Equity in Poverty Program Evaluations

Poverty‐reducing programs often use indicators other than household income to transfer resources to the poor which has important implications in terms of equity of the program. This paper offers a decomposition methodology to analyze the horizontal and vertical equity components of a redistribution policy for subgroups defined according to policy‐relevant characteristics. Our measures are derived by comparing the cost of inequality in terms of equally distributed equivalent poverty gaps in the pre‐transfer income and post‐transfer income distributions. An application to the poverty‐reducing program Oportunidades in Mexico in 2006 reveals that the use of indicator variables more strongly correlated with pre‐transfer incomes in rural households can improve the redistributive effect while it also points out the difficulties of the program in targeting different levels of support among the poor, both within and between groups.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

THE IMPACT OF LOW‐INCOME HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ON HOUSEHOLD ENERGY INSECURITY

The impact of the low‐income home energy assistance program (LIHEAP), the single largest energy assistance program available to poor households in the United States has received little rigorous attention. If LIHEAP participation significantly improves low‐income household energy security, funding cuts or eliminating the program could negatively impact the poor. This article empirically estimates the impact of LIHEAP on household energy security. The results indicate participation in LIHEAP significantly increases energy security in low‐income households. Simulations suggest that elimination of the current household energy‐assistance safety net will decrease the number of low‐income energy secure households by over 17%. (JEL I38, Q48)     

Foreign Capital in a Growth Model

Within the mechanism of endogenous growth, this paper empirically investigates the impact of financial capital on economic growth for a panel of 60 developing countries, through the channel of domestic capital formation. By estimating the model for different income groups, it is found that while private FDI flows exert beneficial complementarity effects on the domestic capital formation across all income‐group countries, the official financial flows contribute to increasing investment in the middle income economies, but not in the low income countries. The latter appears to demonstrate that the aid‐growth nexus is supported in the middle income countries, whereas the misallocation of official inflows is more likely to exist in the low income countries, suggesting that aid effectiveness remains conditional on the domestic policy environment.     

Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime‐Dynastic Income Concepts*

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth‐tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes. In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by high‐income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.     

How Does Fiscal Consolidation Impact on Income Inequality?

In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Using a panel of 18 industrialized countries from 1978 to 2009, we find that income inequality significantly rises during periods of fiscal consolidation. In addition, while fiscal policy that is driven by spending cuts seems to be detrimental for income distribution, tax hikes seem to have an equalizing effect. We also show that the size of the fiscal consolidation program (in percentage of GDP) has an impact on income inequality. In particular, when consolidation plans represent a small share of GDP, the income gap widens, suggesting that the burden associated with the effort affects disproportionately households at the bottom of the income distribution. Considering the linkages between banking crises and fiscal consolidation, we find that the effect on the income gap is amplified when fiscal adjustments take place after the resolution of such financial turmoil. Similarly, fiscal consolidation programs combined with inflation are likely to increase inequality and the effects of fiscal adjustments on inequality are amplified during periods of relatively low growth. Our results also provide support for a non‐linear relationship between inequality and income and corroborate the idea that trade can promote a more equal distribution of income.     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

Artificially Low Interest Rates as Export Promotion Policy

We reconsider the effects of a policy that sets an artificially low interest rate. Such a policy involves a combination of an interest rate ceiling and a rationing rule that assigns a priority‐lending status to export sectors over domestic service sectors. We demonstrate that the policy works as an export‐promotion policy, and improves national income. Furthermore, under some conditions, the policy expands the domestic service sector, despite the reduced amount of funds owing to the rationing rule. Finally, the artificially low interest rate improves national welfare.     

Redistributive Taxation and Public Education

This paper examines the relative effectiveness of publicly provided ‘white collar’ professional (university) education versus ‘blue collar’ vocational training in achieving the government's redistributive goals. Although professional education directly benefits high‐skill high‐income workers and vocational training directly benefits low‐skill low‐income workers, we show that either provision of more professional education or less vocational training than in the first‐best allocation is optimal along the second‐best Paretian frontier since this facilitates incentive compatibility in labor supply decisions. Accordingly, the observation that public higher education expenditures in most countries favor universities is not necessarily inconsistent with an optimal redistributive program.     

POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL: OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION*

This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two‐type OLG model when individuals’ relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low‐ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low‐ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within‐generation and upward comparisons.     

What Determines Sectoral Trade in the Enlarged EU?

In this paper, we estimate a sectoral gravity model for trade within a heterogeneous trade bloc, the enlarged EU, comprised of a high‐income group (wealthiest EU), a middle‐income group (Greece, Portugal and Spain), and a low‐income group (new Central and Eastern European member countries). The estimation was conducted on sectors with different degrees of scale economies and skill‐intensities in the presence of transport costs. The results offer support for the call to incorporate trade theories based on both endowments and scale economies. In addition, whilst integrating poorer countries is beneficial for all of the participants in the bloc, there is still a role for a redistribution policy, such as the EU's Regional Policy, which should comprise a mix of policies, focusing on both income and education/skills, together with infrastructure development.     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

我国居民收入不平等的主要原因：市场还是政府政策？

市场因素和政府收入再分配政策是决定一国居民收入不平等程度的两个重要因素。本文采用中国家庭收入调查（China Household Income Project ,CHIP）住户数据,计算出我国居民市场收入基尼系数与可支配收入基尼系数,并同发达国家进行比较,借此探讨目前我国居民收入不平等是由市场力量造成的,还是政府收入再分配政策力度不足的结果。研究发现,从市场收入基尼系数来看,我国与发达国家之间的差距并不大。由此认为,政府收入再分配政策效果不明显是导致我国居民收入分配不平等状况较发达国家严重的主要原因。加大转移支付等再分配政策力度是缓解和改善目前我国居民收入不平等的主要途径。     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

Trade Policy and Global Uncertainties: How to Promote an Open Trade Agenda

EU trade policy initiatives since 1995 offer better products at lower prices with estimated annual savings of up to €60 billion annually, which is especially beneficial for low‐income households who spend a larger share of income on basic commodities. If trade is so beneficial, why is there so much discontent? The paper argues that a convincing communication strategy in support of trade policy is key for trade policy legitimacy and gives the example of the European Commission's #FTAcomes2town platform based on firm‐level data. Politicians can zoom in across all EU members to find examples of small companies in their constituency exporting and creating jobs due to a trade measure.     

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN URBAN CHINA BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM—AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME

This study investigates the redistributive effect of social security reform in urban China using the nationally representative urban household surveys of 1995 and 2002. The main findings are as follows. First, public pension is the main income for the elderly in urban China. The majority of people aged 60 and over (72% in 1995 and 82% in 2002) receive a pension. Second, the social security system in urban China has increased the income of low‐income and older age groups and reduced the relative poverty rate. However, the redistributive effect did not offset the expanding income inequality, which resulted in the Gini coefficient of redistributed income in 2002 being higher than that in 1995. Third, during 1995 and 2002, both low‐income and high‐income groups received a positive net benefit from the social security system, but the net benefit increased with income. The Chinese social security system lacks progressivity in contribution, and does not favor the poor in terms of benefits. Fourth, assuming that the reformed policy was applied to public sector employees, the long‐term redistributive effect of the pension system for the working population, calculated using their lifetime income, is larger. (JEL D31, H55, I38)     

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.     

Relative Income Position and Happiness: Are Cabinet Supporters Different from Others in Japan?

During the period of 2001–2006, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) adopted a market‐oriented policy under the Koizumi cabinet. Using data covering the Koizumi and first Abe cabinets, the present paper attempts to examine whether the effects of relative income differ between supporters and non‐supporters of the Koizumi cabinet. Key findings are as follows: within the Koizumi cabinet period, a relatively low‐income position is negatively related to happiness for non‐LDP supporters but not for LDP supporters. However, under the period of the first Abe cabinet, the difference in the effect of relative income for LDP supporters and others disappears. These results imply that an expectation of market outcomes leads to a difference in the effect of relative income position on happiness levels.     

Good Jobs,Bad Jobs and Redistribution*

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy‐maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a “good jobs” sector due to the capture of quasi‐rents by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for income equality, the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the policy‐maker may instead choose to tax investment.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.