智能化立体车库优化车辆存取策略研究

通过对智能化立体车库的研究，提出了三种可提高车库效率的优化车辆存取策略，即分区存取、交叉存取和自调整策略。     

A note on the projection properties of Hadamard matrices obtained by the first Payley construction

We show that the projections on four factors of an arbitrary orthogonal array of strength 2 allow the estimation of main effects and two-factor interactions when all other effects are assumed to be zero, if those projections satisfy the bounds given by Weils theorem. The only exceptions are the Hadamard matrices of orders 16 and 24. A consequence is again the estimability of main effects and two-factor interactions for the projections on four factors of the first Payley construction for arbitrary run size.     

倾斜摄影测量中影响模型精度的因素分析

目前,倾斜摄影测量作为一种新技术,经过不断的探索、应用和发展,已开始在测绘行业中大显身手,并取得了不小的成绩。通过三维模型进行的矢量数据采集,其矢量精度完全依赖于三维模型精度。论文以实践经验为基础,定性地分析了在航空摄影、像控测量、模型生产三阶段中,影响模型精度的因素,希望对三维模型的生产起到一定的指导作用。     

供应链管理环境下我国中小型第三方物流企业运营解决方案

通过对目前我国中小型第三方物流企业市场现状的分析，从供应链一体化的角度，阐明了提高企业营运竞争力的重要性，并试探性地提出了有关我国中小型第三方物流企业如何在营运层面上提高竞争力的建议与解决方案：     

Less Government—More Wealth? On the Macroeconomics of a Smaller Public Sector in Europe

In this paper, we analyze the reactions of European economies to a fiscal policy strategy aiming at diminishing the public sector. Within the framework of the MSG3 model, a macroeconomic model of the world economy, we perform several simulation experiments to explore the effects of reducing government expenditures permanently in different phases of the business cycle. For this purpose, we combine the fiscal contraction with negative and positive, Euro Area-wide and global, supply and demand shocks. It turns out that adverse Keynesian effects on output and employment tend to be mostly weak and short-lived, whereas long-run effects on output and employment are favorable. Due to these long-run effects, the fiscal contraction policy raises welfare as measured by an asymmetric quadratic objective function. The size of these welfare effects depends on the initial situation in a non-trivial manner.     

Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions

This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309).     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Wage inequality, technology, and trade

The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality.     

Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting

A recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters, as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction. However, in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co-ordinate their wage setting. The present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco-ordinated wage setting, thus lowering unemployment in the unco-ordinated outcome, it also reduces wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. It is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment, via the strengthening of the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate.