MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Backtesting Value-at-Risk: A Duration-Based Approach

Financial risk model evaluation or backtesting is a key partof the internal model's approach to market risk management aslaid out by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. However,existing backtesting methods have relatively low power in realisticsmall sample settings. Our contribution is the exploration ofnew tools for backtesting based on the duration of days betweenthe violations of the Value-at-Risk. Our Monte Carlo resultsshow that in realistic situations, the new duration-based testshave considerably better power properties than the previouslysuggested tests.     

Beyond Self-Regulation: Towards A Critique of Self-Regulation As A Control Strategy For Hazardous Activities*

After highlighting some of the key issues and positions in the debate around appropriate preventive regulation, the paper presents a number of observations directed at the proponents of greater self-regulation. These observations confront directly a number of familiar, but often unchallenged, arguments for self-regulation. More centrally we address claims concerning, the extent to which the chemicals industries have a good and improving ‘safety’ record; and whether the sector consists of companies both motivated and capable in the context of effective crisis and disaster management. Lastly, the paper sets out some ‘new directions’ for the nature and role of regulation in the effective prevention of crises. Thus the paper indicates a number of regulatory developments which are distinct from any shift towards greater self-regulation, but which would result in more effective crisis and disaster prevention in the UK chemicals industries and, indeed, beyond that specific sector.     

Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

We study Bayesian mechanism design in the context of the siting of noxious facilities. Under incomplete information, we characterize optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and cost sharing of the facility. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian–Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomenon disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.      

International Comparisons of Australia's Infrastructure Performance

International benchmarking has played a key role in the reform of Australia's infrastructure industries by promoting indirect or yardstick competition, in highlighting the need for further reform and building a consensus for implementing necessary changes. The international benchmarking of infrastructure performance by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) between 1991 and 1996 did much to focus attention on the need for change. The BIE examined the performance of eight infrastructure industries relative to international best practice: electricity, rail freight, telecommunications, the waterfront, road freight, coastal shipping, aviation and gas supply. Performance comparisons concentrated on indicators of price, service quality, labour productivity and capital productivity. This paper reviews and summarises the performance comparisons the BIE undertook over the last three years of its infrastructure benchmarking program. The BIE international benchmarking program provides a useful role model for other countries wanting to seriously pursue reform of their infrastructure industries.     

Cultural Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations

We analyze aspects of the structure of organizational culture.We show that old and culturally uniform organizations are proneto cultural inertia, that is, they are reluctant to adopt adifferent culture in response to a change in the environment.Cultural uniformity can be beneficial because the associatedinertia ex post protects and therefore ex ante encourages culture-specificinvestments by agents. We also explore the model's implicationsfor such issues as cultural uniformity within an organization,cultural heterogeneity across organizations, the destabilizingeffect of growth and mergers, and the conflicts arising in themanagement of culture.     

The Economic Relevance of Environmental Disclosure and its Impact on Corporate Legitimacy: An Empirical Investigation

In determining its environmental disclosure strategy, a firm's management faces a tension between responding to the information needs of financial markets and maintaining its legitimacy within the community. In this paper, relying on information economics and legitimacy theory, we explore how firms resolve this tension. Results show that a firm's environmental disclosure enhances the quality of analysts' information context, which ultimately allows them to make better forecasts. Moreover, financial analysts seem to be able to decipher environmental information, discounting discourses that are inconsistent with a firm's underlying environmental performance. We find also that a firm's environmental disclosure serves another purpose, as it influences how its other stakeholders (beyond financial ones) perceive its legitimacy. Such enhanced legitimacy reduces the information uncertainty faced by financial analysts. Our results suggest also that both economic‐based environmental disclosure and sustainable development and environmental disclosure are useful to analysts in making their forecasts and enhance a firm's legitimacy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Semitractability of optimal stopping problems via a weighted stochastic mesh algorithm

In this paper, we propose a Weighted Stochastic Mesh (WSM) algorithm for approximating the value of discrete‐ and continuous‐time optimal stopping problems. In this context, we consider tractability of such problems via a useful notion of semitractability and the introduction of a tractability index for a particular numerical solution algorithm. It is shown that in the discrete‐time case the WSM algorithm leads to semitractability of the corresponding optimal stopping problem in the sense that its complexity is bounded in order by with being the dimension of the underlying Markov chain. Furthermore, we study the WSM approach in the context of continuous‐time optimal stopping problems and derive the corresponding complexity bounds. Although we cannot prove semitractability in this case, our bounds turn out to be the tightest ones among the complexity bounds known in the literature. We illustrate our theoretical findings by a numerical example.     

Private Property or Several Control: A Rejoinder

Following Mises’s foundational paper, ‘Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth’, first published in 1920, writers in the Austrian tradition have argued that socialism is impossible, because under socialism there would be no private property in the means of production, and without that private property economic calculation could not take place. In the article ‘Economic Calculation: Private Property or Several Control?’, published in this journal in 2015, I argued that this was mistaken. Not private property, but several control, was required for economic calculation, and since several control is consistent with public ownership, this argument for the impossibility of socialism fails. Another article, ‘Private Property and Economic Calculation: A Reply to Andy Denis’, by Bylund and Manish, published in this issue of the Review of Political Economy, defends the traditional interpretation of Austrian reasoning, contending that my argument fails. My rejoinder re-states the issues, addressing, and, ultimately rejecting, the Bylund and Manish critique.