on the relation between agency costs in cooperatives and their performance.