Gestaltung der Abschlussprüferhaftung – Implikationen theoretischer Modelle

Business scandals such as Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat have sparked intense discussions on the quality of corporate governance as well as the trustworthiness of statutory auditors. It is therefore no surprise that regulators have issued a large number of new regulations concerning auditing. The civil liability of external auditors has not changed in Germany, but such changes have already been announced by the German government. An increase in the existing liability cap in cases of negligent misconduct and extended third-party liability are planned. As a consequence, the results of analytical research on this topic are highly relevant. This paper summarises and comments on prior analytical research, in particular its assumptions and results, and focuses on important elements for the design of a liability regime. To this end, the paper addresses the questions of joint–and-several vs. proportionate liability rules, negligent vs. strict liability regimes, the extent of third party liability, and limited vs. unlimited liability.     

The formation and early development of German audit firms

This paper examines the emergence of audit firms in Germany through an analysis of contemporary sources. Special attention is paid to the range of services offered, their legal forms and ownership structure. In Germany, the demand for external audits developed because the corporate supervisory boards had been unable to fulfil their monitoring task satisfactorily. As a consequence of the major economic crisis of 1929-1931 and the collapse of large corporations caused by the fraudulent actions of managing directors, statutory audits for stock corporations were introduced in 1931. The first German audit and trust company, the Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, was established much earlier in 1890. Like other trust companies which emerged from 1905 onwards, it was owned by large banks. After the First World War, large commercial groups on the one hand, and the state on the other hand, started to form their own audit firms. Most of the audit and trust companies used the legal form of a corporation. Originally, the main activities of the trust companies were trustee activities and audits. Subsequently, they also offered tax and business advisory services. These features (a broad range of services offered, the corporation as the dominant legal form, and clients who are also owners) help us to understand key characteristics of modern German audit firms such as their limited liability to third parties.     

The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20

With the remarkable increases in the assets under management of private equity firms, the standard compensation arrangement of a 2% management fee plus 20% carried interest has raised concerns of a misalignment of interests between limited partners (LPs) and general partners (GPs). Using a proprietary data set that includes detailed fund terms of 210 PE buyout funds with vintage years between 1989 and 2012, the authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the evolution of fund terms. The authors report that PE fund terms have been remarkable mainly for their resistance to change, and that the only important force for bringing about reductions in percentage management fees has been the recent increase in fund sizes. But the modest cuts in management fees that have accompanied the increase in fund sizes have done little to address what appears to be a conflict of interest between LPs and GPs over the optimal PE fund size. As one possible solution to this conflict, the authors analyze a recent innovation by Bain Capital that involves considerably smaller management fees (say, 1%) and larger carried interest (as high as 30%). According to the authors, such terms have a good chance of becoming the new industry standard for two reasons: First, LPs have become increasingly “professionalized,” which has led to greater focus on GP compensation and ways of realigning their interests with LPs'. Second, the “signaling” benefits for those GPs willing to distinguish themselves by offering terms like “1 and 30” could encourage more GPs to move in this direction. In the authors' words, “For all but the most reputable and established PE firms, those GPs that do not offer the new terms may well be seen as signaling little confidence in their ability to do what they're being paid to do: namely, produce above‐market returns.”     

Asset market games of survival: a synthesis of evolutionary and dynamic games

The paper examines a game-theoretic model of a financial market in which asset prices are determined endogenously in terms of a short-run equilibrium. Investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules) depending on the exogenous states of the world and the observed history of the game. The main goal is to identify portfolio rules, allowing an investor to “survive,” i.e., to possess a positive, bounded away from zero, share of market wealth over an infinite time horizon. The model under consideration combines a strategic framework characteristic for stochastic dynamic games with an evolutionary solution concept (survival strategies), thereby linking two fundamental paradigms of game theory.     

The impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence-some evidence from Denmark

The Enron case has highlighted that the provision of management advisory services (MAS) can endanger auditor independence. Recently, a number of changes have not only been made to the relevant international and US regulations, but also to the Danish regulations in this area. Theoretical research explains the emergence of non-independence and demonstrates that the provision of MAS can decrease independence. According to the economic model of DeAngelo, the existence of client-specific quasi-rents impairs auditor independence. The provision of MAS increases quasi-rents and thus, is a threat to independence. Antle used an agency theoretical approach. Information asymmetries between auditor and client could lead to a moral hazard risk, i.e. the auditor could give up independence from client's management and accept payments for withholding detected errors and irregularities. The client's management could also use MAS to legally compensate the auditor for giving away independence.A large number of empirical studies have investigated the influence of MAS on the perceived independence of the auditor. Most of these studies were performed in English speaking countries and the majority found a negative impact. Sociological research reveals cultural differences between English speaking and Nordic countries, e.g. concerning the dimension ‘masculinity’. Thus, an empirical investigation of the impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence in Denmark is promising. It was found that shareholders, bank loan officers and journalists perceive a negative effect on auditor independence if MAS are provided. The recent liberalization in Denmark is inconsistent with this finding. Furthermore, it was shown that the type of MAS influences the degree to which auditor independence is perceived to be impaired. Thus, independence rules related to MAS should be differentiated. Additionally, the study ascertained that perceived auditor independence does not increase if MAS are provided by a separate department of the audit firm. An internal separation of the auditing and the consulting function within the same audit firm is not viewed as being beneficial in Denmark.     

Consumption paths under prospect utility in an optimal growth model

This paper studies the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model of optimal economic growth in the presence of loss aversion and habit formation. The representative agent's preferences for consumption can be gradually varied between the standard constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) case and Kahneman and Tversky's prospect utility. We find that the transitional dynamics of optimal consumption paths differ distinctly from the standard model, in particular consumption smoothing is more pronounced. We also show that prospect utility can cause the economy to remain in a steady state with low consumption and low capital.     

Die Wahlabhängigkeit wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen

Summary In the last years, some publications appeared where so-called political-economic cycles were postulated.Hubka andObermann in one of the last issues of Empirica tried to find empirical evidence for this theory from the economic development in Austria. An examination of the methods applied in this study shows: The result do not proof as a (secure) evidence for or against the existence of any cyclical setting of administered prices and public expenditures. Finally some conditions are discussed, which must be fulfilled to bring about cyclical economic policies; informational requirements are shown, which are important for empirical verification.     

Harrod's long‐range capital outlay as a stabilizer of Harrodian instability

Drawing on Harrod, Kalecki and Kaldor, this paper seeks to revive the view that ceteris paribus firms reduce investment if they have already built up high capacities relative to their assessment of the normal potential of their markets. This reaction introduces a fundamental stabilizing mechanism into the economy. The paper adapts the idea to a growth context and applies it to the neo‐Kaleckian baseline model with its Harrodian instability. It demonstrates that, in principle, a sufficiently strong feedback could stabilize the steady state.