Die Bewertung von Handelsrisiken eines Übertragungsnetzbetreibers anhand einer Monte-Carlo-Simulation

EnBW Transportnetze AG (TNG) is the transmission system operator (TSO) of Energie Baden-Württemberg AG. Due to the Renewable Energy Sources Act, the TSOs are obliged to take-up the (fluctuating) complete amount of electricity made of renewable resources. The TSOs have to transform this feeding into a constant output. Therefore, TNG has started trading on the European Power Exchange. The amount of electricity needed to be bought and sold respectively in order to create a constant output involves risks because of price volatility. As a result of the merit-order-effect, these risks increase. Due to this effect, procurement costs generally exceed sales revenues despite of well-balanced quantitative electricity tradings. For evaluating the procurement and merchandise risk at the intraday market, a Monte-Carlo-Simulation is executed on the basis of historical turnover data.     

Induced innovation and spillover effects of US and Canadian research expenditures in Canadian agriculture

This study examines the induced innovation hypothesis (IIH) from 1958 to 2015 for two Canadian agriculture regions: Central Canada (the provinces of Ontario and Quebec) and Western Canada (the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba). There is broadly consistent support for the IIH for Canadian agriculture, especially for Western Canadian agriculture. In addition, there is support for the notion that US, as well as Canadian, research expenditures are important to explain changes in the input ratio in Canadian agriculture in the long run. This indicates the existence of spillover effects from US agricultural research expenditures to Canadian agriculture.     

Should Commodity Exporters Peg to the Export Price?

To account for the specific situation of commodity exporters, pegging to export prices (PEP) has been proposed elsewhere as an alternative to other conventional monetary regimes such as an exchange rate peg or inflation targeting. PEP is supposed to deliver automatic accommodation to terms‐of‐trade shocks, while retaining the credibility gain from a nominal anchor. This paper analyzes the PEP proposal in a dynamic general‐equilibrium model and compares it with a standard Taylor rule, consumer price index (CPI)‐level targeting and a nominal exchange rate peg. Judged by the degree of output stabilization, PEP performs very similar to CPI targeting for export demand as well as domestic demand shocks and underperforms in the case of shocks to the export price. The results suggest that PEP is not superior to conventional CPI targeting from a macroeconomic stabilization perspective.     

Controllers’ use of informational tactics

Controllers typically have a ‘dual accountability’ towards the finance function and operational management, respectively. This dual accountability at times confronts them with conflicting expectations. In this paper, we suggest that ‘informational tactics’ constitute an important resource which controllers rely on so as to handle these expectations and to successfully present themselves vis-à-vis their different internal stakeholders. Drawing upon interview data, we demonstrate that informational tactics relate to different dimensions of information control (i.e. ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘what’ information is to be exchanged) and that they depend on the respective room for manoeuvre a controller has in a given situation. Overall, our analysis adds a more nuanced picture to the literature on controllers’ handling of information and demonstrates the fundamental role of informational tactics for their everyday work.     

Accountability in an agency model: Project selection,effort incentives,and contract design*

We analyze an agency model of project choice and implementation where the agent is held accountable for his performance. We show that implementation of the ex ante efficient project may be impossible, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed wage and bonus rate. If it is possible, the principal may be forced to increase the bonus rate above the optimal project‐specific rate. The higher profit share compensates the agent for pressure he faces when he has to justify/explain his performance.     

An analysis of competing IMF reform proposals

In the wake of several major crises, in which it played a highly controversial role, the IMF has recently come under heavy fire from various quarters. A number of proposals for reform have been put forward, of which the report of the Meltzer Commission has attracted particularly widespread attention. The authors analyze this and some competing reform proposals using the “trilemma of economic integration”, which the US Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, suggested as a common framework for investigation.     

The Sources of Financing Constraints

Which financial frictions drive firms’ financing constraints? We structurally estimate dynamic firm financing models embedding many financial frictions, on panels of public firms and private firms. We focus on limited enforcement, moral hazard, and trade-off models and assess which models rationalize best observed corporate policies across various samples. Our tests, based on empirical policy function benchmarks, favor trade-off models for larger public firms, limited commitment models for smaller public firms, and moral hazard models for Private firms. Our estimates suggest significant financing constraints due to agency frictions and highlight the importance of identifying their sources for firm valuation.     

Exploring the Persuasiveness of Accounting Numbers in the Framing of ‘Performance’ – A Micro-Level Analysis of Performance Review Meetings

Based on a micro-level analysis of performance review meetings and drawing on an interactional framing perspective, this paper analyses the role of accounting numbers as ‘framing devices’ in discussions about performance. Analyzing interactions between superiors and subordinates, we examine how and why these two groups of actors mobilize different accounting numbers to make claims about performance and try to persuade the other party. Our interest is with the choice of accounting numbers and how they come to be seen as persuasive. The main theoretical argument developed in this paper is that whether a specific accounting number or indicator comes to be seen as persuasive or not in a particular situation is both a matter of how legitimate the underlying indicator is to the actors involved as well as whether they regard the signal it provides, i.e. the actual outcome on this particular indicator, as salient when compared to the actual outcomes on alternative indicators. Taken together, our findings suggest that persuasiveness is not an ‘objective’ quality of accounting numbers, but a situated achievement that results from interactive alignments between different actors with potentially competing interests.