ANALYST REPUTATION,DEALER AFFILIATION,AND MARKET MAKING

We investigate the effects of analysts' affiliation and reputation on dealers' market making activities. We find that for a given stock, dealers who have affiliated analysts covering the stock quote and trade more aggressively than those who do not have any affiliated analysts. More important, the reputation of affiliated analysts plays an additional role in the affiliated dealer's quote and trade behavior. Dealers with affiliated star analysts post more aggressive quotes and have larger market shares than dealers with affiliated nonstar analysts. Although dealers who post more aggressive quotes also induce affiliated star analysts to cover the stocks, the positive effect of analyst reputation on the affiliated dealers' quote aggressiveness remains significant and robust after controlling for potential endogenous and simultaneous problems.     

The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world

We study the role of institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries. We find that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with good governance, while foreign institutions tend to overweight firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and members of the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. Firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures. Our results indicate that foreign and independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to firms, are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide.     

Technological innovation and real investment booms and busts

We investigate why new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment. We develop an equilibrium model in which rational, risk-averse agents overinvest in a risky technology, possibly to the point that its expected return is negative. Overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments. Competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with “keeping up with the Joneses” properties that can induce herding. Because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology, our model can explain why new, risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles.     

GLAMOUR VERSUS VALUE: TRADING BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

We design a new metric to measure the net buying and selling by institutions and individual investors and find that from 1980 to 2004 institutional investors were net buyers of growth stocks and net sellers of value stocks, implying that individual investors were net buyers of value stocks and net sellers of glamour stocks. The institutional preference for glamour and value stocks seems to be related to sell‐side analysts' recommendations and recent favorable stock price performances, especially during the post‐1994 period. Finally, the institutional buying of growth stocks and sale of value stocks was not based on superior information.     

EFFECT OF FED POLICY ACTIONS ON THE DEFAULT LIKELIHOOD OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.     

A note on the existence of unique equivalent martingale measures in a Markovian setting

Simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure are provided. Furthermore, these conditions give us a handle on situations where an equivalent martingale measure cannot exist. The existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure is of relevance to problems in mathematical finance. Two examples of models for which the question of existence was unresolved are studied. By means of our results existence of a unique equivalent measure up to an explosion time is proved.     

On the Role of Futures Trading in Spot Market Fluctuations: Perpetrator of Volatility or Victim of Regret?

We examine the role of index futures trading in spot market volatility. We use the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) approach to measure volatility, analyze causality and feedback relations between volatilities in the spot and futures markets, and test various hypotheses in the context of a multivariate model that incorporates other macrostate variables. Our empirical results suggest index futures trading may not be blamed for the observed volatility in the spot market. Rather, we find stronger and more consistent support for the alternative posture that volatility in the futures market is an outgrowth of a turbulent cash market. We use the regret (cognitive dissonance) theory to explain our results.     

Forms of Foreign Investment Liberalization and Risk in Emerging Stock Markets

I examine the effect of different forms of foreign investment liberalization on risk in emerging equity markets, including international cross-listings and closed-end country funds, and in the domestic equity market as foreign investment restrictions are eliminated. I find that in Latin American markets volatility declines significantly with different forms of foreign investment liberalization, and in Asian markets volatility does not increase significantly. Volatility is driven by domestic factors in South America, but the transmission of volatility from the United States to Mexico increases after liberalization. The market risk exposure increases in Argentina after liberalization, in Chile with an index of American Depositary Receipts, and in Thailand with greater foreign ownership, reducing the diversification benefits of these markets.