Fiscal rules and budget forecast errors of Italian municipalities

We study the impact of the domestic stability pact on the accuracy of budget forecasts of Italian municipalities. Identification of the causal effect exploits a quasi-natural experiment generated by the removal in 2001 of the fiscal restraints on budget decisions for municipalities with fewer than 5000 inhabitants and by stricter budgetary restrictions and severe penalties for noncompliers in 2002. We find that relaxing fiscal rules had a sizeable impact on budget forecast errors, especially in 2002. In fact, revenue (expenditure) forecast errors for municipalities with fewer than 5000 inhabitants became 26% (22%) larger than in the past.     

刺芪参胶囊的制备工艺研究

目的:探索刺芪参胶囊的制备工艺。方法:采用正交实验,以总皂苷质量为指标,优化提取工艺;采用单因素实验优化制剂工艺。结果:在最佳提取工艺条件下,刺芪参胶囊提取物中的总皂苷含量为12.19 mg·g-1;以糊精作为填充剂、硬脂酸镁为助流剂、95%乙醇为黏合剂制备胶囊剂。结论:刺芪参胶囊的制备工艺稳定可行。     

Competition‐driven repositioning

We study competition as an impetus for firms to reposition—to abandon their current positioning strategy and adopt a new one. We predict that as a strong firm moves closer, competition erodes the profitability of situated firms and prompts them to reposition. We expect this effect is pronounced the greater difference in competitive strength. However, we expect that countervailing forces exist such that the viability of alternative positions and the opportunity cost of abandoning a current position mitigate this effect. Evidence from a natural experiment in China's satellite television industry supports our hypotheses. This research adds to the existing literature on repositioning, which emphasizes the phenomenon as opportunity‐driven, and to the competitive interaction literature, which typically does not distinguish between noncounterattack strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of consumer demand for circular economy products. A case for reuse and remanufacturing for sustainable development

We investigate determinants of consumer demand for circular (reused and remanufactured) products. Based on exploratory choice-based conjoint experiments with a sample of 800 adults in the United Kingdom, we examine two types of premium segment electronic appliances: a mobile phone and a robot vacuum cleaner. We find that consumers prefer partly circulated products over fully or not at all circulated products and that circular products can likely successfully enter the existing market at the retail price of a new product. Interestingly, circular products compete for market share primarily with new products, leaving the market share of second-hand options less affected. The results show a promising path for firms considering a transition to circular business models.     

Discouraging Rainforest Transformation: An Ex-ante Policy Impact Analysis

Despite extensive efforts made by national and international certification agencies, Indonesian smallholder farmers’ participation in palm oil certification schemes adoption remains low. A fundamental obstacle is the smallholder practice of rainforest transformation into oil palm plantation which is forbidden by the agencies. In this context, we investigate three policies that could lead to a reduction in rainforest deforestation by smallholders: price premium on certified palm oil; the provision of environmental information; contributor recognition. In order to evaluate the influence of the policies ex-ante, we conduct a social dilemma experiment involving rubber and oil palm smallholders in Jambi Province, Sumatra, Indonesia. The findings indicate that the price premium and provision of context-specific environmental information could reduce rainforest transformation. However, a statistically significant effect of contributor recognition was not found.     

Money secrets: How does trade secret legal protection affect firm market value? Evidence from the uniform trade secret act

Research summary : We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm market value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about its value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, but a negative effect in industries with (1) high resource–value uncertainty and (2) high poor‐investment risk. Managerial summary : We argue that an increase in trade secret legal protection might not unequivocally benefit firm owners when selling their business. A stronger trade secret protection increases the market value of firms in industries with high workers' mobility, but it decreases the market value of firms in industries with uncertain resource value and/or high risk of poor‐acquisition investments. Based on the contingent effect of trade secret protection, companies may want to adjust their strategic decisions, including where to locate or relocate, based in part on whether they will derive benefits or suffer losses when trade secrets are better protected. Finally, our study should help policymakers understand more fully the economic impact of government policies associated with trade secrets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

We experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment decisions as independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment. The third party’s exaggerated emotion towards free riders is proposed to explain their superior punishment effectiveness.     

Tuition fees and social segregation: lessons from a natural experiment at the University of Paris 9-Dauphine

Using a natural experiment, a sharp rise in tuition fees in some of the programmes at the University of Paris 9-Dauphine, we study the impact of tuition fees on students’ pathways, and outcomes. We apply an optimal matching method to the national database of students’ registrations (SISE) to define a typology of pathways. We then use a nonordered multinomial logit model to evaluate the impact of the rise in tuition fees on the types of pathways selected by the university. We show that there is a significant impact on these pathways. The increase in tuition fees reduces geographic and social mobility, thereby accentuating the phenomena of social segregation. Furthermore, contrary to what some of the studies assert, the rise does not appear to encourage greater effort: we find no impact on the graduation success rate.     

Regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability

This paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance. Our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance. In the Random Audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection. In the Tournament Audit mechanism the probability of inspection increases with the degree of estimated underreporting. To study the effects of social information, the experiment varies the observability of identity, output, and compliance decisions. Optimal output is theoretically independent of the auditing scheme, but equilibrium reporting is higher under the Tournament mechanism than Random auditing. Experimental findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions for reporting, but deviate modestly for output. In particular, we find that average output is lower and reporting is higher in the Tournament treatment compared to the Random Audit treatment. At the individual level, a majority of participants misreported in most periods. Social observability does not affect output or reporting significantly in either of the audit treatments.