Does the Delphi process lead to increased accuracy in group-based judgmental forecasts or does it simply induce consensus amongst judgmental forecasters?

We investigate the relative impact of internal Delphi process factors - including panelists' degree of confidence, expertise, majority/minority positioning - and an external factor, richness of feedback - on opinion change and subsequent accuracy of judgmental forecasts. We found that panelists who had low confidence in their judgmental forecast and/or who were in a minority were more likely to change their opinion than those who were more confident and/or in a majority. The addition of rationales, or reasons, to the numeric feedback had little impact upon panelists' final forecasts, despite the quality of panelists' rationales being significantly positively correlated with accurate forecasts and thus of potential use to aid forecast improvement over Delphi rounds. Rather, the effect of rationales was similar to that of confidence: to pull panelists towards the majority opinion regardless of its correctness. We conclude that majority opinion is the strongest influence on panelists' opinion change in both the ‘standard’ Delphi, and Delphi-with-reasons. We make some suggestions for improved variants of the Delphi-with-reasons technique that should help reduce majority influence and thereby permit reasoned arguments to exert their proper pull on opinion change, resulting in forecast accuracy improvements over Delphi rounds.     

Cost-effective compensation to avoid carbon emissions from forest loss: An approach to consider price-quantity effects and risk-aversion

Analyses were carried out on financial compensation to avoid loss of tropical forests and related carbon (C) emissions when marginal financial yield declined for land-use options with extended areas, and when a risk-averting perspective (modeled according to financial theory around the capital asset pricing model) is assumed. The approach in this study was to consider natural forest, forest plantation, pasture, and cropland simultaneously to investigate how an optimized land-use distribution may reduce the amount of compensation necessary to avoid C emissions from forest loss.The financial compensations derived were as high as US$ 176 per hectare per year when comparing natural forests only with the most profitable alternative (croplands). However, compensation decreased to US$ 124 for risk-neutral decision-makers, who would strive for optimized land-use allocation, and to only US$ 47 per hectare per year for risk-avoiders, who would look to maximize the reward-to-variability ratio. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the compensation under risk-aversion increased much less than under risk-ignoring when increased productivity of agricultural land-use or growing demand for agricultural products was simulated. It was concluded that considering appropriate diversification strategies and the well documented human behavior to avoid risks is an important step in developing cost-effective compensation policies.     

内蒙古草原生态补偿意愿的实证研究

草原生态补偿意愿是确定草原生态补偿标准的重要参考,理论上补偿意愿包括补偿主体的支付意愿和补偿对象的受偿意愿。利用条件价值评估法(CVM)研究补偿主体的支付意愿和补偿对象的受偿意愿。通过采用SPSS软件中的皮尔逊相关分析法得出如下结论:内蒙古地区居民对草原生态补偿的支付意愿是23.10元/hm2.年;内蒙古草原牧区牧民的受偿意愿是1 944.75/hm2.年。影响支付意愿的因素主要是被访者的受教育程度(即学历水平)、对草原生态环境的认知程度和家庭人口;影响受偿意愿的因素主要是牲畜饲养方式和牧民居住地距离旗政府所在地的距离。     

土地使用管制及其利益补偿研究:理论和实践意义

运用文献回顾以及微观经济学理论和方法,对土地使用管制的目的、功能、手段、效果、补偿等问题进行了探讨。对土地使用的限制是目前我国土地管理制度存在的突出和新的问题。研究认为,必要的管制是有益的,但是要审慎运用管制手段,并注重对权利主体的利益保护和必要的补偿。土地使用管制是政府配置土地资源、干预土地市场的一种方式。纠正土地使用的外部性、提供公共产品是管制的主要目的。土地使用管制的存在是必要的,但是人们必须注意加强对其效果的研究。这些效果有些是积极的,有些是消极的。土地使用管制本身是有成本的。随着社会的发展,土地使用管制方式越来越多样化,越具有弹性化和市场化。由于管制而给有关主体造成的影响可通过税、费或者补偿的方式予以再调整,以维护社会公平,并达到特定的社会目标。     

基于均衡博弈模型的土地流转杠杆平衡机制

深入分析了确保土地开发利益平衡应聚焦的三大问题,即有限土地资源的集约利用、建设用地开发与农用地保护及城乡统筹的利益平衡、城市发展空间的进一步有效拓展;提出了土地流转杠杆平衡机制的设计框架;采用纳什均衡博弈模型,构建了利益补偿机制模型和风险托底机制模型。研究结果表明,可以通过杠杆机制来平衡多边利益,得到土地流转过程中的利益补偿和风险托底的基金分配方案。最后,提出了土地流转的配套政策。     

上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

高管薪酬问题是公司治理理论的核心,如何科学、客观、准确地评价高管薪酬是理论界和实践界共同关注的焦点。通过计算2008年1 581家上市公司的高管薪酬指数,提出基于公司业绩的高管薪酬指数,并分行业、地区和所有制性质分析了上市公司高管薪酬指数的特点,本文认为对高管薪酬的评价不能简单地使用高管薪酬绝对值,而应充分考虑高管薪酬与企业业绩的匹配程度。     

国有企业经营者报酬契约模型研究

随着现代企业制度在我国的建立和发展,作为现代公司治理的重要内容和公司长远发展的关键因素,激励约束机制引起了学界的广泛关注。与发达的市场经济下的企业组织相比,由于体制原因和历史遗留问题,国有企业激励约束机制的构建面临着多方面的特殊因素,存在诸多困难。本文主要分析了国有企业委托代理关系的特殊性和复杂性,通过建立国企经营者激励约束的报酬契约模型,为国企激励约束机制的改进提供一个新的思路和方法。     

浅谈人力资源-薪酬管理

薪酬管理在现代市场经济中已成为各国企业人力资源管理的重要环节,对企业的竞争能力有巨大影响.进入二十一世纪后,人才市场的进一步开放使得企业必须进行有效的薪酬管理来满足员工的物质、精神需求,促进企业发展.本文通过对薪酬管理基本理论的解析,分析了我国企业薪酬管理中存在的问题及原因,针对这些问题提出了相关对策.     

上市公司高管薪酬外部公平性影响因素研究——基于管理权力论的分析

通过选取2002--2005年中国上市公司面板数据,从管理权力论的角度分析了管理层权力与高管薪酬外部公平性的关系,并进行实证研究,结果发现高管组织权力大小与高管薪酬外部不公平性正相关;高管所有制权力大小与薪酬外部不公平性负相关;股权集中度与高管薪酬外部不公平性负相关;国有控股上市公司的高管薪酬更具有外部公平性。     

违约损害赔偿的经济学分析

从经济学的角度看,违约行为并不总是一件坏事,当违约的收益大于或等于因违约而要承担的违约责任时,当事人就有违约的激励。否之,则有履约的激励。违约损害赔偿作为价格高低可以影响当事人选择违约亦或履约的激励。违约损害赔偿的经济目标是鼓励有效率的违约,阻止无效率的违约。通过三种方案的比较,将可得利益损失纳入违约损害赔偿之内,是唯一可以实现违约损害赔偿经济目标,满足法律的效率要求的方案。