The Role of Ethical Standards in the Relationship Between Religious Social Norms and M&A Announcement Returns

Journal of Business Ethics - Prior studies suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms have higher ethical standards. In this study, we examine whether the ethical...     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Risk preferences in multi-period consumption models, the equity premium puzzle, and habit formation utility

The relationship between the relative risk aversion measure for the utility function for consumption and that for the value function for wealth is a derived relationship whose properties depend on how consumption and wealth are defined and measured. This fact together with information concerning estimates for these two relative risk aversion measures is used to give another perspective on the equity premium puzzle, and to explain why it is that the habit formation utility function is effective in eliminating that puzzle. A time separable utility function that can serve as an alternative to the assumption of habit formation is also presented.     

Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations

Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously.     

Understanding the Economic Factors Influencing Farm Policy Preferences

A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers' preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models.     

State Trading Enterprises as an Impediment to Improved Market Access: The Case of the Korean Rice Market

The trade and welfare effects of tariffs are well known. Less well known, and more difficult to analyze, are the economic effects of state trading enterprises (STEs). Despite STEs in importing countries having the potential to limit market access, they are no longer on the agriculture agenda in the Doha Round Negotiations in the WTO, because some Members have asserted that importing STEs do not distort international trade. We evaluate this assertion through the use of a theoretical model of an STE, which is calibrated to data for the Korean rice market. We show that this STE does distort international trade by restricting market access relative to a Cournot benchmark, and that it affects the domestic and international distribution of social welfare. This finding permits the conclusion that an important opportunity is being missed in the negotiations to improve market access, because importing STEs are not on the agenda.     

Profutures. The birth of the strategic prospective and futures studies international network for applied methodology

On 30 September and 1 October 1993, the European Commission's Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (PROMPT) organized a meeting, in collaboration with LIPS-CNAM (the Laboratory for Investigation in Prospective and Strategy of the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris), on the theme: ‘Methods and tools in strategic prospective: retrospective and perspectives’. The main outcome of this meeting, which brought together 23 international experts from the strategic prospective-futures studies field at the Ispra campus of the EC's joint Research Centre, was the creation of a new network, devoted to applied methodology, to be known as Profutures.