Information,Asset Prices,and the Volume of Trade

A dynamic equilibrium model is constructed in which agents with access to different information sets participate in the capital market. Agents must use the equilibrium price of capital to make optimal forecasts of the return to holding capital. Examples show that the volume of trade, as well as the price of capital, can be highly correlated with a measure of the information content of prices. This measure of information is the difference between the unconditional entropy of the dividend and the entropy of the dividend conditional on observing the price of capital.     

International Transmission Channels of U.S. Quantitative Easing: Evidence from Canada

The U.S. Federal Reserve responded to the great recession by implementing quantitative easing, or large‐scale asset purchases, when its conventional policy rate reached the zero lower bound. We assess the international spillover effects of this quantitative easing program on the Canadian economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) framework, by considering a counterfactual scenario in which the Federal Reserve's long‐term asset holdings do not rise in response to the recession. We find that U.S. quantitative easing boosted Canadian output, mainly through the financial channel.     

Integrating the Social Structure of Accumulation and Social Accounting Matrix with the Social Fabric Matrix

The purpose here is to elaborate on the social fabric matrix approach (SFM‐A), and to assess the possibility of integrating it with the social structure of accumulation and the social accounting matrix.The SFM‐A to analysis and policy evaluation allows for cultural values, social beliefs, institutions, attitudes, technology, and the ecological system to be modeled into a system. The guiding goal is to work toward a more complete model of the provisioning process.     

Why Are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.     

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

This article explains how economic analysis can be applied to understand environmental problems and to suggest appropriate policies to deal with these problems. Economic analysis is performed using static and dynamic models, and one‐person and several‐person game theoretical models. Policy recommendations include the control of industrial pollution in China and the regulation of world CO₂ emission through the application of a resolution by the United Nations.     

Credit Losses in Australasian Banking

We analyse the determinants of bank credit losses in Australasia. Despite sizeable credit losses over the past two decades, ours is the first systematic study to do so. Analysis is based on a comprehensive dataset retrieved from original financial reports of 32 Australasian banks (1980–2005). Credit losses rise when the macro economy is weak. Asset markets, particularly the equity market, are also important. Larger banks provide more for credit losses while banks with high cost-income-ratios show greater loan loss provisions. Strong loan growth translates into significantly higher credit losses with a lag of 2–4 years. Finally, the results show strong evidence of income smoothing activities by banks.     

Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms

Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because workers have diverse preferences over firm policies, while investors all support wealth maximization. However, the source of the asymmetry between capital and labor remains unclear. We resolve this puzzle by arguing that because financial capital is exceptionally mobile, capital markets induce unanimity. The lower mobility of human capital implies that labor markets are monopolistically competitive and hence that unanimity cannot be expected in labor‐managed firms. Moreover, such firms are vulnerable to takeover by investors, while capital‐managed firms are substantially less vulnerable to takeover by workers.