A New Regulatory Paradigm for the Digital Sector in Europe

The new regulatory framework in the digital sector in Europe is likely to fall short of expectations. A fragmented digital market with insuffi cient incentives for investment is the probable outcome. European regulators should abandon their approach in favour of a new and more flexible set of ideas discussed in this paper.     

Operations of a Pension Fund after the Asian Crisis: The Thai Experience*

During and after the Asian crisis, institutional investors and pension funds in Asian financial markets have been confronted with a number of difficulties effecting their performance and the way they carry out their role within the national pension system. We analyze these problems by comparing the actual investment policy of an institutional investor with an optimal investment strategy derived from the insights of modern portfolio theory. We also analyze whether the organizational set‐up of a pension fund allows it to adequately perform its role within the pension system. As an example, we examine the operations of the Thai Government Pension Fund (GPF). We find that allowing international investments and reducing restrictions on equity investments while lowering the implicit requirements for investments in government debt would allow the GPF to further diversify its investment risk and to increase its risk‐adjusted return. We also show that some changes in the governance structure of the GPF would lower the occurrence of conflicts of interest for the management and increase the efficiency of the GPF operations.     

The division of labour and market structure

Most firms produce most of the time under conditions of substantial economies of scale. The division of labour, according to Adam Smith the mainspring of wealth, is intrinsically an economies of scale phenomenon. Market structure in most industries in characterized by a small number of suppliers and a larger number of customers. I explain this law of small numbers as the equilibrium of two forces: the deconcentration effect of imitation and the market spliting effect of further refinements in the division of labour by innovation. A deconcentrated market creates larger incentives for market splitting (product differentiation) by innovation than a concentrated market. But market splitting raises concentration in the market and it raises the number of different markets in the economy. Before the economies of scale of old products are fully exploited, new products are being offered which again are produced under conditions of economies of scale.     

US trade policy in an unbalanced world economy

Both the national as well as the international debate on US trade policy are overshadowed, and strongly influenced, by the large external inbalances of major trading nations. What do these disequilibria mean for US trade policy? Moreover, is the USA losing comparative advantage in agriculture and high-technology manufacturing? Do industrial policies in other countries distort American trade?     

The Austrian current account deficit: Driven by twin deficits or by intertemporal expenditure allocation?

The evidence presented in the paper rejects the twin deficit hypothesis for the Austrian current account balance during the last two decades. The results are based on an estimate of a vector error correction model including quarterly data for the current account balance and potentially relevant variables driving its dynamics. We compute the variance decomposition of the current account's forecast error and its generalized impulse responses to shocks in the innovations of the system. The results in favor of intertemporal expenditure reallocation cannot be reproduced within a second analysis including the current account and a measure of net output, however. The estimated implicit current account balance, interpreted as the discounted expected change in future net output, does not follow the actual behaviour of the current account. First version received: June 1999/Final version received: March 2001     

Optimale Aufteilung des Stichprobenumfangs bei mehreren Merkmalen

Zusammenfassung Es wird gezeigt, daß sich das vonNeyman undTschuprow für ein einziges Merkmal gelöste Problem der optimalen Aufteilung des Stichprobenumfangs auf vorgegebene Schichten auf ein nichtlineares Programm mit linearen Restriktionen und nichtlinearer Zielfunktion zurückführen läßt. Auf Grund der Konvexitätseigenschaft der Zielfunktion ergibt sich, daß das Minimum der Zielfunktion (Minimum der Streuung des Stichprobenmittels ) stets eindeutig ist. Der beiNeyman undTschuprow mögliche Fall, daß sich in derh-ten Schicht ein Stichprobenumfang ergibt, der größer als der Umfang in der Gesamtheit ist, kann hier nicht auftreten.Durch Einführung einer verallgemeinerten Streuung wird das Problem der optimalen Aufteilung bei vorgegebener Schichtung imk-dimensionalen Merkmalsraum aufk Merkmale verallgemeinert. Es wird gezeigt, daß diese verallgemeinerte Streuung (=Zielfunktion eines nichtlinearen Programms) im allgemeinen nicht über dem ganzen konvexen Bereich der zulässigen Lösungen konvex (von unten) ist. Ein Teilbereich des zulässigen Bereichs, über dem die Zielfunktion konvex ist, wird angegeben. Schließlich werden hierzu vergleichende Ergebnisse gebracht.     

Probleme gleichgewichtsorientierter Inflationserklärungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungHerrn Doz. Abele und Herrn Dr. Beinsen bin ich für die kritische Durchsicht dieser Arbeit zu Dank verpflichtet. Doz. Abele hat mir vor allem allgemeine Hinweise zum Stand der Theorie gegeben, die mich zu dieser Arbeit erst so recht anregten.     

A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.