Vertical integration by oil-exporting countries

Intereconomics - Most oil-producing countries have now nationalised their oil reserves and are pursuing their own pricing and marketing policies; in recent years some of them have attempted to...     

Optimal foreign borrowing: The impact of the planning horizon on the half and full debt cycle

We appreciate comments from G. Franke and M. Rauscher.     

The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment,Prices, and Profits of Retailers*

We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.     

Comparable Worth: Some Problems

Can legislation promote equality of earnings between men and women? Stanley Siebert, of Birmingham University, argues that the comparable worth criterion has serious disadvantages.     

Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain

The Freeman–Lazear works council/worker involvement model is assessed over two distinct industrial relations regimes. In non-union British establishments our measures of employee involvement are associated with improved economic performance, whereas for unionized plants negative results are detected. The suggestion is that local distributive bargaining can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen. Also consistent with the model is our finding that mandatory works councils do not impair, and may even improve, the performance of larger German establishments. Yet smaller plants with works councils under-perform, illustrating the problem of tailoring mandates to fit heterogeneous populations.     

Building blocks in the economics of mandates

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more ‘deserving’ workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts—separating the various worker types—the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.