The optimal exchange rate regime for a small country

This paper examines the welfare comparisons between a freely floating, a managed floating, and a pegged exchange rate regime. We compare the expected loss under these regimes by modifying and generalizing Hamada’s (2002) model to accommodate intervention policy. We consider the de jure and de facto classifications, where the former is defined by the officially stated intentions of the monetary authorities, while the latter is based on the actually observed behavior of the nominal exchange rate. We first examine the exchange rate regimes from the central bank’s policy stance and the actual exchange rate policy. Next we assume that the regime which the private sector perceives according to an official announcement may be different from the one adopted actually by the central bank. We examine nine combinations of the de jure and de facto regimes. We interpret that, whenever they are different, there is informational friction between the central bank and the private sector. We show that the welfare level of a small country under freely floating is no less than that under other regimes, and that with some restrictive conditions, the de facto pegged or de facto managed floating is close to freely floating. This partly explains “Fear of floating” and “Fear of pegging”.     

Mining History of Gamification Towards Finding Expertise in Question and Answering Communities: Experience and Practice with Stack Exchange

Recently, an online Q&A tool has become an essential part of individual communities and organizations of experts on specific topics. Using the answers to questions about specific topics will help such communities work more efficiently in their fields. Currently, Q&A online communities are adopting gamification to engage users by granting awards to successful users. In this paper, we investigate how to mine award achievement histories to find expertise. We propose the use of sequence analysis and clustering techniques. Specifically, we study the history of Stack Exchange, a large Q&A community that employs gamification. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of using award achievement history to find expertise in Q&A communities.     

Contributing for Myself,but Free riding for My Group?

Many real‐world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision‐makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision‐makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision‐makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.     

Farewell to the salaryman? The changing roles and work of middle managers in Japan

The 1990s and 2000s witnessed significant organizational change in Japanese firms and accompanying readjustments to the employment system. Such changes potentially have major implications for middle managers, or salarymen, in Japanese corporations. A survey of human resource managers and middle managers in eight medium sized Japanese organizations pointed to fairly significant, if not radical, change. This did, indeed, impact upon middle managers in those organizations. While the middle managers felt reasonably secure in their jobs, the nature of their jobs had reportedly changed, with a greater range of tasks, work intensification, longer hours, greater stress, more accountability, and a worsening work–life balance.     

Parallel Consultant-Guided Search with Crossover

Consultant-guided search (CGS) is a recent metaheuristic method. This approach is an algorithm in which a virtual person called a client creates a solution based on consultation with a virtual person called a consultant. In this study, we propose a parallel CGS algorithm with a genetic algorithm’s crossover and selection, and calculate an approximation solution for the traveling salesman problem. We execute a computer experiment using the benchmark problems (TSPLIB). Our algorithm provides a solution with less than 3.3% error rate for problem instances using less than 6000 cities.     

Mediating Internal Competition for Resources*

We consider a model of internal competition, where projects developed by agents with different preferences compete for resources in an organization. Allowing a manager—who has moderate preferences—to control the allocation of resources has benefits when preferences are not too diverse. In particular, the manager acts as a mediator, forcing agents to compromise when competing projects succeed, thus providing better insurance to agents and increasing their effort. Our framework provides a theoretical foundation for two influential views of a manager—as the “visible hand” that allocates resources, and as a “power broker” who resolves conflict in an organization.     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

A risk-sensitive stochastic control approach to an optimal investment problem with partial information

We consider an infinite time horizon optimal investment problem where an investor tries to maximize the probability of beating a given index. From a mathematical viewpoint, this is a large deviation probability control problem. As shown by Pham (in Syst. Control Lett. 49: 295–309, 2003; Financ. Stoch. 7: 169–195, 2003), its dual problem can be regarded as an ergodic risk-sensitive stochastic control problem. We discuss the partial information counterpart of Pham (in Syst. Control Lett. 49: 295–309, 2003; Financ. Stoch. 7: 169–195, 2003). The optimal strategy and the value function for the dual problem are constructed by using the solution of an algebraic Riccati equation. This equation is the limit equation of a time inhomogeneous Riccati equation derived from a finite time horizon problem with partial information. As a result, we obtain explicit representations of the value function and the optimal strategy for the problem. Furthermore we compare the optimal strategies and the value functions in both full and partial information cases.

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Self‐screening Effects of Monitoring: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment in the Swedish Temporary Parental Benefit Program

Monitoring and screening have been shown to be important to reduce moral hazard in social insurances. This paper empirically investigates whether monitoring in the Swedish temporary parental benefit program affects future benefit take‐up. Identification is based on the fact that parents’ benefit applications are monitored randomly by the insurer. The estimation results show that parents who are monitored are less likely to apply again in the near future.     

Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns

We analyze the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns. Both the principal and the agent can be either good or biased; the good players prefer the correct decision, while the biased ones prefer a high action even though it may be wrong. An evaluator who forms the principal's reputation may or may not be able to observe who makes the decision. When the evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority, the principal shares the credit and blame with the agent. Although delegation can improve the quality of decision making because the agent has better information, it may also hurt the good principal's reputation because the high action may be taken by the biased agent while the blame will be shared when it is wrong. Thus, the good principal has a tendency to keep too much authority to maintain her reputation. By contrast, when the evaluator can observe the allocation of authority, delegation becomes a signaling device for the good type of principal to differentiate herself from the biased one. This results in an excessive allocation of authority toward the agent.