U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets

This paper analyzes how U.S. monetary policy affects the pricing of dollar‐denominated sovereign debt. We document that yields on dollar‐denominated sovereign bonds are highly responsive to U.S. monetary policy surprises—during both the conventional and unconventional policy regimes—and that the passthrough of unconventional policy to foreign bond yields is, on balance, comparable to that of conventional policy. In addition, a conventional U.S. monetary easing (tightening) leads to a significant narrowing (widening) of credit spreads on sovereign bonds issued by countries with a speculative‐grade credit rating but has no effect on the corresponding weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for a basket of currencies from the same set of risky countries; this indicates that an unanticipated tightening of U.S. monetary policy widens credit spreads on risky sovereign debt directly through the financial channel, as opposed to indirectly through the exchange rate channel. During the unconventional policy regime, yields on both investment‐ and speculative‐grade sovereign bonds move one‐to‐one with policy‐induced fluctuations in yields on comparable U.S. Treasuries. We also examine whether the response of sovereign credit spreads to US monetary policy differs between policy easings and tightenings and find no evidence of such asymmetry.     

Official Demand for U.S. Debt: Implications for U.S. Real Rates

We estimate a structural term-structure model of U.S. real rates, where arbitrageurs accommodate demand pressures exerted by domestic and foreign official investors. Official demand affects rates by altering the aggregate price of duration risk, and thereby bond risk premiums. Although foreign central banks' demand contributed to reduce long-term real rates mainly in the years prior to the global-financial crisis, the Federal Reserve's demand lowered rates during the quantitative easing period. Overall, the two-factor model, augmented to account for changing liquidity conditions, offers a good representation of real rates during the 2001–16 period; however, we flag some caveats and possible extensions.     

Central bank announcements of asset purchases and the impact on global financial and commodity markets

We present evidence on the effects of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England since 2008. We show that announcements about these purchases led to lower long-term interest rates and depreciations of the U.S. dollar and the British pound on announcement days, while commodity prices generally declined despite this more stimulative financial environment. We suggest that LSAP announcements likely involved signaling effects about future growth that led investors to downgrade their U.S. growth forecasts lowering long-term US yields, depreciating the value of the U.S. dollar, and triggering a decline in commodity prices. Moreover, our analysis illustrates the importance of controlling for market expectations when assessing these effects. We find that positive U.S. monetary surprises led to declines in commodity prices, even as long-term interest rates fell and the U.S. dollar depreciated. In contrast, on days of negative U.S. monetary surprises, i.e. when markets evidently believed that monetary policy was less stimulatory than expected, long-term yields, the value of the dollar, and commodity prices all tended to increase.     

The Asymmetric Impact of Monetary Policy on Currency Markets

This study examines whether tightening and easing actions of the Federal Reserve symmetrically influence currency markets. Using daily data on four exchange rates from 1989 to 2001, we find that changes in the Fed's interest rate target are positively related to changes in the value of the dollar. Surprises associated with monetary tightening have a larger announcement effect as compared to monetary easing for the British pound, German mark, and Canadian dollar, whereas the opposite is true for the Japanese yen. The results appear to be driven by the reactions of foreign central banks to Fed actions, the Fed's credibility as a policymaker, and by the change in the Fed's disclosure policy beginning in 1994.     

Quantitative Easing in the 1930s

During the 1934–39 recovery from the U.S. Great Depression, overnight interest rates were usually at a lower bound. Meanwhile, American monetary authorities followed policies related to today's debates on quantitative easing: they tried to stabilize yields on Treasury bonds with open market operations; they created rapid growth in high‐powered money; and they allowed transitory factors to affect high‐powered money. Effects of these policies on bond yields reveal a portfolio effect of short‐duration asset supply on term premiums. This portfolio effect helps explain why high‐powered money growth was associated with recovery of real activity over 1934–39.     

The open economy consequences of U.S. monetary policy

We consider the open economy consequences of U.S. monetary policy, extending the identification approach of Romer and Romer (2004) and adapting it for use with asset prices. Intended policy changes are orthogonalized against the economy’s expected future path, which captures any effects from open economy variables. Estimated from a set of bilateral VARs, the dynamic responses of the exchange rate, foreign interest rate, and foreign output are consistent with recent work that identifies U.S. policy via futures market changes and a priori impulse response bounds. We compare the two approaches, finding important commonalities. We also outline some advantages of our approach.     

再析美国金融危机前的利率政策

全球金融危机与美国货币政策的变化密不可分,从低利率货币信贷扩张的流动性过剩到高利率的流动性紧缩,使宏观经济产生剧烈波动,前期低利率带来过剩的流动性,后期利率的提高造成巨量房地产泡沫的破灭。让美联储无视资产泡沫的原因是美联储货币政策一贯秉持的"泰勒规则"指导原则没有纳入资产价格因子,致使美联储货币政策调控失误。     

The effects of U.S. quantitative easing on South Africa

This paper investigates the impact of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy on the economy of South Africa, particularly during the period of quantitative easing and thereafter from 2009 to 2018. A VAR model, including South Africa’s inflation, output, a stock market index, exchange rate, and South Africa’s policy rate is examined to determine the impact of the Federal Reserve’s actions. Our results show that the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programs had only slight overall effects on South Africa’s economy. However, the way monetary policy is measured appears to have important effects for studies of international monetary spillovers as the results differ depending on the type of monetary policy measure used.     

Hot Money and Quantitative Easing: The Spillover Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy on the Chinese Economy

We develop a factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FA‐VAR) model to estimate the effects that unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy and economic policy uncertainty have on the Chinese housing, equity, and loan markets. We find the decline in the U.S. policy rate since the Great Recession has led to a significant increase in Chinese housing investment. One possible reason for this effect is the substantial increase in the inflow of “hot money” into China. The responses of Chinese variables to U.S. shocks at the zero lower bound are different from those responses in normal times.     

美国货币政策溢出效应、中国资产价格波动与资本账户管理

本文以2016年美国加息事件为背景,研究美国货币政策对中国资本流动、资产价格和宏观经济的影响。基于小国开放动态随机一般均衡模型,本文梳理了美国货币政策溢出效应的具体传导渠道,发现国外利率升高后,资本流动具有外部性,导致国内资产价格下跌,其通过金融加速器进一步使国内投资下降、资产价格进一步下跌,从而使得国内资产预期回报进一步下降,加剧资本外流。基于政策和福利分析,本文发现资本账户管理可以有效缓解国外利率冲击对经济波动的影响,同时会提高货币政策的独立性,但也会影响国民财富的最优配置。因此,最优的资本账户管理应同时兼顾宏观审慎和效率两个方面。     

International channels of the Fed's unconventional monetary policy

Previous research has established that the Federal Reserve's large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) significantly influenced international bond yields. We use dynamic term structure models to uncover to what extent signaling and portfolio balance channels caused these declines. For the U.S. and Canada, the evidence supports the view that LSAPs had substantial signaling effects. For Australian and German yields, signaling effects were present but likely more moderate, and portfolio balance effects appear to have played a relatively larger role than in the U.S. and Canada. Portfolio balance effects were small for Japanese yields and signaling effects basically nonexistent. These findings about LSAP channels are consistent with predictions based on interest rate dynamics during normal times: Signaling effects tend to be large for countries with strong yield responses to conventional U.S. monetary policy surprises, and portfolio balance effects are consistent with the degree of substitutability across international bonds, as measured by the covariance between foreign and U.S. bond returns.     

Estimating the Evolution of Money’s Role in the U.S. Monetary Business Cycle

We assess money’s role in the post‐WWII U.S. business cycle by employing both fixed‐coefficient and rolling‐window Bayesian estimations of a structural model of the business cycle with money. Our empirical evidence favors a specification with drifting parameters for money‐consumption nonseparability and the Federal Reserve’s reaction to nominal money growth. The role of money is estimated to have been important during the 1970s and declined afterward. The omission of money produces severely distorted impulse response functions (relative to the model with money). Money is found to be important in replicating the U.S. output volatility during the Great Inflation.     

美联储“量化宽松”货币政策的原因、影响与启示

为应对全球金融危机,美联储实施了非常时期的量化宽松货币政策。本文对美联储实施该政策的原因、积极和消极影响进行了深入分析。同时,美联储未雨绸缪,提出该政策的退出机制,对我国今后一段时期如何在经济逐步启稳后把握恰当的时机和节奏实现适度宽松货币政策的及时转向,防范通货膨胀和资产泡沫风险具有非常重要的启示。     

What Accounts for the Changes in U.S. Fiscal Policy Transmission?

Using vector autoregressions on U.S. time series for 1957–79 and 1983–2004, we find government spending shocks to have stronger effects on output, consumption, and wages in the earlier period. We try to account for this observation within a DSGE model featuring price rigidities and limited asset market participation. Specifically, we estimate the structural parameters of the model for both periods by matching impulse responses. Model‐based counterfactual experiments suggest that most of the changes in fiscal policy transmission are accounted for by increased asset market participation and the more active monetary policy of the Volcker–Greenspan period.     

Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy Uncertainty

We document that a trading strategy that is short the U.S. dollar and long other currencies exhibits significantly larger excess returns on days with scheduled Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. We show that these excess returns (i) are higher for currencies with higher interest rate differentials vis‐à‐vis the United States, (ii) increase with uncertainty about monetary policy, and (iii) increase further when the Federal Reserve adopts a policy of monetary easing. We interpret these excess returns as compensation for monetary policy uncertainty within a parsimonious model of constrained financiers who intermediate global demand for currencies.     

FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations

We explore empirically the theoretical prediction that public information acts as a focal point in the context of the U.S. monetary policy. We aim at establishing whether the publication of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) inflation forecasts affects the cross‐sectional dispersion of private inflation expectations. Our main finding is that publishing FOMC inflation forecasts has a negative effect on the cross‐sectional dispersion of private current‐year inflation forecasts. This effect is found to be robust to another survey data set and to various macroeconomic controls. Moreover, we find that the dispersion of private inflation forecasts is not affected by the dispersion of views among FOMC members.     

Japan's Deflation and the Bank of Japan's Experience with Nontraditional Monetary Policy

This paper offers a brief summary of nontraditional monetary policy measures adopted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) during the last two decades, especially the period 1998–2006, when the so‐called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative easing (QE) were put in place. The paper begins with a typology of policies usable at low interest and inflation rates. They are: strategy (i), management of expectations about future policy rates; strategy (ii), targeted asset purchases; and strategy (iii), QE. Alternatively, QE may be decomposed into a pure attempt to inflate the central bank balance sheet, QE0, purchases of assets in dysfunctional markets, QE1, and purchases of assets to generate portfolio rebalancing, QE2. Strategy (ii), when nonsterilized, is either QE1 or QE2. Using this typology, I review the measures adopted by the BOJ and discuss evidence on the effectiveness of the measures. The broad conclusion is that strategies (i) and (ii) have affected interest rates, while no clear evidence exists so far of the effectiveness of the pure form of strategy (iii), or QE0. Strategy (ii) has been effective especially in containing risk/liquidity premiums in dysfunctional money markets; that is, QE1 has been effective. The effectiveness of QE2, however, is less clear‐cut. The strategies, however, have failed to bring the Japanese economy out of the deflation trap so far. I discuss some possible reasons for this and also implications for the current U.S. situation.     

Global Banks,Financial Shocks,and International Business Cycles: Evidence from an Estimated Model

This paper estimates a two‐country model with a global bank, using U.S. and euro area (EA) data. Empirically, a model version with a bank capital requirement outperforms a structure without such a constraint. A loan loss originating in one country triggers a global output reduction. Banking shocks matter more for EA macro variables than for U.S. real activity. Banking shocks account for about 2–5% of the unconditional variance of U.S. GDP and for 3–14% of the variance of EA GDP. During the 2007–09 recession, banking shocks accounted for about 15% of the fall in U.S. and EA GDP, and for more than a third of the fall in EA investment and employment.     

The Pre‐FOMC Announcement Drift

We document large average excess returns on U.S. equities in anticipation of monetary policy decisions made at scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the past few decades. These pre‐FOMC returns have increased over time and account for sizable fractions of total annual realized stock returns. While other major international equity indices experienced similar pre‐FOMC returns, we find no such effect in U.S. Treasury securities and money market futures. Other major U.S. macroeconomic news announcements also do not give rise to preannouncement excess equity returns. We discuss challenges in explaining these returns with standard asset pricing theory.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.