Policy for Poverty Alleviation and Income Redistribution with Quasi-Public Goods

This paper proposes a theoretical framework for a poverty‐alleviation program with quasi‐public goods and presents four main effects. First, this policy succeeds in self‐selection, which identifies low‐productive persons under imperfect information and allows them to receive at least the minimum income. Second, we can observe income redistribution by this scheme without any taxes. Third, the program contributes cost‐effectiveness in many cases. Finally, it makes clear that this policy is suitable, especially in areas where low‐income people are concentrated.     

THE CLOSED-LOOP EFFECTS OF MARKET INTEGRATION IN A DYNAMIC DUOPOLY

This paper develops a dynamic game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider welfare effects of market integration, i.e. reductions in transport costs. We show that welfare under trade is unambiguously less than welfare under autarky for any level of transport costs, which is impossible in static models where trade is profitable if the transport cost is low enough. This is because the negative effect through closed-loop property of feedback strategies dominates the positive effects.     

TESTING THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF A RISK AVERSION PARAMETER IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET*

This paper empirically investigates the structural stability of a risk aversion parameter in a model in which risk premia exist in forward foreign exchange. To maximize his or her lifetime utility, a representative investor invests in a riskless bond denominated in each major currency: dollar, DM and pound. We test the structural stability of the risk aversion parameter in Japanese data using Euler equations. The results show that the risk aversion parameter was invariant from 1973 to 1991.     

中国城市及城市群技术效率差异研究

笔者通过随机前沿分析方法,测算中国不同地理范围的城市技术效率值并对其影响因素做出分析.研究发现,大规模生产资料的投入仍然是我国城市经济增长的主要决定因素；中国城市的生产效率并未出现逐年改进；东部城市群的技术效率一定程度上优于中西部,单个城市的技术效率差异更加明显,现阶段的资源型小城市技术效率优于大中型城市；外资能够与城市技术效率改进形成良性互动,国内资本则反之.     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.     

The Reserve Army Effect, Unions, and Nominal Wage Growth

This paper analyzes the reserve army effect from a perspective which integrates propositions from the social structures of accumulation and regulation approaches. The magnitude of the reserve army effect on nominal wage growth ought to vary according to the subperiods 1958–1970, 1970–1980, and 1980–1987, and also according to subsectors with different unionization rates. This hypothesis is tested empirically by estimating the effect of demand pressure variables on nominal wage growth for heavily, moderately, and lightly unionized sectors. The results generally confirm the hypothesis, while at the same time showing clear differences in the impact of collective bargaining on the reserve army effect between 1958–1970 and 1980–1987.     

Information Losses in a Dynamic Model of Credit

This paper examines dynamic information losses associated with loan terminations. We assume that the aggregated returns of current borrowers contain information about the mean returns to future borrowers. In a competitive loan market, the value of this information is not fully internalized by individual borrowers and lenders, and loan decisions fail to be first best. Introducing heterogeneous borrowers, who know their own risk characteristics better than lenders, safer borrowers are less willing to borrow when risk premia rise. As they cease borrowing, the information generated in credit markets becomes noisier and this tends to increase risk premia. The model produces alternating and persistent periods of “tight” and “loose” credit.     

EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION ON PRODUCTIVITY AND INDUSTRY GROWTH: A STUDY OF STEEL REFINING FURNACES*

This paper examines the impact of new technology on plant‐level productivity in the Japanese steel industry during the 1950's and 1960's. We estimate the production function, considering the differences in technology between the refining furnaces owned by a plant. We find that a more productive plant was likely to adopt the new technology and that the adoption would be expected to occur immediately following the peak of the productivity level achieved with the old technology. The adoption of the new technology primarily accounted not only for the industry's productivity slowdown but also for the industry's remarkable growth.     

QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION,WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.     

INTER‐REGIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH A VERTICAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT *

This paper incorporates the vertical structure of governments into a mixed oligopoly model by considering the public firms owned by different government levels, namely, a state‐owned public firm and a local public firm. As in the existing literature, a state‐owned public firm is assumed to maximise the welfare of an entire country comprising two regions. On the other hand, a local public firm is assumed to maximise the welfare of only one region. In such a setting, we find that when the central and local governments independently consider whether to privatise their respective public firms, only the state‐owned public firm should be privatised. Furthermore, we show that for the welfare of a country, a mixed oligopoly with a vertical structure of government can be more desirable than a mixed oligopoly without it.