Calculating a Standard Error for the Gini Coefficient: Some Further Results*

Several authors have suggested using the jackknife technique to approximate a standard error for the Gini coefficient. It has also been shown that the Gini measure can be obtained simply from an artificial ordinary least square (OLS) regression based on the data and their ranks. We show that obtaining an exact analytical expression for the standard error is actually a trivial matter. Further, by extending the regression framework to one involving seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), several interesting hypotheses regarding the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to changes in the data are readily tested in a formal manner.     

Firm Density and Industry R & D Intensity: Theory and Evidence

By deriving a formal model of industry R & D that identifies factors influencing industry R & D intensity, this paper first suggests firm density, defined as the inverse of average firm sales or simply the number of firms divided by industry sales, as a measure of market structure that is appropriate in explaining industry R & D intensity. The model shows that the cost structure of R & D, consumer preference over quality and price, the appropriability of R & D, firm density, and the average level of firm R & D intensity jointly determine industry R & D intensity. In particular, firm density has a positive relationship with industry R & D intensity, implying that firms in higher firm-density industries feel fiercer competitive pressure and thus engage more intensively in R & D. An empirical analysis of panel data on industry R & D activities of Korean manufacturing industries during the period 1991–1996 provides supportive evidence for the predictions of the model including the positive relationship between firm density and industry R & D intensity. The theoretical model and the empirical results are also consistent with the recent survey of U.S. corporate R & D activities by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Science Foundation (1999).     

Risk compensation in wages – a replication

We use data from Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to test for the effect of earnings variation on individual earnings. We replicate estimates for the USA and find that the variance of earnings in an occupation affects individual wages positively while the skewness of earnings has a negative effect. Both results are in conformity with wage compensation for risk averse workers. First version received: March 2001/Final version received: July 2002 We are grateful to two anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

Income taxes, spending composition and long-run growth

The focus of this paper is threefold. First, it reexamines the impact on long-run growth of changes in flat-rate income taxes when a fraction of total government expenditures is used to provide public services that affect the productivity of privately held inputs. Second, for a given tax policy, this paper studies the impact of government expenditure composition on the rate of economic growth. Third, since demographics follow an overlapping generations structure and fiscal policy affects the economy's productivity, the paper features the role of productivity as a means of redistributing income across generations. The economy is analyzed numerically and policy experiments are carried out.     

(Non-)existence and Scope of Nash Networks

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. We would like to thank two referees for helpful comments.     

Long persuasion games

This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart [R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Long cheap talk, Econometrica 71 (6) (2003) 1619-1660], we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.     

Measuring Barriers to International Division of Labor in East Asia*

International fragmentation has developed dramatically in East Asia since the 1990s. The purpose of the present paper is to measure border barriers in transactions of intermediate goods in East Asian countries. We find that the barriers in each country have steadily declined since 1985. The barriers in China and Taiwan have declined remarkably since the 1980s, whereas those in Indonesia experienced a slight increase in the 1980s. These results are qualitatively unchanged even if we control the effect of agglomeration on intra‐national inputs.     

Governance structures in R&D networks: An analysis in the European context

This paper analyses governance structures used to organize partnerships in R&D networks using two approaches: transaction costs theory and social capital theory. We argue that these theories are complementary; this explains forms of governance through the degrees of administrative (structural and safeguard mechanism) and social factors (cohesion and openness) they embody. Data was obtained from European R&D networks created through Framework Programmes which include a great number of universities, non profit institutions and firms. Findings show the variables that characterize and explain the governance forms based on the applicability of R&D networks. This study not only provides a theoretical model for analysing governance structures of these networks, but is also useful for both improving the management of networks and for fostering collaboration at an international level.     

A comparison of national saving rates in the UK, US and Italy

We develop the approach of Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus [1996. Understanding the postwar decline in US saving: A cohort analysis. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0, 315-390], based on the life-cycle model of savings, to decompose the differences in the national saving rates between the UK, US and Italy. Our work suggests that the US saving rate is lower principally because Americans on average retire later. In contrast, the Italian saving rate is higher predominantly because Italians are credit constrained, particularly when young. We also found that demography and the different tax and benefit systems are able to explain little of the cross-sectional differences in saving rates. The study accounts for the possible importance of inter-generational private transfers in determining saving rates.