Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?

This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non‐star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non‐star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non‐star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non‐star CEOs compared with star CEOs.     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.     

Determinants of organizational performance: some implications for top executive leadership in Korean firms

ABSTRACT

Leadership, although commonly assumed to be greatly significant, is not typically studied in terms of structural characteristics accounted for in organizational performance. The effect of top executive leadership is explored here as a key factor that reflects organizational characteristics by offering a new framework and presenting an empirical test of Korean business firms. This research can be possibly made by focusing on the size of the leadership which explicates the difference between structural, resource and contextual variables in organizations. The multivariate regression analysis shows that firm size, leadership, debt and export significantly affect organizational performance, as measured by net income. The mechanism of Korean business firms needs to readjust to the new environment for organizational performance.     

Who's the Boss at the Top? A Micro‐Level Analysis of Director Expertise,Status and Conformity Within Boards

In this paper we address how director expertise impacts a director's social status and conformity within the board. Our results, derived from two unique multi‐source datasets of peer ratings on director status and conformity of non‐executive directors from Dutch organizations, indicate that industry‐specific expertise and financial expertise differently impact directors’ social status and influence within the board. We find that directors’ individual performance orientation – the motivation to demonstrate expertise – acts as an important contingency for expertise to increase directors’ status within the board. Additional analyses using archival data and interviews with non‐executive directors substantiate our findings and provide additional insight into the dynamics operating within boards. This study extends existing research on boards of directors and provides unique micro‐level insights into the boardroom dynamics that connect director expertise to director status and conformity within boards.     

Human Capital Factors Affecting Human Resource (HR) Managers' Commitment to HR and the Mediating Role of Perceived Organizational Value on HR

Human resource (HR) managers’ commitment to their occupation (HR) leads to the proper delivery and implementation of HR practices and, therefore, is deemed as a critical factor for the success of HR practices. Based on sociocognitive, human capital, and signaling theories, this study examines: (a) HR managers’ own and their chief HR officer's (CHRO) HR‐specific human capital as antecedents of their commitment to HR, and (b) the mediating mechanism through which the CHRO’s HR‐specific human capital positively influences HR managers’ commitment to HR. Based on 146 HR managers from 146 organizations in South Korea, the findings of the current study suggest that HR managers with higher levels of HR‐specific human capital and those working with CHROs with higher levels of HR‐specific human capital tend to have higher levels of commitment to HR. In addition, CHROs with higher levels of HR‐specific human capital positively influence HR managers’ commitment to HR by signaling to them that HR and its function are valued and cared about by their organizations. Theoretical and practical implications of this study are discussed along with study limitations and further research directions. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

The asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation: a panel threshold regression approach

Prior research shows that chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their earnings management. We re-examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach, which allows the effect of earnings management on the CEO compensation to change across the level of earnings management and CEO compensation. Our results show that the effect of CEOs’ discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation. In particular, for firms with moderate (inordinate) levels of earnings management and CEO compensation, earnings management is rewarded (penalized).     

高管薪酬与经营风险的内在联系及实证检验——基于上市银行的研究

本文基于委托代理理论和上市银行的数据,研究银行高管薪酬与经营风险的内在联系。研究结论显示,高管长期薪酬及总薪酬与银行风险水平呈现负相关性,即高管长期薪酬和总薪酬水平较高时,银行经营风险相对较低。因此,应发挥银行董事会在高管薪酬制定中的作用,制定科学合理的薪酬水平和薪酬结构,运用股权激励、延期支付等长期薪酬激励方式激励银行高管,促进银行控制风险,创新经营和可持续发展。     

企业商业信用融资影响因素研究——基于管理人员研究经历的视角

本文以2008-2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,探讨管理人员研究经历对商业信用融资的"净效应"。研究结果表明,管理人员研究经历有助于企业获取更多的商业信用融资;相较于国有企业,管理人员研究经历有助于提升民营企业的商业信用融资;而当民营企业处于法治水平相对滞后的地区时,这种正向影响更为显著。关于作用机理的进一步研究表明,管理人员研究经历是通过强化企业内部控制建设、降低企业财务风险进而提升了企业获取商业信用的能力。