Contagion risk in the interbank market: a probabilistic approach to cope with incomplete structural information

One lesson of the financial crisis erupting in 2008 has been that domino effects constitute a serious threat to the stability of the financial sector, i.e. the failure of one node in the interbank network might entail the danger of contagion to large parts of the entire system. How important this effect is, depends on the exact topology of the network on which the supervisory authorities have typically very incomplete knowledge. In order to explore the extent of contagion effects and to analyse the effectiveness of macroprudential measures to contain such effects, a reconstruction of the quantitative features of the empirical network would be needed. We propose a probabilistic approach to such a reconstruction: we propose to combine some important known quantities (like the size of the banks) with a realistic stochastic representation of the remaining structural elements. Our approach allows us to evaluate relevant measures for the contagion risk after default of one unit (i.e. the number of expected subsequent defaults, or their probabilities). For some quantities we are able to derive closed form solutions, others can be obtained via computational mean-field approximations.     

Welfare State, Market Imperfections, and International Trade

Within a two-sector-two-country model of trade with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, a more generous welfare state in one country increases welfare in that country and can have positive spillover effects on the other. Furthermore, synchronised expansions of social security are more welfare enhancing than unilateral ones. Our results counter the fears that a race to the bottom in social standards may result from the ‘shrinking-tax-base’ entailed by international capital mobility. While affecting trade patterns and income distribution, capital mobility interacts with welfare state policies in increasing welfare, even when capital flows out of the country that initiates the shock.

Foreign direct investment,tax competition and social expenditure

The aim of this paper is to make a first step towards studying the role of social expenditure and its interaction with corporate taxation in determining the destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Using panel data for 18 OECD countries and measuring the extent of social welfare policies by the (public social expenditure)/GDP ratio, we find strong support for the conjecture that redistributive social welfare state policies are valued by multinationals as, for instance, they may signal a government's commitment to social stability.     

(De)Unionization,Trade Liberalization and Selection

The effects of union bargaining power and trade liberalization on industry selection are analysed within a two‐country heterogeneous‐firm model with firm‐specific unions and inter‐country asymmetries in size and union power. Union bargaining power is shown to have more nuanced effects on efficiency and welfare than what typically suggested by conventional wisdom. While the higher wages resulting from an unfavourable union power differential harm firms' competitiveness, by reinforcing standard market access mechanisms, they give rise to aggregate demand effects that can act as a catalyst for industry and result in a pro‐variety effect.     

Temporary social dumping,union legalisation and FDI: a note on the strategic use of standards

This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as a policy instrument to attract inward foreign direct investment. While its presence may discourage a foreign multinational (MNE) from locating in the host country, unionisation is an important rent-extracting instrument for the host country. We show that if the MNE benefits from dynamic effects, the host country government may have an incentive to adopt temporary social dumping: banning the union in the short run to extract higher rents in the future. However, if the government can use a fiscal instrument in conjunction with union legalisation, the former can circumvent the need to engage in social dumping.     

Tourism competitiveness of Italian municipalities

Quality & Quantity - The purpose of the paper is the study of tourism competitiveness and its determinants for the almost 8000 Italian municipalities. The partial least squares method...     

Should I stay or should I go? Foreign direct investment,employment protection and domestic anchorage

This paper examines theoretically and empirically how employment protection legislation affects location decisions of multinationals. We depart from the “conventional wisdom” by examining not only the effect of protection on inward foreign direct investment (FDI), but also a country’s ability to “anchor” potential outward investment. Based on our simple theoretical framework, we estimate an empirical model, using data on bilateral FDI and employment protection indices for OECD countries, and controlling for other labour market institutions and investment costs. We find that, while an “unfavourable” employment protection differential between a domestic and a foreign location is inimical to FDI, a high domestic level of employment protection tends to discourage outward FDI. The results are in line with our conjecture that strict employment protection in the firm’s home country makes firms reluctant to relocate abroad and keeps them “anchored” at home.     

Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour markets choose between producing an intermediate good in-house and outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship-specific investment in developing the intermediate. The paper sheds light on the issue of whether international outsourcing offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of domestic unions and on the existence of intra-industry wage dispersion. We show that outsourcing typically increases marginal costs even when it lowers union wages. Despite this, more powerful unions increase the incentive to outsource.     

Job Search Channels,Neighborhood Effects,and Wages Inequality in Developing Countries: The Colombian Case

This paper analyzes the relationship between social networks and the probability of finding a job. We explore geographic closeness as the social interaction to explain the job search function. Using data from Colombia in 2009, we calculate how neighborhoods have an effect on the channel used to find a job (social network versus no social network). In addition, we study how wage premium relates to using a social network in finding a job, exploring the inequality that can arise using a different job search method. Our results show that neighborhood affects the individual's job search method and that referred workers earn less at the bottom of the wage distribution with respect to non‐referred workers. Colombia presents persistent high levels of informality and inequality with the existence of spatial clusters that impose important social and economic costs with strong informational asymmetries on the job market.