供应链系统柔性经济定量模型

企业系统柔性是众多文献讨论得比较多的问题,然而系统地研究供应链系统的柔性,目前还处于初始阶段.在现有为数不多的供应链系统柔性研究文献中,定性讨论较多,定量研究方法多为模拟、加权评价法等.完整而系统地采用数学模型对供应链系统的整体柔性作出定量和说明,对于整个供应链系统的规划和决策,具有重要意义.但是,这方面的研究基本上还是空白.本文利用产品组合柔性（Product mix flexibility）的概念,建立了供应链系统的整体柔性经济定量模型,该模型能够对供应链系统的整体柔性作出定量化解释,从而帮助供应链系统作出柔性决策.     

家庭非农劳动供给时间的影响因素分析

非农劳动供给在家庭中占有非常重要的地位。本文利用四川和安徽12年12乡的农户调查数据,采用Heckman两阶段模型,对影响家庭非农劳动供给的因素做了实证分析。研究结果表明,年龄轻、家庭平均受教育程度高、家庭初始经济能力有利于家庭非农劳动供给决策和非农劳动时间的增加;家庭中男女劳动力的比例对非农劳动供给时间具有不同的影响,土地资源匮乏是家庭从事非农劳动供给的重要原因。文章认为,政府应当在教育培训、信贷支持、通讯设施建设方面加以完善,以增加农户家庭的非农劳动供给。     

人力资本分层与劳动供给的跨期替代

通过人力资本分层的视角来研究劳动供给的跨期替代.我们发现低收入阶层劳动力由于受到信贷约束以及生活、教育、医疗等基本保障的约束,不能在实际中进行劳动供给的跨期替代,中高收入阶层具备了进行劳动供给跨期替代的条件,但由于传统文化习俗、工作合约和潜在失业威胁的存在,一般也不会轻易进行劳动供给的跨期替代.     

Taxes and labor supply: Portugal, Europe, and the United States

I relate hours worked with taxes on consumption and labor for Portugal, France, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. From 1986 to 2001, hours per worker in Portugal decreased from 35.1 to 32.6. With the parameters for Portugal, the model predicts hours worked in 2001 with an error of only 12 min from the actual hours. Across countries, most predictions differ from the data by 1 h or less. The model is not sensible to special assumptions on the parameters. I calculate the long run effects of taxes on consumption, hours, capital and welfare for Portugal. I extend the model to discuss implications for Social Security. I discuss the steady state and the transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system.

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

企业绿色供应链管理模式的探讨

绿色供应链管理模式有助于企业提高资源利用效率，实现了产品生命周期内负环境影响最小化。本文在分析绿色供应链管理模式的内容和运作流程的基础上对企业实施绿色供应链管理提出了相关政策建议。     

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。     

供应链绿色物流管理策略

本文首先分析了开展供应链绿色物流管理的意义,然后讨论了供应链绿色物流管理的内容,最后提出了一些供应链绿色物流管理的策略。     

中国货币供应、通货膨胀及经济增长关系实证研究

采用协整与方差分解的方法时中国货币供应、通货膨胀与经济增长的关系进行实证研究发现，通货膨胀与经济增长在短期和长期中作用关系相反，但都具有回归自然水平趋势，货币供应时通货膨胀和经济增长的影响具有滞后效应，长期内货币非中性。而通货膨胀和经济增长并不影响货币供应。一方面。应当采取措施降低货币供应增长率：另一方面，偏紧货币政策的滞后效应可能导致经济紧缩应当采取措施降低货币供应增长率，因此应谨慎调控宏观经济政策，以避免金融风险。