非国有经济发展对中国经济增长质量影响机理研究——来自VEC模型的新证据

转轨以来,中国非国有经济的发展促进了经济增长的数量扩张.这是因为,经济非国有化改革作为一种制度创新,是一种增量式改革.这种改革使得体制内利益在未受影响的条件下,实现了帕雷托式的增长.然而,非国有经济的发展并没有带来中国经济增长质量的同比改善.这是因为,中国民营企业发展一般都过分强调以利润为中心,忽略环境成本,并且由于融资困难等因素导致了其技术创新能力的弱化;其次,中国引进的外资不仅在技术和管理创新的扩散效应上没能达到预期效果,而且日益增加的加工贸易通过转移定价方式使中国经济不能充分享有出口增长带来的利润贡献.     

关于自然保护投入来源的探究

现阶段自然保护的目标是提高经济增长的稳定性和降低经济增长的社会成本。围绕着这一目标,解决自然保护所需投入问题的关键,是建立行之有效的投入机制。     

Can the Risks of the Kyoto Mechanisms be Reduced Through Portfolio Diversification? Evidence from the Swedish AIJ Program

Through Joint Implementationand the Clean Development Mechanism, reductionsof greenhouse gas emissions achieved abroad canbe credited to domestic firms. However, thetechnical, economic and political risksinvolved may prevent the private sector frominvesting in such projects. This paperdescribes three types of risks which emissionreduction projects are exposed to. Eleven pilotprojects carried out under the ActivitiesImplemented Jointly (AIJ) program and financedby Sweden are evaluated. Actual project costsare found to exceed projected costs in allcases. Annual emission reductions also deviatefrom their expected values and vary stronglyover time, supporting the hypothesis that suchprojects are risky business. The riskmanagement tool portfolio diversification isapplied to a sample of Swedish AIJ projects.The results indicate that diversification canreduce the risks of greenhouse gas mitigationprojects significantly. Thus, carbon funds area promising way of lowering the risks of theKyoto Mechanisms for private sector investors.     

期货交易所财务管理体制创新研究

笔者在对期货交易所现行财务管理体制分析的基础上提出优化期货交易所财务管理体制必须处理好几个关键点:政府监管与自律管理的关系、交易所财务管理的目标、共同治理的治理结构、内部财务监控组织设置、以预算管理为轴心、对下属子公司集权与分权的选择等,而且要从动力机制、决策机制、控制机制、评价机制四个方面建立起有效的财务管理运行机制。     

Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation

Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored.     

杭嘉湖平原地区土地利用变化驱动机制分析

选择位于杭嘉湖平原地区社会经济快速发展的浙江省海盐县为研究区,利用遥感数据,对研究区土地利用类型的空间转移与格局变化进行分析的基础上,选取研究区土地利用变化的社会经济驱动因子,运用典型相关分析方法诊断各社会经济驱动因子对土地利用变化格局形成贡献作用的大小,同时运用典型相关系数和冗余度分析,检验了分析结果。研究结果表明,人口密度、单位面积工业总产值、单位面积农业总产值、城镇化水平、农民人均年纯收入等5个因子是影响研究区土地利用变化的主要社会经济驱动因子。     

民间资本供求与民营企业融资:对陕西的实证分析

本文建立在调研和有关资料基础上对陕西现实及潜在的民间资本供求进行测算分析,从总量和结构等方面实证了民间资本供给充足、而民营经济对民间资本的需求欲望非常强烈这一结论,要解除民间资本供求的市场失灵现象,就必须构建以"民资、民用、民管"为原则的内生性融资机制,建立社区民间金融管理组织和社区民间金融市场,选择内生性融资方式,创新其融资产品,实现民间资本供给与民营经济对其需求的有效对接.     

绿洲系统"三生"承载力驱动机制与模式的理论探讨

以全新的视角解释了绿洲系统生态-生产-生活承载力的内涵，从生态、经济与社会效益的角度分别以水资源、投资作为驱动因子分析了绿洲系统“三生”承载力的驱动机制，阐明了人口在绿洲系统“三生”承载力驱动机制中的双重作用。水资源、投资与人口共同影响着绿洲系统“三生”承载力的模式类型与更替机理，绿洲系统“三生”承载力模式类型的科学界定，对合理开发绿洲系统具有重要现实意义。     

会计价值机制论

本文认为,市场和企业是组织经济活动的形式,也是组织价值信息传递和价值激励的系统。市场价格机制是在长期市场供求关系作用下而形成的,而会计价值机制是随着企业的发展不断演化,在企业目标引导下组织价值信息传递和价值信息激励,以促成企业目标实现。企业替代市场或取得竞争优势,都是基于相同的原因和两种机制作用的结果,即是通过企业提供的产品或服务的成本低于市场价格而实现的。     

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.