CAP Forum on Forensic Accounting in the Post‐Enron World: Education for Investigative and Forensic Accounting*/FORMATION ET JURICOMPTABILITÉ

Recent financial scandals have raised the awareness that accountants should be alert to potential fraud and other economic disputes and can provide significant assistance in preventing, investigating, and resolving such matters. Forensic accountants provide these services with knowledge of court requirements and proceedings so that effective legal action is possible, even though most actions are concluded without the involvement of the courts. Although forensic accounting was growing in importance even before Enron and the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, the ensuing tightening of the securities regulations in both Canada and the United States triggered recognition that accounting students and professionals need a fuller understanding of fraud and other economic crimes, and how to find, prevent, and resolve them, as well as the career choices that could be involved. While some of this material is covered in auditing texts and courses, emerging expectations will require the enhancement and restructuring of forensic accounting education within university programs, and will encourage more interest in graduate specialist professional designations. This paper has two objectives: to offer insights into the design and delivery of forensic accounting programs, and into the availability of professional programs; and to provide some exploratory evidence on the type of services currently rendered by investigative and forensic accountants in Canada.     

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS ON THE ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OF ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT STUDENTS IN SECOND‐YEAR MICROECONOMICS

This paper analyses the impact of educational interventions made in the first‐ and second‐year microeconomics courses on academic development students' final mark in the second‐year course. It also addresses issues of methodology, specification, and statistical analysis with respect to other studies in the field. The results suggest that the educational interventions in the first‐year had a positive impact on the academic performance of the academic development cohort, relative to the mainstream cohort for the first period (2000‐2002). The results also suggest that the educational interventions introduced in the second period (2003‐2005), in the form of voluntary workshops, improved the academic performance of the academic development and mainstream cohorts.     

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

This study analyzes wage patterns over time among California electronics employers. While the range of wages paid is substantial, employers on average make only small departures from market wage that are not pervasive across occupations or persistent across time. Employers appear able to change employment levels without affecting wages. Internal wage relativities also appear flexible. Differences between administered wage scales and actual wages paid are used to distinguish wage policy from market outcomes.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re-examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum-welfare tariff will exceed maximum-revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum-welfare tariffs versus maximum-revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.     

The Impact of In-Substance Defeasance on Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth

This paper hypothesizes and tests the argument that a defeasance transaction initiates a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders. Our empirical tests provide compelling evidence of bondholder gains, but no support for shareholder losses when a firm defeases debt. We speculate that the insignificance of the loss to shareholders is primarily due to the size disparity between the value of defeased debt and the market value of outstanding equity, since the suggested economic merits of defeasance appear unfounded. Although we cannot prove an agency motivation for defeasance, we find a very high correlation between compensation tied to earnings and defeasing debt at a book gain.