On the Earnings and Price Momentum Strategies: Evidence from European Real Estate Firms

We test the performance and interaction between earnings and price momentum for European real estate companies by first making use of decile portfolios sorted on the previous 3- to 12-month returns, standardized unexpected earnings and a combination of both. Then, the relation is tested on a risk-adjusted basis employing a 3-factor asset pricing model and Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression analyses. Our analyses reveal several critical findings: (1) both price and earnings momentum are effective for European firms, the effect being stronger for the UK than EU firms; (2) unlike U.S. REITs, price momentum seems to dominate drift for European firms; (3) there is weak evidence for positive interaction between drift and price momentum, contrary to the U.S. evidence; (4) the performance of momentum strategies depends on the state of the economy, while controlling for systematic factors; (5) idiosyncratic risk of real estate property firms may influence the returns on drift and momentum factors.     

Junk bonds,life insurer insolvency,and stock market reactions: The case of first executive corporation

The First Executive Corporation was the largest failure in the history of the life insurance industry. The company was one of the most aggressive purchasers of junk bonds through the 1980s and was the first of several large failures in the staid life insurance industry. In this article, we examine the effect of First Executive's failure on the value of companies in the life insurance industry. We find that the price of other life insurance companies' stock is negatively affected by the earnings announcement that preceded First Executive's failure. The magnitude of an individual company's reaction to First Executive's loss varies according to the proportion of the company's assets invested in junk bonds, the proportion of the company's assests invested in real estate, and the financial strength of the company as measured by A.M. Best's rating.     

A REGRET-THEORETIC EXPLANATION OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY

This paper uses Regret Theory to explain some survey results on managers' dividend policy decisions under uncertainty. Regret Theory suggests that when an individual chooses an action from a number of uncertain alternatives, his decision is influenced by the potential post-decision regret (pride) he feels on his inabilty (ability) to select the option with the best outcome. Based on this premise, we argue that (1) the decision to pay dividends and simultaneously raise venture capital from external sources is attributable to managerial aversion for regret at the failure of a risky investment opportunity implemented with internal funds generated by a conservative dividend policy; and (2) the decision to support dividends with borrowed funds when earnings are declining is motivated by the prospect that an improvement in the firm's financial condition will make the managers proud that their judgment has helped avert a potential crisis for the firm without any wealth loss to its shareholders.     

FROM COMPETITION TO REGULATION: THE SIX-YEAR BATTLE TO REGULATE CALIFORNIA'S INSURANCE MARKETS

Abstract: The passage of California's Proposition 103 in November 1988 changed the State's regulatory structure for insurers from a competitive to a heavily regulated system. The six-year legal battle that followed resulted in several California Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court rulings and an ultimate implementation of rate roll backs on property-liability insurers on November 22, 1994. The study examines both property-liability and life insurers' returns. While only property-liability insurers are affected by the rale rollback and prior approval rate regulation, both life and property-liability insurers are affected by the proposition's other provisions. This paper examines the effect of successive changes on both types of insurance companies and analyzes the differential impact of the changes in regulatory structure.     

Underpricing and aftermarket performance of American depositary receipts (ADR) IPOs

American depositary receipts (ADRs) are negotiable instruments representing foreign company shares traded in US dollars in the US capital market. We present comparative analyses of the pricing and aftermarket performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by ADRs and a matching sample of US firms over the 1990–2001 period. Offered by large, well-known multinationals, ADR IPOs go through a detailed scrutiny, and incur significant costs, during the pre-IPO period to recast financial statements in conformity with SEC rules and the US GAAP. This mitigates the information asymmetry between the IPO firm and investors. We categorize the ADR issuing country as developed or emerging, and our sample includes several cases of privatization of state owned corporations. The analyses indicate that (1) ADR IPOs are significantly less underpriced than comparable US IPOs; (2) IPOs from developed countries are more underpriced; and (3) Privatization IPOs are less underpriced than non-privatizations. The lower underpricing of ADR IPOs persists even after differential IPO attributes, the traditional proxies for information asymmetry and, the unique characteristics associated with ADR IPOs, are accounted for. We conclude that extant literature offers only partial explanation for this puzzling phenomenon.     

Investor Protection,Investment Efficiency and Value: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

We examine the impact of improved investor protection due to cross‐listing on foreign firms’ investment decisions and firm value. While we find that cross‐listing increases firms’ capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions activities, cross‐listed firms also invest more in research and development, make better acquisition decisions, and have higher profitability compared to non‐cross‐listed firms. Moreover, cross‐listing is associated with better cash utilization by foreign firms for investments. These improvements in investments and cash utilization are more pronounced for firms cross‐listed on US exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor protection laws.     

Does IPO Pricing Reflect Public Information? New Insights from Equity Carve‐Outs

We examine the efficiency of initial public offering (IPO) pricing using a sample of over 300 equity carve‐outs from 1985 to 2009. The partial adjustment theory posits that the initial return of IPOs is predictable based on private information, but public information is fully incorporated. Prospect theory is consistent with both private and public information not being fully incorporated in the offer price. Our analysis confirms that both price update and initial return of carve‐out IPOs can be predicted based on the parent firm's returns during the prepricing and preissuing periods. Further, postissue ownership of the parent firm is associated with significantly higher price update and initial return, while IPOs where the majority of the proceeds are paid out register lower initial return. The size of the subsidiary and relative size of the offering are also significantly related to price update and initial return. These findings are consistent with prospect theory.     

On the Determinants of REIT Capital Structure: Evidence from around the World

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Using a sample of REITs from twelve countries around the world, we examine the determinants of REIT capital structure. We investigate...     

AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER REACTION TO DIVIDEND CUTS AND OMISSIONS

In this paper the proposition is tested that stock market reaction to a dividend change is a function of its information content. A multiple regression model is formulated to identify the factors that contribute significantly to the capital loss suffered by shareholders when firms decide to cut/omit dividends. Results indicate that, in conformity with the information content hypothesis, the announcement period capital loss induced by a dividend deduction significantly depends on the percentage change in dividends, the size and risk of the firm, and the price performance of the firm's stock in the immediately preceding period. The results further reveal that (1) simultaneous announcements of poor earnings cause larger capital losses; (2) prior announcements of loss/lower earnings, strikes, etc. attenuate the negative impact of dividend cuts; (3) managerial reassurances that the dividend reduction is growth-motivated produces a weakly favorable effect, and (4) institution of stock dividends concurrently with the dividend cut significantly reduces the negative valuation effect. It is concluded from the evidence that stock market reaction to managerial signals is a function of the perceived costs associated with these signals.