Social Transfers And Income Inequality In Old Age

Abstract

This paper examines variation in old-age income inequality between industrialized nations with modern welfare systems. The analysis of income inequality across countries with different retirement income systems provides a perspective on public pension policy choices and designs and their distributional implications. Because of the progressive nature of public pension programs, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between the quality of public pension benefits and old-age income inequality—that is, countries with comprehensive, universal, and generous public pension systems will exhibit more equal distributions of income in old age.

Luxembourg Income Study data indeed show that cross-national variation in old-age income inequality is partly explained by differences in the percentage of seniors’ total income derived from public pension transfers. Sweden, for example, has the highest level of government transfers and the lowest level of old-age income inequality, while Israel and the United States have the lowest levels of dependency on government transfers and the highest levels of income inequality. A notable exception is Canada, where public transfers represent only a moderate portion of elderly income, yet old-age income inequality is relatively low. These findings suggest that quality of public pension benefits does indeed play a role in explaining differences in old-age income inequality between industrialized nations, yet these variations are also likely influenced by other factors.     

Negative Effects of the Canadian GIS Clawback and Possible Mitigating Alternatives

Abstract

In Canada there are three main sources of government-provided retirement income: the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP), which have benefits and contributions based on earnings up to the Yearly Maximum Pensionable Earnings; Old Age Security (OAS), which is a fixed amount for most but does include a “clawback” of benefits for high-income individuals; and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), which is designed to supplement those persons with extremely low income. The annual GIS benefit is reduced, or clawed back, by 50 cents for every dollar of annual income the person has in retirement, including C/QPP and income from Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) and other savings. OAS benefits are not included in determining the GIS clawback.

The result of this is that low-income individuals who attempt to enhance their retirement replacement ratio actually see a decrease in government-provided support the more they save for retirement. Savings in an RRSP can effectively be taxed at more than 100% through corresponding reductions in the GIS, social housing, home care, GAINS (Ontario’s Guaranteed Annual Income Supplement), and other benefits that are based on one’s personal retirement income.

This paper explores alternatives to the 50% GIS clawback, including a basic GIS exemption, a GIS clawback rate lower than 50%, and a combination of the two. The goal is to improve the fairness of the GIS and reduce the disincentive to save for retirement, without increasing the overall cost of the program significantly.