The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex,lies, and firm value

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.     

试析监测与监控技术在桥梁施工中的价值

目前,我国现代化进程不断加快,桥梁的建设也日趋现代化。因此,加强桥梁施工的监测与监控管理,提高监测与监控技术,进一步确保桥梁施工的进度和质量,为国家和社会做出该有的贡献。     

主通风机在线监控系统中的抗干扰措施研究

主通风机在线监控系统中的数据容易受到强电磁环境中的电磁干扰而产生数据失真,为此本文着重探讨主通风机在线监控系统中抗干扰措施,包括硬件抗干扰和软件抗干扰措施,为该监控系统的可靠运行提供了一种新的解决方法。     

广甘高速公路边坡安全监测实践与思考

本文结合四川广甘高速公路边坡安全监测实践,对边坡安全监测技术的发展过程与前景进行了认真的思考与分析。     

艺术类高校质量监控体系存在的问题及对策研究

本文从艺术类高校质量监控的传统形式出发,分析了当前艺术类高校教学质量监控体系存在的问题,并根据艺术类学校的特点,针对艺术类院校教学监控体系中存在的问题提出了对策。     

Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of board directors with foreign experience (BDFEs) on stock price crash risk. We find that BDFEs help reduce crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including a firm fixed effects model, controlling for possibly omitted variables, and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, we find that the negative association between BDFEs and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with more agency problems, weaker corporate governance, and less overall transparency. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of board directors matter in determining stock price crash risk.     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.     

The Importance of Monitoring for Developing Intra-Group Trust in Ethiopian Female Workgroups

We examine the relation between intra-group trust and monitoring in a patriarchal society, and how this relation affects workgroup performance. Data were collected from 352 women who were members of 72 female workgroups in Addis Ababa by means of field experiments and a survey. The data are analyzed using multiple mediation analysis. We find that intra-group trust needs time to develop, and that trust is higher in workgroups with more monitoring. The positive relation between monitoring and trust might be explained by women’s ambition to overcome disempowerment and negative gender stereotypes. The results also indicate positive effects of intra-group trust and monitoring on workgroup performance, and that the effect of monitoring runs through its relation with trust. The last finding stresses the importance of monitoring for developing intra-group trust in these female workgroups.     

Evaluating Board Roles Performance in Adopting Corporate Social Responsibility （CSR） Practices

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the board roles that make a board effective in the performance of adopting corporate social responsibility （CSR） practices. This paper examines directors＇ perceptions of the three main roles： monitoring, service, and strategic, which provide tools for critically understanding how the board adds the value in moving the organization towards more CSR practices. The stakeholder theory is used to distinguish the influence of the three main roles on the adoption of CSR practices. Primary data were collected for this research by conducting structured questionnaires with a sample of 461 directors from Saudi listed companies for study purpose. The results show that an appropriate mix of directors＇ roles and the development of sound board monitoring and service roles are the most crucial determinants of CSR adoption in Saudi listed companies. As the extant corporate governance and CSR literatures do not provide a clear perspective with contradictory outcomes about board roles in influencing CSR practices, the originality of this research is its contribution by evaluating the directors＇ perceptions of developing a direct relationship between the board roles and the adoption of CSR practices. Furthermore, the use of the stakeholder theory provides additional insights into identifying the most influential board role factors enhancing stakeholders＇ expectations of CSR practices.     

Monitoring as a partially observable decision problem

Monitoring is an important and costly activity in resource management problems such as containing invasive species, protecting endangered species, preventing soil erosion, and regulating contracts for environmental services. Recent studies have viewed optimal monitoring as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which provides a framework for sequential decision making under stochastic resource dynamics and uncertainty about the resource state. We present an overview of the POMDP framework and its applications to resource monitoring. We discuss the concept of the information content provided by monitoring systems and illustrate how information content affects optimal monitoring strategies. Finally, we demonstrate how the timing of monitoring in relation to resource treatment and transition can have substantial effects on optimal monitoring strategies.