Capital Flows to Latin America (2003–17): A Critical Survey from Prebisch’s Business Cycle Theory

ABSTRACT

The economic literature on capital flows to developing countries has shared two important commonalities since the 1990s. Published works (whether they focus on the external situation or stress the domestic determinants of capital flows) tend to assume a beneficial effect of capital inflows, which leads to an improvement of peripheral institutions, whose deficiencies are ostensibly the main cause of economic turmoil and/or failure in attracting capital flows, in continuity with New Institutional Economics. In doing so, mainstream economists deliberately overlook the asymmetric characteristics of the international monetary system and the persisting hegemony of dollar. Raul Prebisch’s pioneering work on business cycles in Latin America provide an alternative view, one capable of amending the existing mainstream literature. On the one hand, Prebisch stressed the destabilizing role of capital inflows on Latin American economies, particularly short-term speculative capital. On the other hand, Prebisch designed a set of counter cyclical monetary policies in order to contrast capital volatility, particularly during downturns. An analysis of stylized facts shows that, when correctly updated, Prebisch’s theory has remarkable explanatory potential when applied to Latin America’s current economic and financial situation.     

债务违约、社会责任与政府支持

转型期中国，地方国有企业作为地区经济发展的一股中坚力量，当其发生债务违约时，作为实际控制人的地方政府究竟是否愿意提供支持，会优先选择哪些企业提供支持，政府的支持行为是否会影响到信贷资源的配置效率呢?为得到验证，文章选取2007-2016年沪深A股地方国有上市企业作为研究样本，实证分析了地方国企发生债务违约后，地方政府的支持行为及其对信贷资源配置效率的影响。研究结论表明：第一，地方国企发生债务违约后，地方政府会提供更多的"支持"，且支持额度与债务违约额呈显著正相关关系；第二，债务违约前，承担了更多社会责任（环保投资、捐赠以及就业等）的地方国企，在债务违约后可相应地获得更多的地方政府支持；第三，违约企业，尤其是得到更多政府支持的违约企业可获得更多的信贷资源，而其经营业绩却往往更差。由此表明政府干预一定程度上降低了信贷资源配置效率。     

Hi-tech start-ups: legitimacy challenges and funding dynamics

Studies on the legitimacy challenges faced by hi-tech start-ups are still scarce, leaving room for research, and policymaking debate. Legitimacy issues may become difficult to face for hi-tech firms in comparison with other start-ups, because they work in an extreme environment where the technological challenges are at the edge of the scientific possibility. The paper proposes a conceptual model to grasp the relevance of three legitimacy drivers of the hi-tech start-ups for investment decisions. We investigated the ability of 30 hi-tech start-up firms to obtain financial resources from the US investors, employing a set-theoretic approach and carried out fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Our findings clarify that the funding decisions of US investors are driven by the location of headquarter and R&D of hi-tech start-ups and by the educational experience of the founders. Our study has significant theoretical, practical, and policymaking implications.     

A hybrid information approach to predict corporate credit risk

This study proposes a hybrid information approach to predict corporate credit risk. In contrast to the previous literature that debates which credit risk model is the best, we pool information from a diverse set of structural and reduced‐form models to produce a model combination based on credit risk prediction. Compared with each single model, the pooled strategies yield consistently lower average risk prediction errors over time. We also find that while the reduced‐form models contribute more in the pooled strategies for speculative‐grade names and longer maturities, the structural models have higher weights for shorter maturities and investment grade names.     

Honesty in Environmental Regulation

This paper analyzes the determination of the optimal environmental regulatory policy under imperfect competition when the firms differ in their polluting technologies and degree of honesty. We show that more honesty does not necessarily imply lower social losses. The effect of honesty in social welfare depends not only on the degree of honesty measured by the proportion of honest firms and their particular cost features but also on the industry structure.     

Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.