Corruption and the Provision of Public Output in a Hierarchical Asymmetric Information Relationship

This paper develops a principal‐agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an honest politician may create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, but the latter creates more bribes. The model identifies a tradeoff between bribery and efficiency. This helps to reconcile some conflicting results on the implications of corruption for the size of the public sector. It also provides new results on the circumstances under which an improvement in the auditing technology is beneficial. The paper identifies conditions under which corruption is welfare enhancing. However, the paper also shows that under precisely these conditions private provision, even by an unregulated monopolist, would be better than public provision.     

OPTIMAL GROWTH IN A TWO‐SECTOR RSS MODEL WITHOUT DISCOUNTING: A GEOMETRIC INVESTIGATION*

This essay reports results on optimal growth in a two‐sector model with fixed coefficients, irreversible investment and no discounting. Under normalization, the model can be represented by two real numbers, but despite its deceptive simplicity, it admits rich transition dynamics and apparent pathologies that seem to have been missed in earlier work. From a methodological point of view, and in the light of recent work of Nishimura and Yano, this essay can also be seen as a further rehabilitation of geometric methods as an engine of analysis.     

Optimum Distribution-Free Tests and Further Evidence of Heteroscedasticity in the Market Model

In this paper several powerful distribution-free tests for heteroscedasticity are introduced and are used to test the hypothesis of constant variance in the market model. These tests are noted for their flexibility in specifying alternative hypotheses. It is found that the assumption of homoscedasticity is untenable for the majority of stocks analyzed. The implications of this finding for the efficient estimation of the parameters of the market model are also discussed.     

Existence of a Condorcet Winner When Voters Have Other‐Regarding Preferences

In standard political economy models, voters are “self‐interested” that is, care only about “own” utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have “other‐regarding preferences” (ORP), that is, in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit “envy” and “altruism,” in addition to the standard concern for “own utility.” We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.     

IMPACT OF TRADE SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA: A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX APPROACH

This paper discusses a new approach for studying sanctions based on multipliers derived from the Social Accounting Matrix. I apply the methodology to the South African case and discuss output effects and distributional impacts on factors and households. The results show that the effects of trade sanctions on the South African economy are significant.