利率市场化条件下农村信用社贷款定价方法研究——湖南的现状考察与模式选择

提高贷款定价能力、增强贷款定价的自主性和科学性是利率市场化条件下农村信用社的必然选择.作为金融支持社会主义新农村建设主力军的湖南省农村信用社,应从自身实际情况出发,选择与之相适应的贷款定价模式--市场与成本相机抉择的成本相加定价模式,并进一步完善具有市场化特征的贷款定价机制.     

发展我国预约定价安排制度的思考

作为解决关联企业转让定价问题的一种方法,预约定价出现较晚,人们对其了解也较少。本文在简单阐述预约定价安排制度的基础上,分析了预约定价的优缺点,并结合我国预约定价的实践,提出了进一步完善我国预约定价安排制度的若干建议。     

Intraorganizational influences on business-to-business pricing strategies: A political economy perspective

Historically, researchers have addressed pricing issues from many different perspectives, including the firm's business model (cost structure, experience curve), stakeholders (customers and channel partners), competition (market structure and intensity), and macroeconomic issues (interest rates, economic growth). An important dimension of organizational price setting that has been neglected is the impact that the firm's internal political system, reflected in interdepartmental coordination and rivalry, has upon price setting. A study of managers who are influential in shaping the firm's pricing strategy was conducted to identify intraorganizational issues and their relative impact on the firm's pricing strategy. The results of the study provide important implications for the development and execution of a firm's pricing strategy.     

Markup pricing in petroleum refining:: A multiproduct framework

This paper describes a structural model of markup pricing under joint production with quasi-fixed inputs of capital, labor, and inventories. The price–cost markups are functions of the inverse price elasticity of demand, an industry average conjectural variation elasticity, and the inventory to sales ratio. Our empirical findings suggest significant markups over marginal cost that differ considerably by product. This study also estimates the elasticities of markups with respect to supply and demand shocks.     

Why is Price Dispersion Higher Online than Offline? The Impact of Retailer Type and Shopping Risk on Price Dispersion

When physically similar products, of similar quality, are offered by retailers both online and offline, we often observe that the dispersion in prices of these products online is greater than the price dispersion offline. This observation runs counter to early theories that suggested price dispersion online would be smaller than that offline due to the ease of search and information availability online. This paper investigates and provides an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon by examining the impact of two important drivers of price dispersion: retailer type and consumers’ shopping risk. Retailer type refers to whether a retailer is a pure offline, pure online, or dual channel retailer. Shopping risk is defined as the product of consumers’ perceived risk of shopping and the transaction uncertainty related to shopping at different types of retailers.A game-theoretic approach is adopted to model consumers’ price search and product purchase, as well as price competition within and across retailer types in online and offline markets. Equilibrium pricing strategies are derived for different retailer types competing for different consumer segments with different levels of perceived shopping risk. The impact of retailer type and shopping risk on online versus offline price dispersion are quantified, and conditions when price dispersion is greater online than offline are identified.Results indicate that price dispersion is greater online when the number of pure online retailers is sufficiently large and is increasing in the number of pure online retailers. In addition, a reduction in online shopping risk may actually increase online price dispersion. Results further suggest that even without any online sales, dual channel retailers should maintain their online presence for the purpose of information dissemination, which justifies the importance for pure offline retailer to incorporate webrooming strategies, where consumers can search for prices online but purchase offline.     

Retail Market Power in a Shopping Basket Model of Supermarket Competition

Supermarket retailers typically operate with relatively low margins, suggesting a highly competitive retail environment. However, despite the fact that consumers purchase an entire shopping basket at a time from supermarkets, this evidence is largely based on models of retail competition with single-category purchases. In this paper, we develop and test an empirical model of retail price competition that explicitly accounts for the effect of demand complementarity among items in consumer shopping baskets. Relative to the case where consumers purchase products with independent demands, we demonstrate that equilibrium prices are higher for all items when retailers take demand-complementarity into account. Our findings indicate that non-price strategies intended to encourage complementarity, such as co-merchandising, strategic shelf-positioning, or featuring complementary goods tend to soften price competition, and lead to higher equilibrium prices.     

The Bakery: a cross-functional case study for introductory managerial accounting

This instructional case is designed to achieve four educational objectives: (1) to give students a more complete appreciation of the importance of considering accounting information along with marketing and economics-related information, avoiding a myopic focus on accounting data, (2) to give students practice in pricing, cost volume profit analysis (CVP) and outsourcing decisions, (3) to help students learn to build spreadsheets that are capable of what-if analysis, and (4) to provide an active learning experience that engages introductory accounting students. The Bakery is a non-profit organization whose primary function is to sell baked goods and beverages to students in a large campus residence hall complex. In completing the case, students utilize information provided about the costs and previous pricing structure of The Bakery, along with information they collect about competitors' product offerings, prices, and accompanying services, and their own knowledge of The Bakery's customers, college students and their parents, as a basis for making pricing decisions. Once they have completed the pricing analysis, students use the resulting variable costing income statement to perform CVP and to analyze a decision to potentially outsource The Bakery's operations.     

Timing of Sale,Pricing, and Cost Information: Evidence from the Airline Industry*

This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R² of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R² of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.     

Game-Theoretic Coordination Mechanisms in Distribution Channels: Integration and Extensions for Models Without Competition

A significant game-theoretic literature on the coordination of distribution channels has developed over the past three decades. We provide an extensive analysis of an important subset of this literature, channels without competition. We review four major models that build on the initial work of Jeuland and Shugan (1983) – who developed a quantity-discount schedule that induces channel members to set price and non-price, marketing-mix variables (MM-variables) at channel-coordinating levels. Moorthy (1987) criticized their schedule's complexity, arguing for a simpler wholesale contract that induces coordination by avoiding double marginalization.     

Joint pricing and inventory control for non-instantaneous deteriorating items with partial backlogging and time and price dependent demand

In this paper, a joint pricing and inventory control for non-instantaneous deteriorating items is developed. We adopt a price and time dependent demand function. Shortages is allowed and partially backlogged. The major objective is to determine the optimal selling price, the optimal replenishment schedule and the optimal order quantity simultaneously such that, the total profit is maximized. We first show that for any given selling price, optimal replenishment schedule exists and unique. Then, we show that the total profit is a concave function of price. Next, we present a simple algorithm to find the optimal solution. Finally, we solve a numerical example to illustrate the solution procedure and the algorithm.