Customer satisfaction and service domains: a further development of PROSERV

Quality & Quantity - This paper aims to represent that levels of customer satisfaction of tourist accommodation are an important prerequisite when the goal is building a loyal relationship with...     

Tourism competitiveness of Italian municipalities

Quality & Quantity - The purpose of the paper is the study of tourism competitiveness and its determinants for the almost 8000 Italian municipalities. The partial least squares method...     

Liberal parentalism

What normative constraints should bind parents (or policy makers) if they intervene in the choices of children (or constituencies) whose preferences evolve over time? For a sophisticated child who anticipates correctly his preference change, we prove that generically there exist parental interventions that are Pareto improving over the backward induction path that the child will follow on his own. If, in contrast, the child misperceives his future preferences, Pareto improving interventions might not exist, and even nudges might be painfully sobering. The parent may then choose to minimize the maximal disappointment along time that her benevolent intervention would cause.     

Examining the process of performance measurement system design and implementation in two Italian public service organizations

In the last two decades, the adoption of new public management (NPM) practices in the public sector has increased as public sector organizations seek to improve efficiency, effectiveness and public accountability. We present case study findings of a NPM initiative to implement balanced scorecard (BSC) performance measurement systems in two Italian public sector organizations. This study considers the question of whether the BSC development process can be effectively translated into the public sector context. Our findings highlight the importance of aligning the development of performance management systems with a greater understanding of the internal and external environment of public sector organizations. Our results further emphasize the significant role of emergent stakeholders and management culture for the success of NPM performance management initiatives.     

Magic mirror in my hand … How trade mirror statistics can help us detect illegal financial flows

Misreporting tricks of different sorts applied to the transfer of goods between different countries are typically exploited by criminals worldwide for money laundering ends. The main international anti‐money laundering organisations started paying attention to this phenomenon, dubbed “trade‐based money laundering” (TBML), a long time ago, but the failure to develop appropriate analytical tools has reportedly dogged preventive actions. Nonetheless, literature has widely advocated the possibility that the analysis of inconsistencies in mirrored bilateral trade data could provide some help. By building on previous contributions in the field, this work sets up a model factoring in the main structural determinants of discrepancies between mirrored data concerning Italy's 2010 to 2013 external trade at a highly detailed (6‐digit) level of goods classification for each partner country. Point estimates of freight costs are used to net each observation of the corresponding cif/fob discrepancy. The regression estimates are then deployed in order to compute TBML risk indicators at a country/4‐digit product level. Based on the indicators, rankings of countries and product lines can be compiled, which may be used for a risk‐driven search of potential illegal commercial transactions.     

MONOPOLISTIC LOCATION CHOICE IN A TWO‐SIDED HOTELLING MODEL

We analyse the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two arbitrarily located platforms on a two‐sided market. By extending the traditional Hotelling framework, we show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one‐sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single‐ or multi‐homing. In the mixed case (one side single‐homes, the other one multi‐homes), the optimal platform locations are in line with the respective symmetric case. If the monopolist is restricted to choosing the same location on either side of the market, the optimal locations are determined by the relative profitability of the market sides.     

Defending Gibrat’s Law as a long-run regularity

According to Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the period examined. While earlier studies tended to confirm the Law, more recent research generally rejects it. This article reconciles these two streams of literature, taking into account the role of market selection and learning in reshaping a given population of firms through time. Consistently with previous studies, we find that Gibrat’s Law has to be rejected ex ante, since smaller firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts. However, a significant convergence toward Gibrat-like behavior can be detected ex post. This finding is an indication that market selection “cleans” the original population of firms, so that the resulting industrial “core” does not depart from a Gibrat-like pattern of growth. From a theoretical point of view, this result is consistent with those models based on passive and active learning, and can be seen as a defense of the validity of the Law in the long-run.

The determinants of firm start-up and entry in Italian producer services

In this paper the determinants of new firm formation in the producer services are studied by using National Security data on firms with at least one employee. Two ratios are computed and analysed for the 95 Italian provinces: an index of fertility represented by the share of new enterprises on employees, and a birth rate represented for each province by the ratio between new enterprises and resident population. On examination of the determinants of this process, we found that the average wage rates and the ratio of utilized credit to the total line of credit negatively affect both indexes, and that both indexes are affected positively by sector growth and by a measure of small firm presence. The index of fertility is also explained by a dummy variable which identifies for each province those policies which are aimed at fostering the process of new firm formation. The birth rate is instead affected by a dummy variable which is equal to one for the provinces in which the chief towns of each region are located and zero otherwise, and by the potential demand for new producer services arising from the industrial sector.