Allegations of Sexual Misconduct: A View from the Observation Deck of Power Distance Belief

Journal of Business Ethics - We seek to understand how third-party observers respond to allegations of sexual transgressions, whether their responses vary and if so why, how they determine...     

Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice

We develop a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face. The decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them, and these assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world. At each stage, the decision maker chooses the strategy that she assesses to give the highest payoff. She updates her assessments adaptively. We show that such behavior leads to maxmin choices. We also consider the decision maker who experiences shocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8.     

THE PRIVATE COMPANY DISCOUNT

When appraisers or investment bankers value privately held companies by making comparisons to otherwise similar public companies, they typically apply a discount. Most practitioners attribute this discount mainly to the relative illiquidity of private companies; and, for this reason, they value private companies based on empirical studies designed to measure illiquidity discounts. But this assumption and the valuations based upon it are likely to be unreliable because private companies are valued differently than public companies owing to a variety of other, more "fundamental" factors that have caused the firm to stay private rather than choosing to list on an exchange.
This article presents an alternative framework to estimate the discount for private companies that computes four separate valuation multiples for a set of private transactions and a comparable set of public transactions. After comparing these four sets of multiples for both domestic and foreign firms, the authors reach the following conclusions:

• ▪

   Domestic private companies are acquired at an average 20–30% discount relative to similar public companies when using earnings (more precisely, EBIT and EBITDA) multiples as the basis for valuing the transactions. The average discount measured using price- to-book value multiples are somewhat lower, and there are no significant differences between the revenue multiples of acquired private and public companies.

       

A sequential approach to cross-impact analysis

A knowledge of the likelihoods of future scenarios is needed for planning in industry and government. The approach in this article employs the knowledge and the experience of “experts”, in the form of subjective probabilities, to determine the likelihood of the events. The necessary and sufficient conditions that the elicited information from the experts must satisfy in order to consistently compute the likelihoods of the scenarios are derived. A sequential procedure is developed that uses this information in generating the probabilities of the scenarios. Approximation schemes and sensitivity analysis are recommended to implement the approach with less time, effort, and cost.     

Accounting-based versus market-based cross-sectional models of CDS spreads

Models of financial distress rely primarily on accounting-based information (e.g. [Altman, E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23, 589–609; Ohlson, J., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 19, 109–131]) or market-based information (e.g. [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449–470]). In this paper, we provide evidence on the relative performance of these two classes of models. Using a sample of 2860 quarterly CDS spreads we find that a model of distress using accounting metrics performs comparably to market-based structural models of default. Moreover, a model using both sources of information performs better than either of the two models. Overall, our results suggest that both sources of information (accounting- and market-based) are complementary in pricing distress.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Buying decisions in four Indian organizations

This article addresses the organizational buying structures and systems in India. The intent was to identify the emerging trends and changes that have taken place over a period of time in buying designs. The impact of these trends and changes on organizational marketers is considered.The four firms studied are large Indian firms, which will allow the readers of other countries to compare the situations between a developing country like Indian and their own. Case method of data collection has been used to capture both the details and perspective.The Indian buying scene has changed a great deal in the last decade. It has become more professional, systematic, and demanding. Failure to recognize this may lead to business failures.     

Extrinsic Rewards,Intrinsic Motivation,and New Product Development Performance

Reward structures can have a significant impact on the performance of new product development (NPD) teams. However, there are several gaps in our understanding of how different types of extrinsic rewards influence the creative performance of NPD teams. Drawing on key theoretical objectives for advancing rewards-creativity research in general, and NPD research in particular, this study incorporates a cognitive and behavioral view of rewards use. In so doing, we distinguish between three kinds of extrinsic rewards: financial, recognition, and social (based on their properties). We then draw upon self-determination theory to hypothesize the differential effects of three types of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic task motivation, and subsequently the creative performance of NPD teams. The proposed framework is tested using two rounds of survey data from 238 members of 64 NPD teams in the high-tech industry. Results of a multilevel structural equation modeling (MLSEM) analysis show that financial rewards have a negative relationship with intrinsic task motivation, while recognition and social rewards have a positive influence. Complexity of the product being developed not only helps to mitigate the negative effects of financial rewards on intrinsic task motivation, but it also reduces the positive effects of social rewards on intrinsic task motivation. Intrinsic task motivation is found to have a positive effect on NPD creative performance in terms of both the developed product’s degree of innovation and its quality. Theoretical and managerial implications are explored.     

A microstructure examination of trading activity following stock splits

In a study of 1,131 stock splits spanning the period 1983–1989 we observe an increase in the number of trades as well as a reduction in the mean trade size following the split. Combined with earlier reported findings of an increase in the number of shareholders postsplit, we conclude that the number of liquidity traders increases after a split. We confirm the previously observed increase in the bid-ask spread following a split, and upon decomposition of the spread find an increase in its adverse selection component in the postsplit period. This is consistent with the finding by Brennan and Hughes (1991) of an increase in the number of analysts following a stock after a split. Further, observing a decrease in market depth following a split we determine that Kyle-type models incorporating diverse private information for informed traders most correctly describe the nature of security trading. Since this decrease in postsplit market depth is not related to the trading volume or the split factor, we reject price correction explanations for stock splits.