Bundling and Menus of Two-Part Tariffs

Inducing self-selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.     

以史为鉴，美国经济或尚未转危为安

【美国《华尔街日报》5月5日】金融系统最痛苦的时刻或许已经过去，但美国经济的麻烦或许才刚刚开始。     

Current Issues in the Analysis of Commercial Real Estate

This paper identifies and discusses a number of current issues regarding our understanding of commercial real estate markets. These issues include: 1) accurate estimation of the quantity and location of our nation's commercial space; 2) an understanding of the linkage between the space and capital markets for commercial real estate; 3) identification of the macroeconomic factors that affect the rate of return on commercial property and whether local market factors also affect the rate of return; 4) problems associated with measuring the return characteristics of equity investments in commercial property (including measures of the diversification benefits and inflation-hedging abilities of this asset class); 5) a better understanding of rental markets, including good measures of changes in effective rents over time; and 6) examination of the rationale for ownership of commercial space by corporate users. This paper reviews recent research related to these questions and suggests future research that should prove to be fruitful.     

Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation in Hong Kong: Reply

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

Regulatory Monitoring and the Impact of Bank Holding Company Dividend Changes on Equity Returns

This paper examines the impact of announcements of dividend changes by bank holding companies (BHCs) on equity returns. Many empirical studies of dividend behavior reveal positive market responses to dividend increases, which have been interpreted as confirmation of the signalling theory of dividend behavior. These studies typically focus on “large” changes, however. We argue that BHCs allow for a stronger test of signalling theory because regulatory monitors, in effect, “certify” dividend signals. Consequently, even “small” dividend increases should result in positive abnormal equity returns. Using the event study methodology, our results generally confirm this hypothesis for a sample covering the period 1973–1987.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

COORDINATING PRODUCTION AND DISPOSAL OF COMMODITY STOCKPILES WITH APPLICATION TO AUSTRALIA'S WOOL INDUSTRY

Following the dismantling of a price-support program, a central bureaucracy is left with a commodity stockpile to dispose. It happened with wheat and feed grains in the U.S. in 1986 and wool in Australia in 1991. It soon may happen in Europe with grains, manufactured dairy products and other commodities which have supported prices. Obvious policies include privatising the stockpile, disposing of the stockpile by a central bureaucracy and quarantining the stockpile from the market. Each policy imposes constraints on disposal based, perhaps, on judgments of political acceptability to producers and government. In this article, optimal rules for production and disposal are derived and solved and a new policy is proposed. Then the model is applied to the disposal of Australia's wool stockpile. Results show that centralised disposal will almost always be preferred to privatisation of the stockpile. Centralised disposal is also preferred to quarantining the stockpile if interest rates are high, but quarantining is preferred if interest rates are low. Centralised disposal and quarantining are not optimal, however. Optimal production and disposal combines the efficiency of privatisation with the market power of centralised disposal. To achieve this, the property rights to the stockpile can be redefined using payment-in-kind certificates and individual transferable entitlements. The payment-in-kind certificates assign ownership of the stockpile to individual producers who then make both production and disposal decisions. The individual transferable entitlements allow the industry to produce efficiently and extend market power from the central bureaucracy to producers. For the Australian wool stockpile, optimal production and disposal would benefit the industry by an estimated $2.7 billion.